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Thomas Aquinas
Typically, he

is

has long been understood to have reconciled faith and reason.

understood as having provided justification for

particularly, that the Five

laith

becomes a species

success of the Five

Ways prove

ot justified belief,

Ways

justified belief, at least as

has

its

own

it

is

I

Under

and the justification for

(or, alternatively,

evidence). In this dissertation,

faith

the existence of God.

faith

understood

in

this interpretation,

faith rests

on the success of other

argue that Aquinas’s account of

by means of proof,

upon

justificatory

faith is

not one of

contemporary philosophy. Instead.

basis for epistemic “reasonableness”

-

the

I

argue,

a reasonableness that does not

derive from ordinary evidence nor proof. Rather than requiring evidence accessible to
the natural light of reason. Aquinas holds that faith has

which
faith

results

from the

light

its

soil

of faith. Aquinas “Aristotelianizes”

has the Aristotelian epistemic virtue of certitude, and

and Aristotelian reason,

own

at least as Aristotle

in so

of “evidence” - that

faith

and argues

doing reconciles

that

faith

was understood by Medieval philosophers.

This reconciliation resolves important tensions between Aristotelian science and
Christian doctrine. Further,

I

examine three contemporary accounts of what counts

v

as

an epistemically "responsible" belief
(namely, justified

belief. practical rationality

and

warrant) and argue that under Aquinas's
account, faith should be counted as
rational.

and

in

an important, though modified sense, as

vi

justified.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FAITH AND REASON

1.1.

I

hat there might be

to recognize than

two, even

if

it

is

it

is

The problem of faith and reason

some

sort of

to formulate

"problem ot

— certainly

there

is

faith

and reason

some

sort ot tension

only superficial. Part of the difficulty

perhaps easier

is

between the

in explicating the nature

of this

tension resides in the fact that opinions about what constitutes faith and what
constitutes

reason have changed over the

last

2,000 years, and the tension has been observed for

nearly as long as there has been Christian
st

in the 2

century the same as in the 2

nd

faith.

or the

Is

the tension between faith and reason

th
1

?

A

further difficulty

is

that

what

counts as an acceptable solution has also changed, and such changes are not completely
explicable in terms of changing accounts of faith and/or reason. For instance,

contemporary philosophers or theologians
advocates)

may

(e.g.,

some

contemporary creation science

hold that the beliefs of faith are “rational” because they meet the

standards of modem science; however, to Medieval theologians

who had

very different

standards for “science” such a solution would be unacceptable.

Even though

we

there

shall try to limit the

is

no uniform account of faith amongst religious

scope of the problem of faith and reason by constraining our

consideration of faith to Christian faith (even though there

among

believers,

Christians about the nature of faith).

And though

it

is

also

seems

much disagreement
that nearly every

theological or philosophical text that surveys accounts
of faith has

categorizing accounts,

Hick

in

we

shall further limit the

from fides,

is

it

identified with a cognitive act or state in

encompass

1

either

We

shall take as a

to excoriate

it.

said to

criterion for

know God

faith

and reason

any account of

is

to find

faith (including drinking babies" blood, orgies,

when he

real

one side

and

goods. Karl Marx, for instance,

claimed, “[Religion]

is

the

abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people

happiness.”

3

On

the part of early Christians, reliance

perceived as a diminishment of trust in
viciousness. Tatian

(c.

1

God

(faith as fiducia),

50-170) exemplifies

has been free from vain boasting?”

4

this position

And

opium of the people.
is

required for their real

on philosophical reasoning was

thing have you produced by your pursuit of philosophy?

and contributed

when he

Who

says,

to

“What noble

of your most eminent

he continues, providing a

philosophers and their vices, implying that the practice of philosophy

in

list

of notable

each case has

contributed to moral turpitude. And, of course, Christians have always held that

salvation requires faith, so that

fiducia one
,

or

one or both of these meanings.

from achieving true or

exemplifies this later view

men

is

Later secular critics found moral fault with Christianity in that faith was held

to prevent Christians

The

faith: the first,

Early critics of Christianity accused Christians of all sorts of

moral failures related to their
incest!).

which one

minimum

A common response to the tension between
and

metric for

a trusting and confident attitude towards God, the second,

is

have knowledge about Him.
faith that

own

scope of the problem by following John

observing that there are fundamentally two types of Christian

from the Latin fiducia,

at fault

its

would

also

fail to

if

one, as a result of reasoning loses or

be saved.

2

tails to

have

Of more

interest, perhaps, to

philosophy are the arguments that reject either

faith

or reason on epistemic rather than moral grounds.
Early Christian writers criticized

reason precisely because (they argued)

it

yielded an intellectual failure. Tertullian

200) observed that reason, (exemplified by Greek philosophy with

methods) conflicted with

faith as fides

what was known or claimed

to

because

its

its

(c.

dialectical

conclusions were incompatible with

be true about God.

Indeed heresies are themselves instigated by philosophy. From this source
the Aeons, and I know not what infinite forms, and the trinity of man in
the system of Valentinus, who was of Plato's school. ... Then, again, the
opinion
...

came

that the soul dies is held

the

by the Epicureans; while the denial of the restoration of
taken from the aggregate school of all the philosophers; also, when
made equal to God, then you have the teaching of Zeno; and when any

body

matter

is

is

doctrine

is

alleged touching a god of fire, then Fleraclitus

subject-matter

is

philosophers; the same arguments are involved.

permitted?

Unhappy

What

is

Aristotle!

the origin of

who

and pulling down; an
embarrassing even to

man? and

invented for

in.

The same

its

itself,

Whence comes

evil?

Why

is it

what way does he come?
these men dialectics, the art of building up

so evasive in

art

conjectures, so harsh, in

Not only did

comes

discussed over and over again by the heretics and the

its

in

.

propositions, so far-fetched in

.

its

arguments, so productive of contentions
retracting everything,

and really treating of nothing!

Tertullian recognize that philosophical reasoning produces heresies, but he

noticed that Scripture recognized this as well, and that the exercise of philosophy was
explicitly proscribed therein:

when

the apostle would restrain us, he expressly names
which
he would have us be on our guard against. Writing to
philosophy
the Colossians, he says, “See that no one beguile you through philosophy and
vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and contrary to the wisdom of the Holy
Ghost.” He had been at Athens, and had in his interviews (with its philosophers)
become acquainted with that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth,

From

all

these,

as that

whilst

it

only corrupts

it,

and

divided into

is itself

its

own

manifold heresies, by

What indeed has Athens to do with
Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What
between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from "the porch of
the variety of

its

mutually repugnant

sects.

Solomon,” who had himself taught that "the Lord should be sought in simplicity
of heart.” Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic,
Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after

3

possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying
the gospel! With our

we

desire no further belief.

According

to Tertullian, there is a

reason that

is

faith.

...

problem of reason and

faith

because the operation of

philosophy often yields conclusions that contradict the
propositions that

are to be believed under taith. Faith as fide

and philosophical reasoning are

incompatible because fides holds certain propositions to be true whereas
philosophy
rejects

them, or vice versa. Tertullian’ s recommendation: abandon Greek philosophy

in

favor of Christian fides.
1

he tension between philosophy and fides identified by Tertullian represents an

attitude that has persisted

Christianity.

among

a subset of Christians throughout the history of

Etienne Gilson, in Reason and Revelation

in the

Middle Ages

,

identifies

Tatian, St. Bernard, and Peter Damiani as also holding Tertullian’s position. 7 and in

more contemporary
as evolution

is

times, the rejection by

some

Christians of scientific “theories” such

a result of a perception of tension between a product of reason (in this

case, a scientific theory) and fides. Just as Christian philosophers have found there to

be a conflict between

faith

and the products of philosophy and/or science, so too have

philosophers and scientists found a similar conflict. Philosophers and non-Christians

have long argued
true.

There

is

that the articles

of

faith

should not be accepted because they cannot be

an extensive philosophical tradition

problem of evil, the incoherence of the

Trinity,

in

which problems such as the

and the problem of divine

foreknowledge and human freedom have been advanced
of faith

are, in fact, false.

to

Scientific accounts of evolution,

also often advanced to disprove specific claims of faith

4

demonstrate that the

articles

cosmology and geology

made

in Scripture.

are

A

second

sort ot epistemic tension

between

faith

and reason does not involve

identifying faith and/or reason to have
produced false beliefs, but rather, to have

produced beliefs

famous early

that tail to be

attack of this sort

the True Doctrine ,

which he

formed according

we

on

faith

find a substantial

to acceptable epistemic

was made by Celsus

(c.

nonns.

175). In his

and systematic attack on Christian

criticizes Christians for their failure to abide

A

work On

faith in

by the epistemic norms of reason:

Now

I would not want to say
that a man who got into trouble because
of some
eccentric belief should have to renounce his belief
or pretend that he has
renounced it. But the point is this, and the Christians would
do well to heed it:

One ought first to follow reason as a
anyone who believes without testing

guide before accepting any belief, since

a doctrine is certain to be deceived. ... Just
as the charlatans of the cults take advantage of a
simpleton’s lack of education to
lead him around by the nose, so too with the Christian
teachers: they do not want
to give or to receive reasons for what they believe.
Their favorite

expressions

“Do not ask questions, just believe!” and: “Your faith will save you!” “The
wisdom of this world,” they say, “is evil; to be simple is to be good.” 8

are

William Clifford
that “it

is

is

perhaps a paradigmatic

wrong always, everywhere, and

insufficient evidence.”

later

example of this view, when he argues

for anyone, to believe anything

upon

9

Clifford has in his sights faith in the existence of God that does

not depend on evidence nor strive to find any.

He

continues:

man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of
afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his
mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call
If a

into question or discuss

it,

and regards as impious those questions which cannot
it - the life of that man is one long sin against

easily be asked without disturbing

mankind.

10

Clifford even warns that favoring the form of faith that

put in jeopardy the trust one places in God, that
Coleridge:

“He who begins by

is,

to reasoning

can

the fiducia form of faith.

He

is fide s

own

than

Views held by many contemporary philosophers and

all.”

Church

quotes

loving Christianity better than Truth, will proceed by

loving his

sect or

itself

better than Christianity,

5

and end loving himself better
scientists are often as

extreme as Clifford’s,
this

following passage

if

not more, and the attitude expressed by
Richard

Dawkins

in

common:

is

But insofar as theology studies the nature of the divine,
it will earn the right to
be taken seriously when it provides the slightest, smallest
smidgen of a reason
for believing in the existence of the divine.
Meanwhile, we should devote as
much time to studying serious theology as we devote to studying serious
fairies

and serious unicorns.

The views expressed by
different reasons than

I

1

Celsus, Clifford and

et. al.

call for rejecting faith for

ertullian s call to reject philosophy.

philosophy should be rejected because
Celsus,

Dawkins

have not claimed

it

According

yields false conclusions;

(at least in

to Tertullian,

on the other hand.

these passages quoted) that faith involves

accepting false premises as true. Instead, these secular views argue that faith
sort

of epistemic norms for

Some

belief.

epistemically irresponsible. Augustine (and

through

faith.

sin,

of the body,

And

this, faith

vitiated

and

many

that

is,

when

it

is

that only thus will

Christians following him) famously

is

healthy

first

place.

It is

impossible to

Only the healthy mind can see him. But
it

attain vision,

when

it

is

pure from every

remote and purged from desire of mortal things.

alone can give in the

sick.

is itself

our reasoning faculties were damaged and could only be repaired

For instance, “The eye of the mind

taint

some

Christians, on the other hand, have held that

reasoning about matters pertaining to the divine without having faith

held that, due to

fails

it

if

the

show God

to a

mind

mind does not believe

will not seek healing.”

These examples provide three ways

in

reason about divine matters can be identified.

which

the tension

First, either

about divine matters could be held to be morally bad (or

between

having

at least

faith or

faith

and

reasoning

dangerous). Second,

either having faith or reasoning about divine matters (or matters relevant to claims

about the existence of God or veracity of Scripture) could be held

6

to involve

adherence

to false propositions.

Finally, either having faith or reasoning
about divine matters

could held to be epidemically irresponsible.
Let us dub the position which holds
either faith or reason has failed in

Secular incompatikilists will hold

that

any of these three ways the incompatibilist
position.
faith at fault for the tension,

and

theist

incompatibilists will hold reason at fault. Further,
secular moral incompatibilists claim
that believing

on

faith is

morally bad (or

at least

dangerous), theist moral

incompatibilists claim that reasoning about the divine

is

morally bad (or

at least

dangerous), secular truth incompatibilists claim that the articles
of faith are

false, theist

truth incompatibilists that reasoning about divine matters
(or matters relevant to claims

about the existence of God or veracity of Scripture) leads to falsehood,
secular
epistemic incompatibilists claim that believing on faith

and

finally, theist epistemic incompatibilists

reasoning about the divine

No
positions

is

is

epistemically irresponsible,

claim that believing on the basis of

epistemically irresponsible.

Christian will accept secular moral or truth incompatibilism, for these

would imply

that Christianity is either

immoral or

false.

Some

Christians

could, however, accept secular epistemic incompatibilism, as long as epistemic

"irresponsibility”

is

understood correctly. James Kellenberger presents a model of faith

discussed by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling. This model of faith, rather than hold
that belief in or about

Under
I

God

is

certain, holds that faith is precisely uncertain

and doubtful.

this view, faith is explicated as follows: “It cannot be, all reason is against

believe!”

and reason -

This provides the grounds for one response to the tension between
at least for

some

varieties

tension between faith and reason

when

of

it

faith, the faithful

comes

7

it;

faith

can concede that there

to epistemic

norms and as

yet

is

a

a result, faith

is irrational,

but simultaneously, the faithful can hold
that faith

propositions believed are true.

who

On

is

worthwhile and the

the other hand, no non-Christian (that

rejects the truth ot the Christian faith)

would accept

is,

theist truth incompatibilism,

for this position entails holding that the beliefs
of Christian faith are true,

contradicting evidence (scientific or otherwise)

and philosophers would similarly not accept

someone

and

Most non-Christian

is false.

that

any

scientists

theist epistemic incompatibilism

(which

implies that our reasoning faculties cannot function reliably
about matters relevant to
the divine).

A

14

typical passage

from Scripture

that is often

adduced

support of claims of

in

the moral danger ol reasoning (in this case, philosophy) and thus in support
of theist

moral incompatibilism

is

Colossians 2:8, “Beware

philosophy and vain deceit,

and not

after Christ.

passages such as

after the tradition

A theist moral

this that are

lest

any

man

spoil

you through

of men, after the rudiments of the world,

compatibilist could try to explain

appealed to

in

away

scriptural

support of the incompatibility of faith and

reason, or alternatively, could use competing scriptural passages to diminish support for
the incompatibilist position, such as this one from

Romans

1

:20,

“For the invisible

things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the

things that are made, even his eternal

could argue that reason does not

trust in

God. Arguments

power and Godhead...”

in fact lead to

in support

In a similar vein,

one

heresy nor to behavior that diminishes

of these positions could be philosophical,

theological, even historical: one might

show

that all the

arguments

that yield heresies

are actually fallacious; one might argue theologically that reasoning in fact promotes or

at least

does not diminish Christian

virtue;

one might argue historically

8

that

good

philosophers in the past were,
practices ot philosophy.

in fact,

What

that the products ot reason

do

not drawn

these approaches

away from
all

have

in

virtue as a result of their

common

is

that they argue

not, in fact, yield morally problematic
conclusions or

behavior. Theists, therefore, needn't be moral
incompatibilists.

On

the other hand.

non-Christians could, in principle, accept theistic
moral incompatibilism. NonChristians, despite believing that the articles of
Christian faith are false, might accept

nonetheless that Christians, in believing them (and perhaps
also by living in accordance

with them) are behaving morally.

One might

also further claim that non-Christians,

lacking the moral structure that accompanies Christian belief,
behave badly, or

at least

are at risk of doing so.

Truth compatibilism

immediately obvious
particularly

when

how to

is

slightly

more complicated

to explicate, for

science or philosophy often draw conclusions which

by

faith

is

not

hold that the claims of faith and of reason are both true,

contradict matters of taith. 1 ruth compatibilism holds that there
truths discernible

it

and by reason because

and reason (when correct) does so as

well.

faith

(when

is

seem

clearly to

no tension about the

real) discovers the truth,

Apparent contradictions between the

conclusions ot reason and matters of faith then need to be explained away somehow.

Consider the theory of evolution - a product of reason

number of beliefs of faith,
Genesis.

One approach

incompatible with

made

faith.

that

seems

to contradict a

including, in particular, the story of the creation of humans in

is to

impugn

the reasoning involved that produced results

Creation scientists, for instance, argue that other scientists

errors in reasoning (namely in interpreting data, e.g., the fossil record)

concluded that humans evolved from other species. The creation

9

when

they

scientists argue that

proper scientific reasoning would not yield
the theory of evolution, and hence
would not

A

result in a contradiction with taith.

way

second approach

to interpret Scripture in such a

is

that apparently categorical faith claims that
contradict scientific findings are not

interpreted literally.

literally

The Christian

tradition has left

and figuratively. Even so-called

instance, can be found in Augustine’s

do not seem

to

-

be particularly

word”)

at all

and the

earth.”),

room

to interpret Scripture both

“literal” interpretations

of Scripture,

as, for

De

genesi ad litteram contain interpretations that

literal (i.e.,

“upholding the exact or primary meaning of a

,

for instance, in Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning

Augustine holds that the use of the term

either to dirt or to our planet, but to

unformed matter

God

created the heaven

‘earth’ is not

(the use

of

meant

to refer

‘earth’ in this

passage

helps suggest a pliable substance analogous to unformed matter). With each of these

approaches to truth compatibilism, one assumes that
faith are compatible, as

long as the reasoning

properly interpreted.

would be

It

is

all the

products of reason and of

sound and the matters of

faith are

possible, under this view, for any matter of faith to be

proved by reason, and any apparent incompatibility would be due

to a particular failure

of reasoning or of scriptural interpretation.

A

different,

to hold that faith

and perhaps more

radical,

sort.

The

compatibilism would be

Christian Mysteries are

commonly

held to

Thus, any attempt to reason about the nature of the Trinity, and any

scientific or philosophical conclusion that

Trinity,

to truth

and reason cannot contradict each other because certain truths of faith

are in principle unattainable by reason.

be of this

approach

would appear

must be wrong. Truth compatibilism

what can properly be known by reason so

is

to contradict claims

achieved by restricting the scope of

that reason can never be

10

about the

found

to yield

(correctly drawn) conclusions incompatible
with matters of faith.

some matters

ot faith could

would be beyond

still

be

known by reason -

Under

this

approach

so even though the Mysteries

the scope of reason, the existence of God might
not, and could

perhaps be knowable by a successful proof (e.g., by one of
Aquinas’s Five
In this dissertation,

one solution - Aquinas

I

s) to

want
the

on epistemological solutions

to focus

problem of faith and reason, and so

particularly interested in resolutions to the

far (viz., those that rely

problem of

I

Ways ). 15

(in particular

am

not

and reason mentioned thus

faith

on embracing some form of moral or

truth

incompatibilism/compatibilism). The Kierkegaardian solution to the problem that

embraces secular epistemic incompatibilism, seems,
in nature,

that

to

me,

and not particularly epistemological. Similarly,

to be primarily theological

it

depend on moral compatibilism, though they do resolve

between

faith

and reason, are solutions

seems

to

at least

me

that solutions

some of the

tension

that ultimately require practical ethical

determinations that are not primarily concerned with reason, rationality, justification

and other epistemological concerns.
part,

on

truth compatibilism

On

do appear

to

the other hand, solutions that rely, at least in

be somewhat epistemological. Approaches

taken by creation scientists and non-literal interpreters of Scripture are not particularly
philosophical, and so

I

am

not concerned with them here.

been written of philosophical
true,

the other hand,

have

little

to

much

add

much

about whether the articles of faith are in

and whether or not they have been proven by reason. This

discussion, and

I

interest

On

is

has

fact,

a centuries-long

has been written about proofs or disproofs of matters of faith, and

in the attempt to

answer

this question.

concerned with whether or not the beliefs of the Christian

1

I

shall not

be particularly

faith are true.

That

said,

I

have indicated

that

my

interest in writing this dissertation

is

to

epistemological solution to the problem of faith
and reason.

of truth compatibihsm

is

relevant to

scope ol what reason can possibly

my

interests,

know

examine Aquinas’s

One

aspect of the solution

namely, the approach which limits the

about divine matters. Approaches to

establishing epistemic compatibihsm are, of course,
of particular interest.

1

turn

now

to

these approaches.

Epistemological approaches to solving the problem of faith and
reason

1.2.

Many

contemporary philosophy of religion seem

texts in

concerned either with the truth or
justification, etc.) or irrationality

falsity

of particular

of believing such claims. Both truth and epistemic

interest to those

who

is

faith

and reason - explanations

study the philosophy of religion. These

explanations, though related, are separable: even

it

be primarily

of religious claims, or of the rationality (or

incompatibilism are explanations of the tension between
that are

to

claims turn out to be

if religious

false,

possible that believing those claims can be rational or justified. Since epistemic

concerns about belief are separable from truth claims,

I

will focus primarily

on attempts

to resolve the tension

between

between the two

solutions that try argue for epistemic compatibihsm), while, for

the

most

part,

I

(i.e.,

shall disregard

faith

and reason

arguments

that try to close the epistemic

that attempt to prove

gap

some matters of faith

to

be false and their apologetic counterparts that refute them or attempt to prove matters of
faith to

be

true.

Instead

offered by Aquinas

-

is

I

want

to

examine whether or not a

particular solution

one of epistemic compatibihsm, and

12

further,

I

will

-

that

examine how

adequate such a solution
to

is

for resolving the tension

between

faith

understand any solution of epistemic compatibilism,
however,

what

it

means

to say that

having

faith in

some

proposition

is

and reason.

we must

In order

understand

epistemically responsible

or irresponsible. Alvin Plantinga, in his Warranted
Christian Belief, provides a nice

survey of a number of possible accounts for what
responsibility.

have described as epistemic

In trying to develop an account of epistemic
responsibility,

largely follow Plantinga’s lead

1.2.1.

I

I

shall

16
.

Being epistemically responsible = having rational justification

As we saw

earlier,

William Clifford made the rather strong assertion

wrong always, everywhere, and

for anyone, to believe anything

upon

that “it is

insufficient

evidence.'’ Let us interpret the claim epistemically rather than morally (though

claiming that Clifford himself had

this in

to one’s intellectual or epistemic duty.

am

not

mind) and understand 'wrong' as

‘epistemically irresponsible’ so that to believe on insufficient evidence

up

I

is

to fail to live

This seems to provide us an apparently

simple criterion for evaluating the epistemic responsibility or irresponsibility of any
given belief. Following philosophical tradition.

I

shall call this

view Evidentialism

17
.

In short, the Evidentialist position can be characterized as follows:

(E)

For any belief P held by

if

and only

if there is sufficient

Epistemic responsibility

when understood

this

S: S's belief that

is

P

evidence for

is

epistemically responsible
18

P.

acquired by means of having sufficient evidence, and

way, philosophers will often say

13

that

such propositions are

rationally justified, or, simply, justified.
thesis to be incomplete, for

seems

it

My

different sorts of “evidence”.

Many

philosophers hold the Evidentialist

to be insensitive to the difference

beliefs that Paris

borrow an example from Plantinga) 32

x

12, 8

+2-

I

believe 32 x 94

10, etc.

But these

the capital of France and that (to

94 = 3008 are justified because

sufficient evidence tor each belief. This evidence

so for example,

is

between two very

= 3008 because

latter beliefs are

I

have

depends on other beliefs that
also believe that

I

4x2

=

8.

have,

I

4x3 =

themselves not believed on the basis of

further evidential beliefs, they are ‘basic' or foundational.
Foundational beliefs do not

seem

to require evidence in the

as soon as

I

ways

that non-basic beliefs do; they

apprehend them. They must, of course, be apprehended

count as properly basic, that

is,

seem

to

be

justified

in the right

way

to

as proper justificatory grounds for other beliefs. This

division, of beliefs into basic and non-basic, then, constitutes what Plantinga
calls

Classic Foundationalism.

to

match the terminology
(CF)

I

I

have

slightly

modified Plantinga's formulation of the view

have been using, but

S's belief that P

is

in essence, the

epistemically responsible

sufficient evidence for P.

There

is

if

formulation

and only

if

sufficient evidence for

19

is his:

there

P

if

is

and only

either:

(1)

P

is

properly basic

(i.e.,

P

is

self-evident, incorrigible or evident

to the senses for S), or

(2)

P

is

believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are

epistemically responsible and that support P deductively,

inductively or abductively.

14

20

if

C

lassie

Foundationalism provides several ready solutions
to the problem of faith

and reason. Philosophers or others

who wish

to

impugn

the epistemic responsibility of

the faithful (secular epistemic incompatibilists)
need merely to argue that there
sufficient evidence for

any given matter of faith -

that

is,

is

not

that these beliefs are neither

properly basic nor evidentially dependent (whether
directly or indirectly) on properly
basic beliefs.

We

see such an approach

among

those

who

argue against the soundness

of proofs for the existence of God, an approach which seeks

Hume

sufficient evidence tor faith.

example, he writes on miracles
miracles

is

to eliminate

takes a similar incompatibilist approach when, for

in the

Enquiry and argues

that

evidence

insufficient in light of other evidence against them. 21

solutions under Classic Foundationalism

One approach

is

to argue that faith

one source of

seem

to fall into

in

favor of

Compatibilist

one of two main categories.

does have sufficient evidence so that belief in

matters of faith should count as justified (successful proofs of the existence of God are

taken to be one form of this sort of evidence)." -

argue that

many

ordinary claims that

two hands) do not require a
is

we

A

take to be justified (for example, that

great deal of evidence

taken to be fairly low. Faith,

it

is

second compatibilist approach

—

I

is

to

have

the bar for sufficiency of evidence

then argued, has sufficient evidence, under this

attenuated understanding of sufficient. Plantinga provides just such an argument in his

God and Other Minds when
,

a minimal

he argues that though our beliefs

amount of evidence

in

in other

minds have only

favor of them, the beliefs are counted as justified, and

since faith seems also to meet such minimal standards,

justified.

15

it

should also be counted as

1.2.2.

A

Being epidemically responsible =
being praetieally rational

second way

in

which a believer might be counted
as epidemically responsible

would be

if that

rational.

William Alston,

considers

some

person believing a proposition
were counted as being practically

socially

instance, the practice

environment. (Other

Perceiving

in

common

God

.

advances such a position. 23 Alston

belief-forming practices that people
have

-

of forming beliefs on the basis of
perception of objects

common

for

in

our

practices include, for instance,
forming beliefs by

way of

reasoning [both deductive and inductive]
and forming beliefs on the basis of
memory.)

Alston believes that these practices cannot
be shown to be
that a believer

can be counted as practically rational

two arguments supporting why

beliefs

to

reliable;

engage

formed according

in

however, he argues

them. Alston provides

to these sorts

of practices

should be counted as practically rational.

According

to the first

because (1) those ways do not lead to massive
is no reason to think them unreliable,
(3) we know of
no alternative doxastic practices whose reliability
we could demonstrate in an
epistemically noncircular fashion, and
(4) changing to some other practice
would be massively difficult and disruptive. According to the
second argument,
any socially and psychologically established doxastic practice
that meets certain
other plausible conditions is prima facie rational (i.e.,
such that it is prima facie
rational to engage in it); such a practice will be
all-things-considered rational, if.
as far as we can see, there is no reason to abandon it. 24
...

inconsistencies, (2) there

What makes

belief based on these sorts of doxastic practices rational? Let us
stipulate

that action will count as practically rational if

behaving rationally)

in

me

to

am

behaving

in the right

ways

(i.e.,

attempting to bring about the goals for which such action

means. So, for instance,
rational for

I

if

go where

am hungry

I

1

and

my

goal

do not believe there

is

is

to eat,

it

food or where

could get food (for example, the bank or a closed supermarket).

16

would not be
I

If,

a

is

practically

do not believe

1

on the other hand.

someone were hungry and went
say that such an action
the person

action

s

was

now

Consider

was

to an

open restaurant (and had money,

is.

that

practically rational.

we

cannot), then

of such practices would turn out
to be
order to behave rationally,

However,

we would

quite appropriate for achieving
the desired goals, that

our social doxastic practices.

reliable (Alston thinks

etc.),

we ought

we

If

we would know

true.

If

our goal

to believe

could show that they were

that beliefs

is

to believe

on the basis of only

formed on the basis

what

is true,

then, in

reliable practices.

our standard social doxastic practices,
for example, the practice of

it

believing on the basis of sense
impressions, cannot be

shown

to

be reliable, what then

follows from this? According to Alston,
and motivated by the two arguments above,
believers can

shown

am

be

to

hungry,

still

be counted as rational, even

reliable.

I

I

have the practice of going

I

cannot be sure

(or that the food isn

my
still

inability to

count

method of achieving

my

show

t

my

rotten, or that

hungry.

When

the goal of satiating

my

hunger.

means of ending

housemate (or

rats, etc.)

has not eaten

1

haven

forgotten to go shopping,

t

all

etc.).

the reliability ot going to the kitchen in securing food,

my
the food

Despite

we would

action of heading to the kitchen as practically rational, as long as:

can show to be

reliable,

and

unnecessarily disruptive and difficult.

(4)

Our

I

don

(2)

t

changing

I

have no reason

know of any

my

other

(

1

to think that

way of securing

food-securing routine would be

social doxastic practices (as well as

17

1

In the past, this

a reliable

going to the kitchen would be unreliable, (3)
1

is

is

going to the kitchen has typically been successful,

food that

who

to the kitchen to get food.

cannot show that going to the kitchen

hunger, because

belief-fonning practices cannot be

Consider again the analogy of someone

practice has been a very reliable

However,

if their

my

lood-securing practices) count
as practically rational
because
Ihink that they will

because there

is

fail to

to operate

is

employed

not difficult to see

to

under another practice

in

preference to the current

susceptible to skeptical worries,
believing according to such

still

practices counts as rational, that

It

reason to

yield the desired goal (in
this ease, securing truth)
and

no reason

one. Thus, though

we have no

is,

as epistemically responsible.

how this account

of epistemic responsibility can
be

advance either the epistemic compatibilist
or incompatibilist positions,

hpistemic compatibilists

(like Alston) will

with faith are rational because faith

is

argue that the believing practices
associated

one of those doxastic practices

for

which the two

arguments quoted above apply. 25 Though
Alston does not take the following
suppose one could also

try to

position.

argue that neither faith nor any other ordinary
doxastic

practices pass the criteria specified above,
and thus no doxastic practices should be

counted as

rational.

In this

way. there would be no tension between

because believing something on

laith

would be no more irrational

something on the basis of reason-based doxastic

practices.

epistemic incompatibilists will explain the tension between
that

On

faith

and reason

that believing

the other hand, secular

faith

and reason by arguing

though ordinary (secular) social doxastic practices should be
counted as practically

rational, the practice of faith should not be so counted.

practically rational because, for instance,

massive inconsistencies.

Any

it

Faith might not be counted as

failed to satisfy

( 1 ),

in that faith leads to

reader of Christian Scripture quickly finds a

number of

inconsistencies therein, and church schisms and different denominations also yield
significant inconsistencies.

26

Another incompatibilist approach would be

to hold that

alternative doxastic practices (e.g., those of the natural sciences) might be thought to be

18

I

more

reliabie than faith,

and thus believing as a

result

of the practice of faith should
not

27
be counted as practically
rational.

1.2.3.

A
three

third notion

Being epistemically responsible =
having warrant

of epistemic responsibility

books on warrant.

In

Warranted Christian

is

one introduced by Plantinga

Belief,

in his

he summarizes his view:

Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has
warrant for a person S only if that
belief is
produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning
properly (subject to no
dysfunction) in a cognitive environment
that is appropriate to S’s kind
of
cognitive faculties, according to a design
plan that is successfully aimed at truth.
e must add, furthermore, that when
a belief meets these conditions and
does
enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it
enjoys depends on the strength of the
belief the firmness with which S holds
it.
This is intended as an account of the
centra core ol our concept of warrant;
there is a penumbral area surrounding
the
central core where there are many
analogical extensions of that central core- and
beyond the penumbral area, still another belt of
vagueness and imprecision, a
host ol possible cases and circumstances
where there is really

no answer

question whether a given case

Having warrant

in

mechanism

is

is

fundamentally rational - that

is,

beliefs because

the belief-forming

functioning properly, and in the proper circumstances, and

that is

aimed

at

forming true

to the

or isn't a case of warrant. 28

what one believes yields epistemically responsible

the belief-forming process

mechanism

is

beliefs.

is

the sort of

In this sense, to believe rationally

have a properly functioning belief-forming process. As Plantinga

aimed

at truth.

in (2)

Properly functioning cognitive

faculties are essential to

any attribution of rationality or epistemic responsibility.

someone formed

on the basis of insane ramblings or hearing voices, we would

beliefs

not consider such beliefs to be rational. Plantinga argues that

19

to

indicates, proper

function involves three components; (1) cognitive faculties that function
properly
the appropriate environments, and (3)

is

if

If

our cognitive faculties

are functioning properly,
that

formed

is, if

they yield rational beliefs,
then the beliefs that are

will be internally rational,
that

is,

appropriate inferences from our
beliefs

we

will:

when

have coherent

beliefs,

draw

the occasion demands,
choose the

appropriate sorts of actions given
our beliefs, and exhibit a
preference to believe what
truer

So, for instance,

we would normally

both that she were flesh and
blood and

someone who believed

that

not count

immune

to the

someone

one cannot breathe underwater but
did not

something poisonous, while believing

that

looked for evidence of the truth of one’s
then,

someone counts

and holding beliefs when he or she
to

have warrant

fail to

is

it

who

believed

harmful effects of fire; nor

water diving without oxygen was
dangerous; nor someone

Roughly

as rational

is

infer that deep-

who would choose

to eat

was deadly; nor someone who never

belief,

when such

searching was appropriate.

as being epidemically responsible in
forming

warranted

in

holding those beliefs. Those that

function properly in forming his or her beliefs.

As with

fail

the other

notions of epistemic responsibility, the notion
of warrant allows three obvious solutions
to the

problem of

faith

and reason. The secular incompatibilist solution, similar

to the

solutions for justification and practical rationality,
argues that faith lacks warrant.

Plantinga takes the sort of complaint against faith advanced
by
earlier to

be a complaint that

faith lacks

warrant

30
.

Marx

that

Plantinga interprets

was quoted

Marx

that a perversion in the social structure yields the
dysfunctional cognition that

as holding

is faith.

Alternatively, one could argue that faith lacks warrant because a capitalist
society

represents a hostile environment for proper cognitive function (citizens in a
capitalist
society believe in tales of God as a coping

mechanism

for the conditions

of capitalism),

so that second condition of the warrant of faith (appropriate environment for proper

20

cognitive functioning)

is

that faith has warrant,

and

no, me,. Compatibilist
solutions could, as before,
either argue
is

thus epistemically responsible. 31
or that

nearly never) have warrant,
and thus that faith

is

we

never (or

no more epistemically irresponsible

than any other manner of belief. 32

1.3.

In this paper,

I

Goals and outline of this dissertation

examine the reconciliation of faith and
reason

shall

Thomas Aquinas. My approach
in

looking closely and caretully

shall avail

falls

at the

under the history of philosophy -

as pursued by

am

I

interested

account Aquinas actually provided, and
thus

I

myself primarily of his writings rather than
of interpretations by Thomists or

of the Catholic Church.

My approach

falls

under philosophy

in that

I

am

interested in

the torce of his philosophical arguments,
particularly his epistemological solution to the

problem of faith and reason. Though Aquinas's own
theological arguments based on
scriptural interpretations as well as historical

utilize the context in

arguments provided by others which

which Aquinas lived and worked can both be helpful

in

understanding Aquinas's position on the reconciliation of faith
and reason, these are
only of secondary concern to

my

project.

Of primary

concern are the philosophical

arguments which can largely be understood independently of historical context
and
theological training. Since

reason,

I

I

hold Aquinas to have attempted to reconcile faith and

hold him to have been a compatibilist, and

examine exactly how Aquinas
Aquinas thinks

that faith

in this dissertation

finds faith and reason to be compatible.

and reason have moral,

21

truth,

I

will closely

I

believe that

and epistemic compatibility

1

shall discuss the first

two forms only when necessary

his solution to the
epistemic compatibility

for exploring

my

primary

of faith and reason. Most of
the

interest:

dissertation

will attend to this solution.

Any examination of historical

solutions to the problem of faith
and reason runs

the risk of being anachronistic.
Part of this risk

and reason, and of the

loci

due

to the fact that

accounts of faith

of the tension between the two.
have changed over time. For

instance, early Christian theologians
its

is

tension with Christian faith

were often concerned with Greek
philosophy and

- both because Greek philosophy
drew conclusions

that

apparently contradicted faith and because
Greek philosophy advocated an .deal way
of
hte that could be seen as an
incompatible alternative to the Christian

contemporary Christians,

in contrast,

situated in the conclusions

moral threat not

humanist

to

be

lifestyle of

understand

I

do not commonly

of philosophy but

in

way of life. Many

find the threat

of reason to be

those of the natural sciences, and the

in philosophical ethical theories,
but in the prevalent "secular

post-Enlightenment Western society.

crtullian's concerns in exactly the

same way

It

would be a mistake

to

as those of modern creation

science advocates, and similarly the concerns of
Richard Dawkins are not exactly the

same as those of C'elsus.
section.

I

In surveying the

have considered general ways

(or not to be) in tension

-

in

problem between

which reason and

faith in

faith

reason in the

last

have been found

to

be

these can give us an idea of the nature of the general problem,

and help categorize and understand potential solutions. However, any
treatment of an
historical solution should carefully

between the two as was understood

examine the nature of faith, reason and the tension
at the time.
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In

chapter 2,

1

carefully

examine Aquinas's account of
reason. The

problem of faith and reason of the 13*
century was
Aristotelian science and philosophy
to the Latin
Aristotelian corpus (with the
exception of

the result

West

some of the

in the

texts

or available to Latin scholars
th
until the 12
or 13* century. 33

among

C hristian scholars

was uneven, and

University of Paris, for example,

in

particular

of the introduction of
12

th

century.

Most of the

on logic) was not translated

The reception of Aristotle

certainly not without controversy.
At the

1215. reading and teaching Aristotle's
natural

philosophy and metaphysics was explicitly
forbidden, though teaching his texts
on logic

was

acceptable.

34

In 123

1

,

philosophy texts were supposed to be
purged of errors

before being taught, but by 1255 (during
Aquinas's

works of Aristotle's
study.

By

first

natural philosophy and metaphysics

the mid- 3* century, the study of
Aristotle
1

tenure there), uncensored

were

explicitly assigned for

was widespread among

scholars,

though many Aristotelian conclusions
(particularly those derived from Averroes'

commentaries ot Aristotle) caused problems
again in 1277, authorities

in Paris

for Christian theologians.

condemned those advocating

In

a variety

Aristotelian positions (or positions attributed to Aristotle
by Averroes).

1

270 and

of specific

The problem of

reason and faith in the 13 th century, then, was a problem
of reconciling the recently

discovered Aristotelian philosophy with Christian views of the
time. Aquinas,

following a widespread trend

among

Christian scholars, adopted an Aristotelian account

of reason, as well as many of Aristotle's philosophical positions.
Aquinas' solution

Aquinas

s

to the

problem of faith and reason, we must

account ot reason. This

is

done

is

23

chapter

2, in

In order to understand

first

which

I

understand

discuss in detail

Aqumas's general aecount of reason
and
lor

achieving

it,

its

ideal product scieruia,
as well as the

namely, demonstration.

Understanding Aquinas's account
of faith
argue

Aquinas's reconciliation of

beiiei

faith

under the

(where knowledge

belief).

faith

common

is

He

misunderstood.

commonly
is

taken to be

some

some

detail,

sort ol'evidenced or justified

substantially different from this, as

provides an account of Christian

taith in

accounts of

contemporary notion of unevidenced
or unjustified

faith,

paying attention

I

argue

in this

while trying to maintain a consistent

with the Aristotelian account of reason
described

account ol

Some

I

and reason suffer from anachronism
because they

Aquinas's account of faith

chapter.

spirit

of particular importance, since,
as

is

m chapter 3, h.s account has been commonly

understand

means

in

chapter 2.

to the roles

of the

1

discuss this

will, charity,

and

grace, aspects ol Aquinas's account of
faith that are often overlooked.
In

chapter

and reason.
in

4,

we

begin to build towards Aquinas’ solution of
the problem of faith

In this chapter,

we examine Aquinas’s

position on the limitations of reason

divine matters, looking in particular detail at his
treatment of the eternity of world as

a case study. Aquinas holds that reason

is

incapable of achieving any demonstration

about certain matters relevant to faith (for example, whether
the world
finite in duration, also,

approach
also

to the tension

between

is

taith

Triune,

etc.),

is

eternal or

one compatibilist
in the last section.

1

that are accessible to reason, looking

presentation of the Five Ways, his proofs for existence of God.

Fhese proofs have been

is

which

and reason, as was surveyed

examine Aquinas's position on divine matters

in particular at his

and

God

whether

is

commonly seen

as offered in order to

show

that faith

thus epistemically responsible (and thus these proofs serve the goal of

24

is

justified

establishing epistemic
compatibilism)

intended by Aquinas for this
purpose

- however.

I

- he achieves

argue that these proofs are
no.
his epistemic compatibilism
by a

different means.

In

laith

chapter

and reason.

5.

I

1

provide the

also

full

account of Aquinas' solution
of the problem of

examine Aquinas' solution

Medieval theologians as well as

later Christians

in the

context both of other

and philosophers,

in order to

understand the extent to which Aquinas'
solution was considered philosophically
sound
(or at least plausible).

I

also

examine

a

number of epistemological consequences and

concerns surrounding Aquinas' solution

been of concern

to

though they might not have explicitly

Aquinas, arc of particular interest to contemporary
philosophers of

religious epistemology.

to

that,

Finally,

I

also consider and respond to a

Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and
reason.

25

number of objections
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As with
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secular truth incompatibilism).

faith in reason.

some apparent
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irresponsibility of faith is that
I

related to faith

failing to
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each of
the lai lures below as the root cause
of the epistemic irresponsibility of faith.
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Locke

is

frequently identified as the progenitor of
this view.

1

1

has

have

tried to leave thesis (E)

ambiguous between two senses. Each sense
do not wish to try to

advocates for what properly counts as justification choose one here. Rather, I will simply identify them:

has

its

Internalist Evidentialism holds that S’s belief that
P
(is aware of, etc.) sufficient evidence for
P.

I

is

justified if

and only

if

S

Externalist Evidentialism holds that S s belief that P
theie

is

is justified if and only if
whether or not S is aware of such evidence. (Stephen
argue for a version of this view.)

sufficient evidence for P,
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to
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chapter) have argued that faith lacks sufficient evidence. Plantinga
(2000) cites a

number of recent philosophers who hold
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Plantinga (2000) cites on

hold that there

is

sufficient

this position

on

p.

89-90.

90 a number of philosophers, including Locke,
evidence for faith (or least might be sufficient
p.

evidence).
2^

1

1

Plantinga nicely summarizes Alston’s views

7-134. so

I

shall continue here

in

Warranted Christian Belief

with Plantinga’s introduction of explanations of

epistemic responsibility.
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in

CHAPTER 2

AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF REASON

2.1.

Reason

in

Aquinas

Along with many other Medieval philosophers, Aquinas
held
what

differentiates us

from other animals. Humans

We are distinct

rational animals.

from other

are,

by the Aristotelian

the

power

to reason.

thing to another by which the

(cognoscendum
Aquinas

is

a

bit

]

)

more

their conclusions.”

3

else.”

2

commentary on

In his

the Posterior Analytics

(

movari )

4

— reason

is

is

often described by Aquinas

the

power picked out by

simple transition from one thought to another

an instance of reasoning. Aquinas describes

(

this act

discurrere ) from one thing to another in such a

notum ) one comes

the

cognition to another.

is

not enough to characterize

reason uniquely. The two cognitions must be epistemically linked

(<

,

specific, saying that reason “pertains to bringing principles to

metaphorically as “movement

A

are the only animals

soul reaches or arrives at cognition

This “transition” or “bringing”

movement from one

we

Reason, for Aquinas, “denotes a transition from one

human

of something

we

is

definition,

rational beings (viz., angels) because

are animals, but are also distinct from other animals
because

who have

that reasoning

to a cognition

(

way

order to count as

in

of reason as “[advancing]
that through that

which

cognitionem ) of the unknown ( ignoti ).”

have an act of reasoning, we must not only move from an

29

initial to

5

is

known

In order to

a later thought, but

the

thought should

first

In the

somehow

bring

it

about that

we

have a cognition of the second.

prologue to the commentary on the Posterior
Analytics, Aquinas teases out the

various ways in which the epistemic relation
between the two cognitions can obtain, by

means of an analogy:
should be noted that the acts of reason are in a
certain sense not unlike the acts
of nature: hence so far as it can, art imitates nature.
Now in the acts of nature
we observe a threefold diversity. For in some of them nature
acts from
necessity, i.e., in such a way that it cannot fail; in
others, nature acts so as to
succeed for the most part, although now and then it
It

fails in its act.

latter

case there must be a twofold

cases, as
tails in

regard to what
is

is

one which succeeds

Hence

in this

in the majority

of
generated a perfect animal; the other when nature
appropriate to it, as when from seed something

when from seed

monstrous

act:

is

generated owing to a defect in some principle.

These three are found also in the acts of the reason. For there is one
process of reason which induces necessity, where it is not possible
to fall short
of the truth; and by such a process of reasoning the certainty
of scientia is
acquired. Again, there

is a process of reason in which something true in
most
concluded but without producing necessity. But the third process of
reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle
which
should have been observed in reasoning was defective 6

cases

is

.

How exactly

this

analogy

is

supposed

to

work

cases in which nature acts from necessity

is

is, at first

glance, not entirely clear.

If

deterministic causation, are cases in which

nature acts “so as to succeed for the most part” cases of what
probabilistic causation? In order to understand the analogy,

we would

we must

today consider

first

understand

the three cases of natural causation that Aquinas describes, and then look at what

reasonable analogue from causes to reasoning acts can be drawn.
In

cause

is

is

On

the Principles

of Nature, Aquinas explains what he means by cause: “But

said only of that prior thing

from which the

later

defined as that from whose being another follows .”

their effects, they generate

effect

come

to be.

For

them - something counts

this reason, the builder

30

7

being follows; hence a cause

Causes don't merely precede

as a cause just in case

of a house

is

called

its

it

makes

cause, and the

its

house the eftect - the builder
effect exists.

With

this

is

the cause because he or she brings

it

very rough and simple sketch of
causation,

about that the

we can

understand

the threefold division of natural
causation from the passage above. Aquinas
explains
that

when

nature acts from necessity,

acts in such a

it

way

that

it

cannot

In the

fail.

passage from the Posterior Analytics above,
Aquinas does not provide an example of
this sort of causation, but

and the Metaphysics.

examples can be found

In Physics

II,

in his

commentaries on the Physics

for instance, he gives the

example of the

of day and night being necessarily caused by the motion
of the sun
up,

sun

sun

is

it

is

s

cannot

up

),

tail to

be the case that

and when the sun

being up causes

down,

is

to be day,

it

it is

day

it

(for

cannot

and causes

it

presumably ‘day’

The

necessarily.

the agent, just as the necessity ol death

disposition to join with contraries. This necessity

impediment: and

it

is

is

When

is

the sun

it

is

night.

9

The

of necessity here

sort

way of generation,

comes from matter

called absolute because

also called the necessity of matter .”

is

simply ‘when the

be the case that

fail to

absolute: “Absolute necessity arises from causes prior in the

namely matter and

8
.

alternation

When

it

s

has no

nature acts from

necessity, these are cases of causation in which, given the cause, the effect must follow,

because nothing can impede the cause from bringing about the

The second type of causation
the

most

part,

into those acts

although

now and

of nature

that

nature fails in regard to what

then

is

it

one

in

which “nature

fails in its act"

effect.

acts so as to succeed for

and Aquinas further divides

this

succeed “in the majority of cases” and those acts “when
is

appropriate to

it.”

Aquinas gives the example of a seed “succeeding”

To
in

illustrate these

two types of cases

producing a perfect animal versus

the case of a seed “failing” to do so, and instead producing something monstrous.
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These cases ot causation are

to be

marked off from necessary causation because

cause does not always bring about the
beards, simply being a

man

effect.

So. for instance, though most

will not necessarily result in

the

men grow

growing a beard, and though

taking medicine often cures people of
what ails them, taking medicine does not
necessarily produce health. Aquinas explains:
”• lt does not follow that because this has
taken place, namely, that he has drunk
the medicine, that this will be, namely,
that he will be cured. For it has already
been established that a cause which necessarily infers
its effect is simultaneous
Therefore, having posited what is prior, the
subsequent does
not follow of necessity in those cases in which the
effect of causes

with

its effect.

.

.

.

can be

impeded.
In cases

of natural necessity, the cause cannot be impeded from bringing
about the

effect, but, in contrast, there are cases in

which causes, though they may sometimes

bring about effects, can be impeded from doing so. So, for
instance, seeds have within

them the
that

ability to generate animals, but in

some cases

monstrous things are instead generated.

causal

power

fails to

produce an animal,

it

this causal ability is

In cases like the latter, in

is

not the seed, but

some

which the seed's

other,

cause that produces the monster. These impeding causes (whatever they

Aquinas terms as
a particular case

'fortune' or 'chance .'

is

1

Why

chance occurs

to

impeded, so

impeding

may

be)

produce an accident

in

perhaps the purview of empirical study, though Aquinas does

identify three general circumstances in

which a cause may

fail to

produce

its

normal

effect:

because of the conjunction of two causes one of which does not come
under the causality of the other, as when robbers attack me without my intending

First,

meeting is caused by a twofold motive power, namely, mine and
of the robbers. Second, because of some defect in the agent, who is so weak

this; for this

that

which he aims, for example, when someone falls
on the road because of fatigue. Third, because of the indisposition of the matter,
which does not receive the form intended by the agent but another kind of form.
This is what occurs, for example, in the case of the deformed parts of animals.
that he cannot attain the goal at

32

This second type of causation, in which
effects can be impeded and are thus
not
absolutely necessary,

is

causation in which the effect

a cause and effect relationship necessary or
contingent

God

wills

- He chooses whether or not

necessity or only contingently

merely contingent. What makes

is

is

ultimately a matter of what

certain effects will follow from a given
cause of

13
.

In cases ot natural causation then,

we have two main

types: causes

which

necessitate their effects because the cause cannot be
prevented from bringing about
effect,

and causes which do not necessitate

prevented.

Of this

latter type,

certain effects (e.g.

because the cause can be

things of a kind (e.g. seeds) are considered causes of

grown animals)

if,

specified effects. In a particular case,

animal, and instead a monster

their effects

is

as a general rule, those things bring about the

some

particular seed

may

fail to

produce an

generated - in cases such as these, there

for producing the monster. In cases

is

when

a sort of necessity, though

no causal

is

connection between the seed and the monster — some other, chance cause

animal, there

its

is

responsible

the seed does succeed in producing an

it

is

not absolute. Aquinas calls this

conditional necessity: “Conditional necessity arises from causes posterior in generation,

namely form and end,
This

is

as

we

say that conception

conditional because for this

under a condition:

if

a child

is

woman

is

necessary

going to be bom. This

if

is

analogous

like natural causation, a

to the three types

is to

be generated.

there

called the necessity of end .'’

is

15
it

.

movement from one

of causal relation between cause and

33
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to be an effect that is the

production of an animal, there must be a seed which causes

is,

man

to conceive is not absolutely necessary, but

Seeds are conditionally necessary for animals -

Reasoning

if a

thing to another. So,

effect,

Aquinas

identifies three types

of epistemic relation between the

first

cognition and the second.

Acts of reason, Aquinas claims, can be
divided into three kinds that are
analogous
three kinds of natural causation: the
fall

first

“induces necessity, where

short of the truth'’, in the second
“something true in most cases

it is

is

to the

not possible to

concluded but

without producing necessity”, and the third
“fails to reach a truth because some
principle

initial

which should have been observed

in

reasoning was defective.” Perhaps an

and straightforward interpretation of Aquinas would
be

to correlate natural

necessity, natural contingency and causal failure
(causation by chance) with analogues
in the

movement

deterministic

ol reason.

Under

movement of the

second thought) occurs. But
interpretation there

this interpretation, natural necessity

reason: necessarily, if

this interpretation

would be no

it

cannot be

may happen

any given reasoner, cognition of some particular

cognition of some particular second thought,
absolutely necessary

of the

(the first thought) occurs,

first

-

for

it

is

right, for

under

it

always possible

often,

first

(the

is

and even every time,

thought invariably yields

cannot be the case that this movement
that,

and second thoughts, the thinker could

is

between the instances of the having

die.

So

it

seems

that reasoning,

though a movement, should not be considered a straightaway analogue
natural

B

this

actual instances of the kind of reasoning that

analogous to natural necessity. For though
that for

A

corresponds to a

to other

forms of

movement.

A

preferable interpretation of Aquinas's analogy would be to hold that the three

cases of reasoning are analogous to the three cases of natural causation because of the
nature of the connection between the two thoughts. In the cases of natural causation,
the three kinds of causation can be distinguished by the nature of the connection

34

between cause and
effect

- they

cause

is

cause

(e.g. the

effect.

For natural necessity, the cause
absolutely necessitates the

are essentially bound. For
for-the-most-part successful causation,
the

only contingently linked to the effect,
and for chance causation, the
purported
seed)

is

not causally linked to the effect at

lor reasoning should not be
necessarily, if

A (the

necessary connection between cause and effect

I(A -> B)).

The second and

third cases

So just

and the analogue

and corresponding

for a reasoning act

to causal failure, in

as there

is

would be

Natural Causation

an absolutely

would
in

is

that

contingently connected to the

it

is

contingent that (A

my

interpretation,

first

B);

thought does

works as follows:

Movements of Reason

A

B

logically necessitates

B

A contingently implies B

A does not cause B

A does not imply B

the

there be

reasoning

A contingently causes B

Though
makes

and B are

which the event under consideration as cause and

not imply the second. So the analogy, under

absolutely necessitates

A

of reasoning would also correspond nicely

the effect are not actually connected, so with reasoning
failures: the

A

(the second

and second thoughts

first

to causation: with for-the-most-part
causation the cause

effect,

B

D(A -> B) (where

in natural necessity, so

an absolutely necessary connection between
the
(i.e.,

So. perhaps the analogue

thought) occurs,

first

thought) occurs but rather a simple logical
entailment:
the propositions that are successively
cognized).

all.

modal connection between cognitions

in the

movement of reason

for a neat correspondence with types of natural causation,

Aquinas also has a

particular interest in the start and end states of reasoning acts. If we look back at the

35

original passage at the beginning of
section 2.1,

component
seems

to

in acts

we

of reason, namely, the epistemic

see that Aquinas alludes to a
second
states

of reasoners. Aquinas clearly

be referring to the epistemic states of
reasoners when he talks about

how

kind of act “induces’' necessity and the
“certainty ( certitudo of scientia"

first

the

is

“acquired"; of the second kind of act he also
refers to “concluding" truths and of
the
third kind

of act he discusses “failing

to

observe" principles of reason.

hand, reasoning acts resemble natural acts

in that the

On

the one

modal connections of the

propositions that are reasoned about correspond to
similar connections between events
in natural causation.

On

the other hand, reasoning acts also include

some reference

to

epistemic states ol reasoners. This should not be surprising,
for in order to distinguish
the

movements of reason from

other natural

movements we must appeal

reasoners different from other causal entities capable of having
states

seem

- and

these

two aspects of reasoning

remainder ol

this section

fit

that

For simplicity,

I

I

together. This

(i.e.,

shall refer to as acts

there

(i.e.,

shall refer to as acts

of contingency. Those

no

logical connection

we

shall

is to

examine just

pursue both in the

there

is

is

of reasoning acts as follows: those

a necessary connection between the

of necessity. Those

most-part causation

is

would

acts produce several different sorts of epistemic

shall refer to the three kinds

correspond to natural necessity

two thoughts),

this

and throughout the remainder of the chapter.

These three types of reasoning
states.

what makes

be that our reasoning states are epistemic and not simply

(at least in part) to

causal. Part ot our task in understanding Aquinas’s account of reason

how

to

that

correspond to for-the-

a contingent connection between the two thoughts),
that correspond to causal failure

between the two thoughts),
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I

shall refer to as

(i.e.,

I

there

reasoning failures.

According

to

Aquinas, Aristotle divided up his logical
treatises according

epistemic states that are related to these
three types of reasoning

An

act of necessity

is

called

“
judicative

...

because

it

to the

acts.

leads to judgments

possessed ol the certitude certitudine of
16
(
scientia.”
Aquinas observes that three sorts

of epistemic

states are

concerned with acts of necessity: scientia
with conclusions, 17

understanding ( intellects with principles, and
wisdom (sapienta) with highest
causes.

1 he Analytics are concerned with judicative
reasoning—the Prior Analytics

concerns the form of such reasoning, the Posterior
Analytics concerns the content. 19

Acts of contingency are called “investigative”
(inventiva). From investigative
reasoning, one of several epistemic states
truth

may

result,

with diminished certitude

of the conclusion. Investigative reasoning that yields a

fairly

in the

high degree of

certitude in the conclusion produces the epistemic state
of opinion , an epistemic state in

which one believes the
is

concerned with

truth

this sort of reasoning.

belief in the conclusion,

that the proposition

concerned with

of the proposition but fears
If the

,

true (or false), but

this epistemic state.

the Poetics

is

may

is

be false—the Topics

fails to

produce even

merely an inclination to believe

no belief as such. The Rhetoric

As opposed

personal taste (and without any certitude) one

it

reasoning process

one has suspicion which

may be

that

is

to suspicion if
,

is

by mere fancy or

inclined to accept the conclusion then

the applicable text.

Finally, reasoning failures are sophistry and

is

the subject of

On Sophistical

Refutations.

In

sum, Aquinas (following Aristotle) holds

This power

is

characterized by

its

that reason is a

ability to effect the transition
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power of the mind.

from the cognition of

one proposition

to the cognition

of another.

Some

acts of reason can

of the conclusion (sciential others produce
belief with fear
(

opinion or merely an inclination to believe
{suspicion).

mere sophistry
conclusion.

chapter

faith

3),

in

which premises

Though
it

I

fail to

that

Still

what

produce certitude
is

believed

other acts of reason are

produce knowledge of or belief in the proper

have not yet considered Aquinas's account
of faith

seems quite

clear that

some

is false

acts

(I

do

this in

of reason are irrelevant to any problem of

and reason. One whose reason leads him

to accept a proposition

on the basis of

sophistry or poetry certainly will be in no epistemic
bind should she also believe

contradictory propositions on the basis of
triune,

and

is

faith.

If

Mary

persuaded by a lovely piece of wordplay

believes on faith that

that

God

is

lead to a conflict in Mary’s determination of what to accept
about

God

not triune this

God

create the sort of epistemic worry for faith that a proof against
a triune

but

it

God

is

may

does not

would.

Of

the remaining epistemic states, scientia opinion and suspicion, Aquinas
devotes most of
,

his attention to scientia (he wrote a

commentary on

concerned with

little is

this),

apparently did not

but relatively

comment on

remainder of the chapter,

I

the Posterior Analytics,

which

is

said about opinion and suspicion (he

the Topics or the Rhetoric ). In the next section and the

shall turn

my

attention to Aquinas’s account of the acts of

reason that produce scientia. In chapter 3.1,

1

produces opinion.
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will address the reasoning act that

The account

2.2.

Among

of ideal scientia in the Posterior Analytics 1 "

the epistemic states identified as products
of reasoning, scientia

particular interest if we are to

it

is

the products of reasoning that are held to

contradict the matters of faith that are to be believed.

was held

of

examine Aquinas’s reconciliation of faith and reason.

With epistemic incompatibilism,

scientia

is

to be the product

Among

Medieval philosophers.

of proper philosophical reasoning. Thus,

if

philosophy were to produce conclusions that contradicted matters
of faith, those
conclusions would ideally be forms of sciential Thus scientia, as a
perfection of
philosophical reasoning, must be examined in more detail
faith

might be reconciled with

As we saw

at the

act.

end of the previous section,

According

to

is

is

and

1

1

scientia, the cognition

Aquinas, reasoning that produces scientia

it

is

to this text that

how one might come

translated into Latin in

are to understand

how

of a

the epistemic state that results from a judicative

Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, and

what scientia

we

it.

conclusion of an act of necessity,
reasoning

if

to

have

59, and the first full

it.

we

is

covered

turn to understand both

After the Posterior Analytics was

commentary of this

text

was made by

Robert Grosseteste sometime around 1225, the account of scientia presented
Posterior Analytics was the ground for nearly

all

what constituted

scientia,

in interpreting

though many of these

authors presented their unique accounts as faithful to Aristotle’s.

works, Aquinas appears to be concerned

to present
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in the

Medieval accounts of knowledge of

necessary truths. However, Medieval writers varied somewhat
Aristotle’s determination of exactly

in the

Throughout

his

an Aristotelian notion of scientia.

even though his account of scientia
Analytics differs in

commentary.

In

book

I,

works outside

some important ways from

we

In this section,

Aquinas presents

in

in his

shall

commentary on

lecture 4 of his

defines his account of scientia

his

commentary on

the Posterior

the account covered in his

examine the basic account of scientia

that

the Posterior Analytics.

commentary on

the Posterior Analytics. Aquinas

:

... to know something scientifically
(scire) is to cognize ( cognoscere it
completely, which means to apprehend (apprehendere) its truth
perfectly. For
the principles of a thing’s being are the same as those of its
truth, as is stated in

Metaphysics

Therefore, the scientific knower (scientem). if he is to cognize
(cognoscens) perfectly, must cognize ( cognoscat the cause of the thing known
scientifically (scitaef hence he says, “when we think that we cognize
( cognosceret
the cause.’ But if he were to cognize cognosceret the cause by
II.

(

)

he would not yet cognize ( cognosceret the effect actually - which would
be to know (scire) it absolutely (simpliciter) - but only virtually, which is the
itself,

same

as

knowing

in a qualified

(quasi). Consequently,

(simpliciter)
effect;

one

sense (scire secundum quid) and incidentally

who knows

scientifically (scientem) in the full sense

must cognize (cognoscere) the application of the cause

hence he adds, “as the cause of that

To have

scientia that P

amounts

to

to the

24

fact.”

have a perfect cognition ot P (perfecte cognoscere ), which

is to

having a perfect apprehension of the truth of P (perfecte apprehendere

veritatem). Following Aristotle in Metaphysics

II,

he goes on to say that a perfect

apprehension of the truth of P amounts to the same thing as knowing the ground or
cause of the truth of P. That
perfect,

is,

a perfect apprehension of the truth of P, if actually

would include apprehension of why P

is true,

which requires both knowing

the

cause of the truth of P and knowing that the cause of the truth of P actually did cause P
to obtain.

~

After providing this condition, Aquinas adds that scientia also involves

complete certitude.

Note
certitude.

that the notion

of scientia here

is

stronger than one merely of complete

In segregating reasoning acts into three groups,
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Aquinas noted

that in

one

type of reasoning act the premises
email the conclusion, and further,
of these types of
acts,

namely the judicative, concerns complete

certitude of the necessity of the

conclusion. This account of s cientia.
however, adds a second condition, one
of perfect

apprehension of the truth of a proposition.
Let us characterize the account of
scientia
26

presented here as perfect scientia
S_ has perfect scientia that

P =df

We can define perfect scientia as
( 1 )

S cognizes

(2)

S has complete certitude

P;

and

that P;

(3) S has a perfect apprehension
In order lor the first condition to

cognizing P does not

The second and

in itself

follows:

and

of the truth of

be met, S must have had a thought that

P,

P.

though

involve any attitude concerning the truth or falsity of
P.

third conditions will be considered in detail in
the following

subsections.

2.2.1.

In the initial

The

certitude criterion

account of judicative acts provided

in section 2.1, these

were so

called because they led to “judgments possessed of the certitude certitudine of
(
scientia." Investigative acts are differentiated from the judicative because “they are not

always accompanied by

tormed

...”“

certitude.

He goes on

Hence

in

order to have certitude a judgment must be

to say that investigative acts achieve only

perfect certitude,” similar to

how

“more or

various for-the-most-part cases of natural causation

are closer to or farther from natural necessity. This notion of certitude

bound with

less

the judicative act, appearing to be
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seems closely

what distinguishes the judicative

act

from

the investigative. At several points in
the Posterior Analytics, Aquinas
asserts that

scientia

is

certain (certa) cognition of something. 28
This certitude

seems

to

be key

to

categorizing an epistemic state as one which
involves cognition of necessary truths.

Thus,

we can

reasonably infer that the certitude of a cognition

somehow maps onto

its

necessity.

A

natural interpretation of certitudo

—

necessity

thus, judicative acts

would be

to interpret

it

as

synonymous with

by definition involve cognition of certain,

that

is,

necessary truths. Under this interpretation, judicative acts
would be a species of acts of

-

necessity

B)),

for all acts of necessity, the first cognition entails the second

and judicative acts are those acts ot necessity

necessary

that they

(i.e.,

1

B).

which the conclusion

is

D(A -»
also

Investigative acts are distinguished from judicative acts both in

do not involve cognition of necessary

problematic. In the previous paragraph,

“more or

less” certitude,

simply necessity. Also cited

we saw

which

and

(certain) conclusions

premises do not entail the conclusions. However,

acts result in

tor

(i.e.,

this interpretation

that

of certitudo

Aquinas allowed

is difficult

in the previous paragraph,

necessity of a proposition

is

is

necessity. Finally,

a necessary condition of

Aquinas says

Aquinas seems

its

is

that investigative

to understand if certitude is

have certitude a judgment must be formed” which also does not seem
interpretation that certitude just

that the

that “in order to

to

fit

with the

to hold that the

certitude, thus that certitude

could not simply be the same as necessity: “because scientia

is

also sure

and certain

cognition of a thing, whereas a thing that could be otherwise cannot be cognized with

certitude,

it is

otherwise.”

29

further required that

From

what

these passages,

it

is

scientifically

seems clear
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known could

that certitude

is

not be

a property of a

cognizing

act.

degrees; (b)

it

not the property of a cognized proposition:
(a) certitude can be had in
requires the forming of a judgment; and
(c) certitude requires that

its

object cannot be otherwise.

Aquinas does not define certitude
he does, however provide definitions

in his

commentary on

Commentary on

in his

the Posterior Analytics ;

the Sentences

of Peter

Lombard
must be said that certitude
31
intellect to one thing .”
...

it

is

nothing else than the determination of the

must be said that the firmness of the adherence of the cognitive power
knowable object is properly called certitude .” 32

... it

its

From

these passages, and the passages from the Posterior Analytics,

sense of certitudo used in connection with judicative reasoning.
see that certitude

object.

From

What we seem
first,

in a

is

From

can arrive

the Sentences

have

we know

that certitude results

from a judgment.

case of scientia are two propositional attitudes conjoined

in the

-

determination concerning that proposition. What does “determination to one thing”
in this context?

We

reasoning (which results

complete certitude.

I

need certitude

in

map

to

closely to necessity, for judicative

necessary conclusions) yields scientia, which involves

suggest that what Aquinas has in mind here

is

that certitude

cognition amounts to a second, conjoined apprehension: that the proposition

necessary.

possible.

When
If we

proposition (that

then

we

the cognition, or apprehension of the proposition; second, a judgment that results

mean

is

at the

a determination to one thing, also a firmness of adherence to an

the Posterior Analytics

to

we

to

cognizing a proposition,

judge that

is, if

we

we

we

can judge whether or not

is

contradictory

cannot conceive of any possibility but the truth of the

cannot conceive that what

we have determined and

its

of

we

cognize could be otherwise),

firmly adhered to the one option
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left

-

that the proposition

is

necessarily true.

34

Thus

scientia

the epistemic state that cognizes
a necessarily true

is

conclusion and also includes a determination
that the proposition

At

this point the reader

conclusion

and

how

is

to a

may wonder how

certitude, if

it

is

is

necessarily true.
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a recognition that the

necessary, could possibly apply to cognitions
of contingent propositions,

“more or

less" degree.

Here

I

believe that Aquinas has in

mind an

analogous sense of certitude - not complete certitude,
but certitude-to-a-degree. He

up the analogy as follows: “But just as

in the

works of nature which succeed

sets

in the

majority of cases certain levels are achieved - because
the stronger the power of nature
the

is

more

rarely does

it

fail to

achieve

its

effect

- so too

in that

process of reason which

not accompanied by compete certitude certain levels are
found accordingly as one

approaches more or

less to

complete certitude.” 36 In nature, there

concerning natural necessity: some causes necessitate
they bring about those effects
necessitate their effects,

some

1

more often

most similar

some reasoning (namely,
conclusion

is

which means

more

likely to be true

seem

Thus, those causes that bring about their effects

to necessitating causes.

The epistemic analogue here

much

is

acts of necessity) can yield complete certitude that the

seem more
to

that

often than others (ranging,

necessary, but of other sorts of reasoning (acts of contingency),

yield conclusions that

conclusions

their effects,

a sort of hierarchy

time. But of those causes that don't

yield their effects

% of the time to 99%).

suppose, from

are

100% of the

is

likely to

be true than others. Those that are most

have some kind of certitude greater than

less likely to

be

true.

some

For more on

44

that

of those

this see, section 2.3.1

that

The

2.2.2.

There

is

perfection criterion

a another cognition involved
in perfect scientia, and
that

apprehension of the truth of the conclusion.
As

we saw

earlier,

is

a perfect

Aquinas introduces

this

cognition as a necessary condition
of perfect scientia as follows.
...

to

know something

scientifically is to cognize

it completely, which
means to
For the principles of a thing's being are
the same
as those of its truth, as is stated in
Metaphysics II. Therefore, the scientific
nower, if he is to cognize perfectly, must
cognize the cause of the thing known
scientifically; hence he says, “when
we think that we cognize the cause.” But if
e were to cognize the cause by
itself, he would not yet
cognize the effect
actually - which would be to know it
absolutely - but only virtually, which is
the same as knowing in a qualified
sense and incidentally. Consequently, one
w o knows scientifically in the full sense must cognize the
application of the
cause to the effect; hence he adds, “as the
cause of that fact.” 3 ^

apprehend

From
truth,

its

truth perfectly.

the observation that the principles of a
thing's being are the

Aquinas notes

that there are

the truth of a conclusion:

first,

two necessary conditions

we must apprehend

the cause

same

as those of

its

for perfect apprehension of

of it; and second, we must

not merely apprehend the cause ot the conclusion,
but apprehend

how

the cause brings

about the conclusion.

Aquinas says
truth.

the principles of a thing s being are the

In order to understand this,

truth ot a thing (res).

makes

that

it

seem

we must

Though Aquinas

take a quick look

at

same

as those of

the grounds for the

talks in terms of the truth of things,

that objects can be true, this

is

just a loose

which

and casual way of speaking

(see endnote 25). That truth does not attach (at least properly speaking) to
objects
clear from

...

what he says

when

in his

of man; but

has this likeness, since
is truth

and

it

is

the Metaphysics VI:

the intellect forms a concept of mortal rational animal,

itself a likeness

1 here

commentary on

its

it

has within

does not for that reason cognize (cognoscit) that it
does not judge that “Man is a mortal rational animal.”
it

falsity, then,

only

in this

45

second operation of the

intellect.

according to which

not only possesses a likeness
of the thing understood
but also reflects on this likeness
by cognizing

intellectae

it

y making a judgment about it. Hence it
‘" 8S
y ^ the mind '
d

(cognoscendo)

is

”

lepall

it

evident from this that the truth

tHat

“ depends U P°"

and
not

is

“mbillon and

Truth and falsity properly attach
to our judgments and no, the
things (objects) about

which we judge. Thus, the object man
is

is

neither true nor false, but the

a mortal rational animal” can
be true or false.

the things

which are

true or false are the

propositions about which
introduces a

new

- what does

this

it

is

judgments themselves,

we form judgments

question

From

judgment man

clear that for Aquinas

that

is,

that the

are themselves true or false. But
this

“the principles of a thing’s being (esse)”
refer

to?

What Aquinas has
itself, is

thing

...”

s

mind here

is

that the being of a thing, that

the ground for the truth of any proposition
about that thing.

being

is

the cause of any true

if the

purported to represent

Now

it

40
.

is

He

the object

says that “a

judgment which the mind makes about a thing

Briefly, Aquinas’s theory of truth

counted as true only
is

in

is this:

a judgment of a proposition can be

content of the proposition resembles the state of affairs that

it

Aquinas says:

must be noted

(perficatur

)

that any kind of cognition cognitio attains its completion
(
)
as a result of the likeness of the thing cognized (cognitue) existing

cognizing subject (cognoscente). Therefore, just as the completion
(perfectio) of the thing cognized (cognitae) depends upon this thing having the
kind of form which makes it to be such and such a thing, in a similar fashion the
completion (perfectio of the act of cognition (cognitionis) depends upon the
cognizing subject having the likeness of this form. ... truth and falsity designate
in the

perfections of cognition (cognitionum). 4

What we conceive when we form and judge
don't have a

instead,

man

we have

in the

propositions are likenesses of objects

mind when we judge

a likeness of a man, and

'

that

“man

is

when we judge
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- we

a mortal rational animal”

that

man

is

-

a mortal rational

animal,

we judge

that

our likeness of man

is

and animality. This proposition
counts as
likenesses in the

and

mind correspond

falsity are properties

such that

contains mortality, rationality

it

true if the state of affairs
represented by the

to the state

of affairs of actual men. So though
truth

of propositions, the ground of the truth
or

falsity

of a

proposition are the objects (or perhaps
the state of affairs) that the
propositions
represent.

We're now prepared

to understand

principles of a thing's being are the

same

what Aquinas meant when he said

as those of

its

truth.”

The

that “the

principles of a

thing’s being are those causes (principles)
that bring about the state of affairs in
which
the thing exists. These principles, since they
cause the state of affairs, also serve as the

epistemic ground (or cause) of the truth of any
proposition that represents that state of
affairs.

We now turn to how this observation yields the two necessary

conditions

specified by Aquinas for perfect apprehension of the truth
of a conclusion:

must know the cause
conclusion, but

how

of

it;

and second,

the cause brings

As observed above,
state

that

V

,

of affairs to which

it

it

that

we must

not merely

know

The cause of that

by which a proposition can be counted as

true.

Aquinas holds “perfect and “whole" ( totum )
'

which involves apprehending not only the

apprehension of its

truth.

is

we

the cause of the

to

state

its

of affairs

In his

resembling that

is

thus the cause of

commentary on Metaphysics

be synonymous
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—

perfect

apprehension of the truth of a proposition amounts to apprehending the whole

apprehending the cause of a thing

that

about that the conclusion obtains.

the truth of a proposition depends on

refers.

first,

state

of affairs but

its

truth,

cause. Thus,

a necessary condition for having a perfect

However, simply apprehending

47

the cause of the conclusion

is

not sufficient for perfect
apprehension of

its truth.

cause does indeed bring about the

For instance,

effect.

One

also needs to apprehend that
the

we

crashed simply by knowing that the
brake cable was cut it

was because

the brake cable

was

cut

and how

have a more perfect apprehension of the
to

have a perfect apprehension of the

things:

( I )

truth

truth

can't

it

is

know why

only

a car

when we know

this resulted in a crash that

we

concerning the car crash. Thus,

that

start to

in

order

of a conclusion, we must apprehend three

the grounds tor the truth of the
conclusion (i.e„ the state of affairs referred
to

by the conclusion),

(2) the cause

more importantly, how)

of those grounds

(i.e.,

the principles), and (3) that (and

the principles caused the state of affairs
referred to by the

conclusion.

2.2.3. Perfect scientia

— summary

Aquinas defines perfect scientia as follows.
S_ has perfect scientia that

P =df

( 1

)

S cognizes P; and

(2)

S has complete certitude

(3)

S has a perfect apprehension of the truth of P.

In order for the first condition to be met, S

P does not

in itself involve

any attitude concerning the

the second condition to be met,

is

must have a thought

of P, and

that

and

how

that P,

truth or falsity

and

though cognizing

of

P.

In order for

P must be necessary and S must have determined

necessary. In order for the third condition to be met, S must

truth

that P;

such grounds actually result

know

in the truth

that

P

the grounds for the

of P. Aquinas does

note that there are various kinds of scientia, differing in both the degree of certitude and
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the presence or absence of
perfect apprehension of the truth
of P. but that the sciemia
that satisfies the conditions

perfectly).

above

is

the "proper

and perfect" form proprius
(

et
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In addition to this notion

of sciemia, Aquinas also considers

complete notions of sciemia, as well as a
very
that ot a field of study.

2.3.

I

turn

Other

now

of sciemia -

to these accounts.

varieties of scientia in the Posterior
Analytics

There are two main

criteria for

Posterior Analytics, and the easiest
to var\ the extent to

different, but related notion

less perfect or

which each

what

way

I

have dubbed perfect scientia given

to create

in the

weaker versions of scientia would be

criterion obtained.

Aquinas considers both

sorts

of

variations on perfect scientia.

2.3.1. Scientia

As

originally considered, scientia resulted from the cognition of a
necessary

conclusion.

necessity

obtained by weakening the certitude criterion

When

the definition of perfect scientia

was cashed out

was presented,

this cognition

as certitude of absolute necessity; however,

speak ot certitude of the truth of a proposition without having
absolutely necessary. In lectures 37-41 of book

I

we can

of

easily

to appeal to its being

of his commentary on the Posterior

Analytics Aquinas concerns himself with comparisons between different sorts of

demonstrations and different sorts of scientia. In lecture 41, he observes that one way
in

which some sciences can be considered

to
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have more certitude than others

is

by

examining how closely

tied to sensible matter the
subject matter

of the science

is.

The

propositions of some sciences depend
on mutable, contingent matter,
and thus would

come with

less certitude (less assuredness

instance, a purely mathematical
(and

of necessity) than the propositions

a priori)

science. Arithmetic,

of. for

Aquinas points

out.

has more certitude than music, for
“lack of certitude arises from
matter’s changes.

Hence

the closer

one gets to matter, the

less certain the science.” 44

Aquinas clearly

is

prepared to grant that there are sciences
that deal with matter, and that the
propositions
ot that science cannot be

known

must be a form of scientici
In

book

lecture

I,

with complete certitude; thus

we can

infer that there

that involves a certitude less than
complete.

42 of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics,
we see

Aquinas has a notion of certitude

different

from complete certitude

in

mind:

“It

that

should

be noted, however, that there happens to be
demonstration of things which occur, as
were, lor the most
necessary, as

lor the

most

it

stated in Physics

is

part

part, insofar as there is in

and

fail to

be true

II, is

in

them something of necessity. But

not the

same

in natural things

derives from

the

some

example of an

lormed from

that

unless perhaps

impeded.”
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i.e.

that he has in

of natural regularity which occurs for the most

part.

in

mind here

He

gives

olive being generated from an olive seed: "... if a demonstration

which

we

an olive, because

sort

the

(which are true

a few cases) as in the disciplines,

mathematical things, which are always true.” 45 The certitude

is

prior in generation,

it

does

this

Aquinas seems

is

frequently generated of

according to a property of its nature, unless
to be referring to the

effects ol these causes cannot be

it

is

powers of natural causes - though

deduced with absolute certainty
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is

does not conclude with necessity,

take as necessary the fact that an olive seed

it

it

(the causes don't

necessitate their typical effects).

He

sufficiently regular to grant that
a

ot his

commentary on

enable one to

know

sense, namely, that

weak

variety of scientia results.

In

book

II.

is

what

is

concluded

is true

is

lecture

the Posterior Analytics he
says, "Yet such demonstrations
,

that

it

holds that the efficacy of these
sorts of causes

1

do not

absolutely but only in a qualified

true in the majority of cases.

Hence sciences of this kind

fall

short of sctences which deal with
things absolutely necessary, so far
as the certitude of

demonstration

is

concerned.”

2.3.2. Scientia

A

A
I,

47 48

obtained by weakening the perfection criterion

second variety of scientia can be had by weakening
the perfection

subject that has perfect apprehension of the truth
of P
lecture 23 of his

commentary on

knowledge of the cause
might have a weaker
but not

know why P

knowledge of why {propter quid) P

of knowledge than

is true.

the cause of P. In

book

the Posterior Analytics, Aquinas tells us that
this

of P gives us

sort

knows

criterion.

In this case,

this:

we

could

know

is true.

that {quia)

P

We

is true,

one could have cognition with complete

certitude that P, and thus a sort of scientia scientia quia but
not perfect scientia or
,

,

scientia propter quid. In lecture 23, Aquinas provides an example of
the difference

between the two kinds of
true but not

know

its

why

cause.

—

scientia.

this often

He

occurs

With scientia quia we know
,

when we know

that

some

that the conclusion

effect obtains but don't

provides as example the following demonstration quia\
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is

(a)

Whatever does not twinkle

(b)

The

planets do not twinkle.

The

planets are near.

(c)

Setting aside

conclusion

how we know

near.

the premises (a) and (h),

which follows from

(c),

is

(a)

and

we may come

(b), is true, but

we

to

know

that the

don't have sciemia

propter quid ot the conclusion. That the
planets are near follows from the
premises, but
the truth of the premises don’t explain

nearness oi the planets that explains

why the

why

planets are near. In fact,

it

is

the

they do not twinkle, as in the following

demonstration propter quid given by Aquinas:
(d)

Every planet

(e)

Any

(f)

We

No

is

near

planet which

is

near does not twinkle

planet twinkles

could have scientia propter quid about the conclusion

ot the planets

true,

whereas

is

because the non-twinkling

explained by their nearness. The premises (d) and (e) explain

(a)

and

propter quid about

(b)

(f),

do not explain why

We've seen

that

A

we may have

why (0

is

scientia

4g
(c).

different notion of scientia

Aquinas employs variations

degree of certitude about a proposition and

it.

(c) is true, thus

but only scientia quia about

2.3.3.

apprehension ot

(f)

in the

In addition to these senses

in the

notion of scientia both in the

degree of perfection of the

of scientia, Aquinas introduces a

completely different, though dependent, sense of scientia, one
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I

shall translate as

Roughly speaking, sciences

‘science.’

similar to our

modem

subject matter.

in the

commentary on

the Posterior Analytics are

sciences in that they are fields of
knowledge or inquiry unified by

The account of science follows from

the definition of reason set out

earlier in this chapter:

.

.

.a

science

is

said to be one

from the

fact that

it is

as

it

concerned with one generic

The reason for this is that the process of science
of any given thing
were, a movement of reason. Now the unity
of any motion

subject.

is.

judged
clear in Physics V. Consequently, the
unity
is

principally from

its

terminus, as

is

o any science must be judged from its end
or terminus. But the end or terminus
ot a science is the genus concerning
which the science treats: because in
speculative sciences nothing else is sought
except a knowledge of some generic
subject; in practical sciences

what

is

intended as the end

is

the construction of its

subject.

Reason

is

a

movement from one thought

Various movements that lead

to scientia

to another,

and scientia

a species of reason.

is

can be unified by identifying the end for which

those acts are performed. Certain kinds of reasoning
to scientia namely the
,

speculative, are defined as having no other end than attaining

“generic subject”

acts

- that

is,

a subject matter falling under

If,

suppose,

we come

to

come

to

particular genus. Thus,

fall

have scientia whose subject

instance, scientia that the interior angles

thus

some

of speculative reasoning that share the same subject will

science.

knowledge of some

is

of a triangle equal two

knowledge of geometry, whose

specific genus

is

under the same

magnitude

(for

right angles )

magnitude /

we have

1

Scientia - producing reasoning acts are united into a science by having the same

genus as subject matter. What

still

needs to be determined

science will be differentiated from the genus of another.
since something scientifically knowable

is

is

To

how

this

the genus of one

Aquinas

says, "...

the proper object of a science, the sciences

will not be diversified according to a material diversity of their scientifically

objects, but according to their formal diversity .”
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By

a “material diversity”

knowable
Aquinas

means something akin

up the sciences

to divide

what we might describe as the objects
themselves. One way

to

into subjects according to
material diversity

according to natural kinds of objects:
thus

we might have

would be

a science of man. another of

birds (or perhaps of falcons, eagles,
etc.), fish, rocks, trees, etc.

Or perhaps

a division of

subjects according to material diversity
might be according to functional parts:

might

split the sciences into the

we

science of legs, arms, stomachs, etc.
Dividing sciences

according to material diversity looks unpromising
for

its

arbitrariness.

Aquinas,

in

addition, has a principled reason to prefer
formal diversity as grounds for division:

sciences are constituted by things

At

how

sciences should be divided

concerned but by the ways

we

fact that

we have sciemia about

them.

in

is

not by the material objects with which they are

which the scientia of its subject matter

is

obtained. That

gain scientia of a proposition by means of a form of reasoning
(demonstration)

that starts

from principles

that are better

which we have scientia (see section
what distinguish differences
on

of the

root, therefore, sciences are epistemological
constructions, not metaphysical ones,

and

is,

in virtue

this basis.

Here

Now just

is

in

known,

prior to and cause the conclusions of

2.4.1 below).

Differences in principles are

at root

our scientia and thus sciences should be distinguished
,

Aquinas’s argument:

as the formality of visible

taken from

light, through which color is
knowable object is taken according
to the principles from which something is scientifically known. Therefore, no
matter how diverse certain scientifically knowable objects may be in their
nature, so long as they are known through the same principles, they pertain to
one science, because they will not differ precisely as scientifically knowable.
For they are scientifically knowable in virtue of their own principles. 53
is

seen, so the formal aspect of a scientifically

Support for
This

this position is

is

made

clear

given by several examples:

by an example, namely,

that

human

voices differ a great deal

according to their nature from the sounds of inanimate bodies; but because the

consonance of human voices and the sounds of inanimate bodies
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is

considered

accord.ng to the same principles, the
science of music, which considers
both is
0n * he othe r hand lf tllere ar e <Wngs which have
the same nature
hn
ut are considered according to
diverse principles, it is obvious
that they pertain
1611
T lUS he mathemat ca body is never really
distinct from a
natumthT
!
natural
body; yet because the
mathematical body is known through the
principles of quantity, but a natural
body through the principles of motion
the
-

,

,

'

?^

i

'

science of geometry and the science of
nature are not the same

The

distinction

between sciences clearly depends on the
distinction between

principles, a distinction that results in
different

known. Different

first

any given science

results

particular

genus

ways

in

which the propositions are

from the subject matter of that science belonging

a
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The epistemology of reason and

ve tried to develop thus

far

scientia

an exegesis of Aquinas’s account of reason and his

examination of some of the consequences for epistemology

the

to

.

account of its principal product, scientia. What remains to be
discussed

account.

their first

principles bring about different sorts
of scientia, and the unity of

2.4.

I

54
.

that results

The account of reasoning supplied by Aquinas does

way of epistemological

movement from one

is

an

from

not, at root,

have much

consequences. Since reason, simply understood,

cognition to another, a

movement which can produce

epistemic states in the thinker {scientia, opinion, suspicion,

etc.),

this

is

in

a

a variety of

reason itself is not a

particularly interesting epistemic category. This should not be surprising, since reason,

according to Aquinas,

is

is

simply a natural power of the mind, and reasoning simpliciter

simply an exercise of that power. Reasoning acts can be divided into various

epistemic categories, however, and from these a more interesting epistemology can be
constructed. Aquinas divides reasoning acts into three broad categories: those in which

premises and conclusions are necessarily connected, those
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in

which premises and

conclusions are contingently connected,
and those
to conclusions.

The remainder of this chapter

kind of reasoning
considered

will be

which premises are not connected
concerned primarily with the

first

of necessity, the second kind of
reasoning act will he

act. acts

when we consider

faith in chapter 3,

third kind (demonstrative errors that

paradigm case of acts of necessity
first

in

is

and we

will

produce falsehoods)

consider

some cases of the

in section 2.4.2.

The

the reasoning act that results in
scientia, so

we

will

turn to the epistemology of perfect
scientia.

you reason

If

to perfect scientia
,

you not only have cognition of a necessary

truth, but also cognition that the
proposition is necessary

and why

for anti-skeptical epistemology, perfect
scientia appears to be a

since

someone who has

it

should be

immune from

it

is true.

good

skeptical worries.

between

faith

it

would appear

If

get perfect scientiaT and

“How do we know we

the circumstances under

we would

be unable to

compatible.
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we

can have

we have

such

no epistemic reconciliation

and reason would be possible. However, there are two immediate

epistemological worries about perfect scientia that must

knowing

that

a basis

starting point,

perfect scientia about divine matters, and the propositions
about which
scientia contradict matters ol faith, then

As

We

test

be addressed:

“How

do we

have perfect scientia ?” Without

which we obtain perfect scientia or when we have

whether or not

shall consider

first

faith

and reason were epistemically

each of these questions
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in turn.

it,

2.4.1.

Demonstration: Reasoning that produces
scientia

After providing a definition of
perfect scientia in lecture four of the
Posterior
Analytics, Aquinas then provides a
definition of demonstration.
Demonstration

defined as a syllogism that produces
perfect scientia. Thus ‘demonstration'

of that reasoning act
of another.

In the

that starts with

some

is

is

the

name

proposition(s) and ends with perfect scientia

remainder of lecture four, Aquinas discusses
exactly what qualities a

syllogism must satisfy in order count as
demonstration. The proposed definition

is

as

follows:

—

is

a demonstration

= df

( 1 )

X

is

a syllogism that proceeds from principles that are:

(a) true, (b) first,

(d) better

and

known

will leave the in-depth analysis of

have already provided one,
definition that suit

my

immediate, and

than, (e) prior to, and (f) causes of:

(2) a conclusion that is

I

(c)

known with perfect

scientia.

Aquinas's definition of demonstration to those

and instead

I

will give only

some

who

brief comments on this

immediate purposes.

This definition of demonstration

is

provided

in

order to satisfy the jointly

necessary and sufficient conditions that establish perfect scientia. In the course of his

defense of the definition, Aquinas does not

start

with some

common

conception of

demonstration that happens to be something which produces perfect scientia\
definition

is

provided and defended precisely because

it

produces perfect scientia. In

other words, in developing this notion of demonstration, Aquinas

reasoning act which results

in perfect scientia.™
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rather, the

In order for a

is

seeking out a

reasoning act to result

in

PerfeC ‘ SCien“a ’ U must produce a
“Biition of the proposition, a cognition
of its
certitude,

and a perfect apprehension of the

truth

apprehension of the truth of a proposition,
as

of the proposition. Perfect

we saw

before, entails that

we know

causes or grounds for the truth of
that proposition. The conditions
specified

the

in this

definition of demonstration are
necessary for perfect apprehension
of the truth

ofa

conclusion tor the following reasons.
(a)

premises

he premises must be true. Though true
conclusions

I

in ordinary syllogisms, the

the premises

were not

conclusion (that

Aquinas says,

is,

true, then

premises

is

basis for

follow from false

demonstration must be

we would have no

we would have no

“Now what

in a

may

true.

For

if

basis for cognizing the truth of the

knowing

that the conclusion is true).

not true does not exist, for to be and to be
true are

convertible. 1 herefore, anything scientifically

knowable

( scitur )

must be

true.

Consequently, the conclusion of a demonstration which
does beget scientific knowing
(A/c/7 scire )

then

its

must be

true,

ground does not

premises

in a

syllogism

and a fortiori

exist (that

is false,

it

its

is, it

premises.”

some proposition
Thus,

its truth).

is

if

not true,

one of the

could not serve as an epistemic ground for the truth

And

conclusion (that

have perfect apprehension of its

is,

If

has no ground for

of the conclusion.

if

59

one does not apprehend the grounds of the
truth),

truth

of the

then one cannot have perfect

scientia of the conclusion.

(b)

to

& (c) The premises must be first and immediate.

have cognition of a true conclusion

would not have

if

one came

Though one might be

to the truth

able

of it by accident, one

perfect apprehension of the truth of the conclusion.

And

if

premises

a syllogism are not immediate, then they do not serve as grounds for the truth of the
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in

conclusion.

What Aquinas has

in

mind here

themselves, but mediate premises are

known

evident propositions, for instance,
can be
as a result ot proof, and thus
are

is

that

immediate premises are known

in virtue

of some intermediary. Self-

known immediately,

known only

but theorems are

we have

perfect apprehension of

since the grounds for the truth of
these mediate premises rest in

from which they were derived. Aquinas
says, “Suppose,
i.e.

known

mediately. Mediate premises cannot
serve

as epistemic grounds for conclusions
of which

syllogizes from demonstrable,

in

mediate, premises.

its truth,

some other premises

therefore, that a demonstrator

Now he either possesses a

demonstration of those premises or he does not.
If he does not, then he does not

know

the premises in a scientific way; nor
consequently, the conclusion because of the

premises. But

if

he does possess their demonstration, then, since
one

to infinity in demonstrations, principles

reached.

may

not proceed

immediate and indemonstrable must be

Either the truth of a conclusion of a demonstration

is

grounded

immediate premises, which need no proof, or are mediate, which
must

first

in

be proven

in

order for there to be perfect apprehension of the truth of the
conclusion. Thus, a

demonstration that produces perfect apprehension of the truth of the conclusion
must
either

into

come from immediate premises

immediate ones.

senses differ slightly

“First' is

—

“first

principles for us ).

first

resolved

taken as synonymous to “immediate', though their

identifies premises as

to the fact that they are not mediately

“first'

or from mediate premises that are

having no prior, “immediate’ simply

known (which would

also entail that they are
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That premises must be

first

also

seems

to

be necessary for satisfying the

certitude condition of perfect scientia. Aquinas holds that the certitude in scientia
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comes from

the premises:

“However, the case

which do not have a cause. For these
cognition (cognitio) of these things

is

is

otherwise in regard to

&

(e)

things,

are understood in virtue of
themselves; and such

more

certain than

such understanding ( intelligent^ that
scientia acquires
(d)

first

any

its

scientia,

because

certitude .”

& (f) The premises must be better known, prior to

,

it

is

from
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and causes of the

conclusion. With perfect apprehension of
the truth of the conclusion, the
grounds for
the truth of the conclusion are
apprehended. In order for us to be able to
apprehend

these grounds, the premises must be the
cause of the truth of the conclusion - if we
didn’t

know

grounds for
conclusion:

the cause of the truth of a proposition,

its truth.

if

Similarly, the premises

we

must be

couldn't perfectly

better

known and

know

the

prior to the

they weren’t they could not serve as grounds for
the conclusion.

This definition of demonstration

and sufficient conditions needed
unclear, however,

is

may

adequately cover

to bring about perfect scientia

whether we demonstrate often,

if at all.

all

;

the jointly necessary

what they leave

The

certitude of the

necessity of perfect scientia would seem to rule out any contingent
premises, which

would
often

rule out

most propositions about the natural world. Further,

we know the

the truth of any proposition.

we may never

Thus demonstration,

applicable to logic and geometry,

reasoning to be contrasted with

how

may

actually have perfect apprehension of

as defined above, though perhaps

be too stringent to serve as an example of
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faith

.

For, if the standard of reason

demonstration, instances of faith would be just one

meet

not clear

causes of the truth of a proposition. Aside from analytic or a priori

connections between propositions,

that fail to

it’s

that standard.

among many

were held

to be

epistemic occasions

Rather than typical exemplar, demonstration seems more
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like

an idealization of reason. Other,
weaker notions of scientia and
demonstration are

considered

in the

Posterior Analytics, however.

Though

I

shall not consider

them here

(they will be considered in chapter
4), the weaker notions of scientia
considered earlier
in this chapter

have correspondingly weaker varieties
of demonstration.

The answer

to the epistemic worry,

be “by demonstration." But

demonstration
its

get

On

is

this

“How do we

get perfect sciential”

by the

defined as that act of discursive reason that
produces perfect scientia

act that satisfies the necessary

the other hand, this response

to conclusions.

Some of these

them, the result

is

is

to the

perfectly straightforward

in thinking that

How

considers whether

it

— and given

is

we

- we

producing

it.

do, in fact, syllogize

when we perform

get perfect scientia and turn
,

that

we have

it.

does not think

Aquinas admits

that

we can be

a conclusion. In the case of the eternity of

will cover in

more

detail in chapter 4),

Aquinas

demonstrable conclusion that the world

article ot faith or a

that he

it

will set aside, for the time being,

how we

scientia,

we have demonstrated

an

get

.

do we know that we have perfect sciential

the world, for instance (which
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I

for

more pressing epistemological concern of how do we know

Though demonstration guarantees

began

- we

syllogisms are of such a nature that

perfect scientia of the conclusion.

2.4.2.

wrong

how we

and sufficient conditions

worries that demonstration inadequately answers

now

to

answer seems quite unsatisfactory. Since

introduction seems a rather empty response to
the worry about
it

seems

is

it

demonstrable,

it

follows that others have

mistakenly thought so (and mistakenly thought their arguments to be demonstrations). 6 ^
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In the

commentary on

the Posterior Analytics
, lectures 27-30. Aquinas

concerned with demonstrative

number

error.

In these chapters, he covers
in

some

explicitly

detail a large

ot fallacies that yield false premises,
false conclusions, or syllogistic
failures

(failures that result in

chapters that

we

an argument form

that is not a syllogism).

can (and probably do) often

despite the fact that

we

believe that

with any fallacy,

we

It's

clear

from these

demonstrate some conclusions,

fail to

we have done

perfect scientia ol the conclusion, because
is

is

so.

we have

In these cases,

we do

not have

not provided a demonstration.

As

it

can avoid demonstrative error by carefully
checking our

reasoning.

Perfect scientia involves three cognitions

apprehension ot
syllogistic

its

truth

and

argument forms)

certitude.

We can

- cognition of the conclusion,

mistake some syllogisms (or non-

for demonstrations, but

mistaken about having perfect scientia - for either
constitute

it

or

we do

not.

to

cognitions, rather than to try and determine

whether one properly demonstrated or

(i.e.,

cognitions?

truth

that

Is

it

it

would seem

we have

that

we

check

to see

how one
not).

cannot be

the cognitions that

Perhaps a more efficient way of checking to see

claimed to ha \q perfect scientia would be

whether one had

got to one

s

if

all

one

the proper

current epistemic state

But what about these other

of some proposition, or about having a certitude
that there

in its necessity?

It

would seem

can be some error here, for after he defines perfect

scientia (as involving certitude and perfect apprehension of the truth), he says:

who know

falsely

possible to be mistaken about having a perfect apprehension of the

Aquinas does hold

those

perfect

scientifically

and those who do not know

in that

way

they do, take scientific knowing to be as above described. For those
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“...

both

but believe that

who do

not

know

in a scientific

manner but believe

whereas those who know

we can be mistaken

that they do, are

in a scientific

convinced

manner do know

about having perfect scientia then
,

such mistakes can

We

arise.

2.4.2. 1.

which determines the

in the

we

of the

should examine exactly

be.

In the

of error

how

first in

Failure of certitude

(in section 2.2.1), certitude is the result

intellect to

If

truth.

one thing.

If

we

that the intellect is

of a judgment, one

are mistaken about having certitude

with respect to some proposition, the source of the error resides

judgment, namely,

manner described,

manner described.” 66

shall consider the possible sources

certitude, then in perfect apprehension

As mentioned above

in the

in

some erroneous

determined to only one thing, when

it

should not

Disputed Questions on Truth Aquinas gives a rough account of how the
,

intellect

comes

to

be determined to one thing:

Sometimes, again, the possible

intellect is so determined that it adheres to one
without reservation. This happens sometimes because of the
intelligible object and sometimes because of the will. Furthermore, the

member

sometimes acts mediately, sometimes immediately. It acts
immediately when the truth of the propositions is unmistakably clear
immediately to the intellect from the intelligible objects themselves. This is the
intelligible object

of one who understands principles, which are cognized ( cognoscuntur as
soon as the terms are known ( notis ), as the Philosopher says. Here, the very
nature of the thing itself immediately determines the intellect to propositions of
state

this sort.

The

intelligible object acts mediately,

understanding, once

it

cognizes ( cognitis ) the definitions of the terms,

determined to one

member of the

principles. This

the state of one

is

however, when the
is

contradictory proposition in virtue of

who

first

has scientia.

Sometimes, however, the understanding can be determined to one side of
a contradictory proposition neither immediately through the definitions of the
terms, as

is

the case with principles, nor yet in virtue of principles, as

with conclusions from a demonstration.
is

determined by the

will,

which chooses

63

And

in this situation

to assent to

is

the case

our understanding

one side definitely and

move

1

it

the will, though not
seems good or fitting to

believes ( credentis ). This
believes what another says because
it seems fitting
)

may happen when someone
or useful to do so

According
is

to

67
.

Aquinas, the

intellect is

being cognized) or by the

thing

when

it

“moves"

it (

will,

determined to one thing either by the object
(what

and either of these can determine the

movendum ). Again, we

about cognition. With reason,

intellect to

one

see the metaphor of motion bringing

we "move" from one

cognition to another, that

premises to conclusion. In the case of certitude,
however, our

is,

from

intellect is

moved

to

considering only one possible truth value for some
cognized proposition.

When

the

intelligible object itself

moves

understanding the object

we

the intellect, the process

cannot help but consider

instance, the principle ot non-contradiction.

terms that constitute the principle,

moves

or determines our intellect to

In cases

When we

we cannot

principle of non-contradiction itself

is

truth

automatic - in virtue of our

to be true (or false). Take, for

understand the meaning of the

help but hold that

such that

its

it

is

we must

- and

this

truth (or falsity)

inferences

is

in virtue

is

it

The

true

-

ability to

it

certitude.

we

-

are determined to the

perform deductive

us to see that the conclusion must be true (or false), given the truth of

69
.

68
.

directly, but mediately

of these that

of the conclusion. Our cognitive

moves

the premises

it

true

Aquinas has defined as

,

the premises,

is

believe that

of scientia the certitude comes not from the object

when we understand

it

If the intelligible object itself

moves

cannot be mistaken about having certitude, unless

the intellect to certitude, then

we can be mistaken

self-evident propositions or unless our deductive faculties

cannot be mistaken

in

fail.

64

about the truth of

Aquinas holds

cases of self-evident propositions, and as far as

we

I

that

we

have been able

to determine, he never considers the
possibility that our deductive faculties
reliable.

There are two ways
intelligible object

that

tor deception.

our certitude

in

It

when

3,

which we can come

to

have certitude - either when the

I

is

introduced in the

first

some proposition

is

not the result of

worry unanswered

to

have

(we judge
affairs to

it

some

which

it

ways: (1)

proposition

refers), (2)

caused the conclusion, or

be sure

unjustified act of will?

(3)

is

true

we

truth

of a proposition,

it

I

in

will.

we can

could judge falsely about a state of affairs

even though

it

does not resemble the

state

of

we

could

fail to

apprehend the principles that actually

we

could

fail to

apprehend

how

the principles bring about

the conclusion (by, for instance, drawing a false causal inference).

would

we

Failure of perfect apprehension of the truth

in three different

that

can

for the time being, but shall return to

Given the account of perfect apprehension of the
tail

some

how

consider Aquinas’s account of faith and the role played by the

2.4.2.2.

I

manner, the second certainly leaves

the will can cause a cognition of certitude,

will leave this skeptical

chapter

in

determines the intellect to one thing, or when the will
does. Though

have claimed that no error

room

might not be

70

It

seems

that

we

rarely succeed in having a perfect apprehension of the truth concerning the

effects of natural causation, for

we

will frequently fail to understand precisely

how

causes brought about their effects. Our ability to understand nature, and consequently
to

perform adequate causal reasoning about natural processes

quite skeptical about: “... our cognition ( cognitio )

65

is

weak

to

is

something Aquinas

such a point that no

is

philosopher would be able to investigate
perfectly the nature of a single
reads that one philosopher spent thirty
years in solitude that he might
<

fly.

Thus one

know

cognosceret) the nature of a bee ." 71
Depending on the subject matter, then,
failure

have a perfect apprehension of the
it

would be easy

ol

some

for

someone

to

truth

of some proposition can be quite common,

judge mistakenly something

proposition or to misapprehend

conclusion

how

to

the cause brings

it

to

for

be a cause of the truth
about that the

is true.

2.5.

Aquinas holds
to another. This

that reasoning is a

movement can be

acts can be divided

Conclusions

by the

movement

the

from one cognition

characterized in two different ways. First, reasoning

logical relations

between the two cognitions: the two

cognitions can be necessarily connected (the

of necessity,

in the intellect

first entails

the second), and these are acts

two cognitions can be only contingently connected

(the first

merely

contingently implies the second), and these are acts of contingency, or the two

cognitions

may

turn out not to be logically connected at

all

(the first neither entails nor

implies the second). Second, reasoning acts can be divided by the epistemic states that
initiate or result

from reasoning. Of particular

understanding ( intellectus ), which
the

first

final

is

interest are the epistemic states

concerned with grasping the

principles) of acts of necessity; scientia

cognition

(i.e.,

,

which

is

initial

cognitions

concerned with grasping the

the conclusion) of acts of necessity; and opinion, which

concerned with grasping the conclusion of acts of contingency. This chapter

66

(i.e.,

is

is

concerned primarily with scientia,

more

in the next

I

discuss understanding and opinion
in

detail.

Perfect scientia

is

an ideal form of scientia, involving
not only certitude

necessity of the conclusion, but a perfect
apprehension of
scientia provides an apprehension
that the conclusion
to such a cognition as a result of an
act of necessity.

is

its

truth.

in the

Since perfect

necessary, one can only

come

With perfect scientia, one discerns

both the necessity ol the conclusion and the
necessary connection between premises and
conclusion (which

is

a necessary condition of perfect apprehension
of the truth of the

conclusion). Demonstration

is

the

name of that

kind of reasoning act which produces

perfect scientia and provides a thorough knowledge
both of the conclusion and of the

reasons for

its truth.

Though demonstration guarantees perfect
and can even be tooled into thinking

we have

we can

employing

we

we

not have

fail to

it).

There

is

to look tor,

ot our ability to obtain (and

know

we commit

results

when an

conclusion when

demonstrative fallacies, either by

These

sorts

and thus, do not threaten the in-principle

that

we

have) perfect scientia. Second,

have certitude about the conclusion, and thus

which

demonstrate,

a danger of demonstrative failure in three ways.

demonstrate when

know how

fail to

we have perfect scientia,

false premises, false conclusions or invalid arguments.

generally

Certitude,

often

we have demonstrated some

not done so (and also been tooled into thinking that

when we do
First,

that

scientia ,

fail to

intelligible object

reliability

we can

have perfect scientia about

moves

truth ot the conclusion, is reliable, according to Aquinas.

of errors

fail to

it.

the intellect to accept the

However,

in

cases

when we

assent to a conclusion as the result of an act of will rather than demonstration, there

67

is

a

risk of error.

conclusion

is

Assent by willing introduces the
possibility
misplaced, and that

we can

that certitude in the

mistakenly hold ourselves to have
certitude

and perfect scientia of the conclusion.
This epistemic worry
and

4.

we can

fail to

perfect apprehension of

in

chapters 3

demonstrate by not satisfying the necessary
conditions for

its truth.

of a conclusion were we

apprehend the principles
(where

considered

Third, though demonstration
guarantees perfect apprehension of the
truth of the

conclusion,

truth

is

we judge

can also

fail to

that

to

We would
employ

fail to

false

have perfect apprehension of the

premises

(in

which case we

fail

to

cause the conclusion), or to draw a false
conclusion

falsely about the state

judge properly

how

of affairs

that results

from some cause), but we

or that the principles cause the conclusion.
Though

not a logical fallacy, such a failure in
causal explanations

would prevent

a perfect

apprehension of the truth of the conclusion, and thus
prevent one from having perfect
scientia.

The epistemological promise

ot perfect scientia

knowledge of the conclusion, but knowledge

when we have

it, it

is infallible.

that

it

is

is

we

68

it

provides not only

why

it

is

true

-

for obtaining perfect scientia

can be mistaken

ourselves. These concerns will be taken up again in chapter 4,
limitations of reason in matters of faith.

-

necessary, and

However, the conditions

are severe and extremely difficult to obtain, and

great

in attributing

when we

it

to

consider the

ENDNOTES

translator s note: many translations
of Aquinas into English translate
terms
hat blur together epistemie
categories that I wish to maintain
as distinct. For instance
n the translation ot Aquinas's
commentary on the Posterior Analytics,
Larcher
translates notus and related terms
(notitia. nosco) as 'known' or
'knowledge', but also
often translates cogmtio and related
terms (cognosce) in the same way.
(See, for
instance, Larcher s translation in the
PA prologue). Similarly, McGlynn often translates
these terms synonymously in his
translation of the Disputed Questions
on Truth (see
for mstance his translation of
1 5. 1 ).
Ross (1985) explicitly interprets Aquinas'
as
speaking ol knowledge when he uses the term
cognilio. In contrast, I will generally
translate cogmtio as 'cognition',
'apprehension' or 'thought’, and it and related
terms
are to be translated as neutral with
respect to whether or not they are true,
except when
the context makes it absolutely clear
that these terms should be translated
as
nowledge Notitia on the other hand, I will generally
translate as ‘knowledge for
Aquinas does seem to consider it to include truth.
Scientia I will leave untranslated for
as we shall see in section 2.2, it is a rather
special epistemie category and has no

QDV

.

,

’

synonymous English

term. Rather than provide a justification for
these translation
I refer the reader to
Jenkins (1997), p. 16-17, and MacDonald
(1993), p.
160-163. When providing an English translation
of Aquinas, I will generally supply the
translation direct from the sources that I use (see
‘Abbreviations’ for the translations
used); however, when Aquinas uses an epistemically
significant term, I will supply both
my translation and the Latin used by Aquinas.

choices here,

2

ratio

anima humana
hie

(PA

1.

44.nl

5

“scilicet discurrere
ignoti.

(PA

designat,

(QDV

quo ex uno

in aliud

cognoscendum

15.1)

pertinet ad

deductionem principiorum

in

1)

See for example, ST

cognitionem

quemdam

pertingit vel pervenit.”

autem addit rationem, quae

conclusiones.”
4

\ero discursum

1.79.8.

ab uno

in aliud, ut per id

prologue. n4) See also

quod

QDV

est

15.1.

notum deveniat

in

Aquinas describes two

other types of rational acts, which he describes as part of the intellect rather than of
reason proper. These acts, one of understanding simples, the other of combining and
dividing, describe

more

from one proposition

the

coming

to another,

to

cognize a proposition rather than a transition

and thus are not instances of reasoning

in the sense

used here.
6

“attendendum

est

autem quod actus

rationis similes sunt,

quantum ad

aliquid,

actibus naturae, unde et ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest, in actibus autem

naturae invenitur triplex diversitas. in quibusdam enim natura ex necessitate

quod non potest

deficere. in

quibusdam vero natura

69

agit, ita

ut frequentius operatur. licet

deque possit deficere a propno actu. unde
unum. qui sit ut in plunhus, sicut cum ex

q

in his necesse est esse
duplicem actumsemine generatur animal perfectumalium

veto quando natura deficit ab eo quod
est sibi conveniens, sicut cum
ex semine
generatur altquod monstrum propter
corruptionem alicuius principii.

et haec etiam tria inveniuntur in
actibus rationis. est enim aliquis rationis
processus necessitates, mducens, in quo non
est possibile esse veritatis defectum-

hutusmodt rationis processum scientiae certitudo
acquiritur. est autem
processus, in quo ut in plunbus verum concluditur.
non tamen
tertius vero rationis processus est. in

deiectum; quod

unde

in ratiocinando erat

et

per

alius rationis

necessitatem habens

quo ratio a vero deficit propter alicuius
observandum.” (PA prologue. n5)

principii

sed causa solum dicitur de illo primo ex quo
consequitur esse posterioris:
quod causa est ex cuius esse sequitur aliud.” (DPN

dicitur

3)

8

In lect. 15.

necessitas quidem absoluta est quae procedit a causis
prioribus in viam
generationis, quae sunt materia et efficiens: sicut
necessitas mortis quae provenit

ex
ex dispositione contrariorum componentium; et haec dicitur
absoluta quia
non habet impedimentum. haec etiam dicitur necessitas materiae.”
(DPN 4)
materia

bibit,

et

hoc

non enim sequitur quod quia hoc factum est, scilicet quod iste medicinam
sanabitur. iam enim supra dictum est quod causa quae ex

erit, scilicet

necessitate infert ef tectum, est simul
necessitate posterius in
II.

1

illis in

cum

effectu.

...

unde posito

non sequitur ex

priori

quibus effectus causarum impediri possunt ” (PA

0,n9)
11

See P

11.8-10.

1

quarum una sub altera non continetur, sicut cum praeter intentionem
occurrunt mihi latrones. (Hie enim concursus causatur ex duplici virtute motiva, scilicet
mea et latronum). Turn etiam propter defectum agentis, cui accidit debilitas, ut non
possit pervenire ad finem intentum; sicut

cum

aliquis cadit in via propter lassitudinem.

Turn etiam propter indispositionem materiae, quae non
agente, sed alterius

modi

recipit

sicut accidit in monstruosis partibus

formam intentam ab
animalium.”

(M

VI.3.nl210)
13

See

M VI.3.nl220.

This position, that

effects follow necessarily or contingently

is

problem of divine foreknowledge necessitating
14

scilicet a

generari

God chooses whether

or not

some

used by Aquinas to help him out of the
all

future states of affairs.

“necessitas autem conditionalis procedit a causis posterioribus in generatione,

forma

homo;

et fine: sicut

dicimus quod necessarium

et ista est conditionalis,

necessarium simpliciter, sed sub conditione,
necessitas finis.”

(DPN

est esse

conceptionem.

si

debeat

quia hanc mulierem concipere non est
si

4)

70

debeat generari homo,

et

haec dicitur

0f

cours lf animals can be effected
from a cause other than a seed
f’
(for
instance from cloning), then seeds
will not be conditionally
necessary for animals This
particular seed that actually produced
this particular animal (‘Bessie’),
will still be
conditionally necessary for Bessie’s
coming to be however
16

S

mdlCatlVa didtUr eo quod iudicium
’

n6r

prologue

est

cum

certitudine scientiae.”

(PA

F ° r the remainder of the paper I shall
use these terms interchangeablyd
gniti0n
SeC °nd thoUgh1 ’' Als0 ‘"'changeable
with each
other, first thought(s)
o*er
hTv"// first
r° cogmtion(s)’,
‘premise(s)’, and ‘principle(s)’.
t

.

.

'

’

sed tria eorum, scilicet sapientia, scientia
et intellects, important
rectitudinem cognitionis circa necessaria: scientia
quidem circa conclusiones, intellects
autem circa prmcipia, sapientia autem circa causas
altissimas, quae sunt causae
divinae.” (PA 1.44. nl 1)

There are two logical works of Aristotle concerned
with acts of necessity - the

nor and Posterior Analytics. believe we can explain the
separation of these
two works given the epistemological distinctions made
thus
/

I

In acts

far.

acts into

of necessity, the
of some general

premises entail the conclusion. That premises can entail
conclusions is
interest, particularly in understanding logic
by examining the logical relations involved
in inferences - and this is the purview of the
Prior Analytics. But we also want to pay
special attention to those acts of necessity in which
we somehow recognize that the
premises of some particular reasoning act entail the conclusion
in this

particular case.

This recognition, that some particular act of necessity is just such
an act is of particular
epistemological interest, and earns its own consideration in the Posterior

Given

that this dissertation

is

Analytics.
primarily interested in epistemology and not logic, the

Prior Analytics will not be considered here.
20
It

is

commonly

on the works of Aristotle
follow

in this tradition,

held that the views presented by Aquinas in his commentaries
are to be understood as views also held

though

it

discussion relevant to this issue,
Aristotle

's

21

11
“

thirteenth

De Anima

(1999),

by Aquinas himself. I
by no means entirely clear that it is justified. For a
see Pasnau s introduction to Aquinas's Commentary on
is

p. xviii-xxi,

and Chenu (1964),

ch. 6.

See Serene (1982).
For a careful survey of several views on demonstrative science
and early fourteenth centuries, see Serene (1982).

23

in the

Aquinas presents accounts of scientia outside of his Aristotelian
commentaries that seem, at least at first, somewhat different than the account presented
here. There has been some debate as to whether or not the account of scientia in PA is
the same and/or consistent with the account employed in Aquinas's theological
treatises. I am inclined to interpret Aquinas as employing substantively the same notion
of scientia throughout his works, but do not have the space to engage a defense of this

71

interpretation here.

Instead,

I

refer the reader to Jenkins
(1997). ch. 2 in
this interpretive issue.

thoroughly and usefully discusses

which he

24

" quod scire allc uld est perfecte cognoscere
ipsum, hoc autem est perfecte
pprehendere ventatem ipsius: eadem enim
sunt principia esse rei et veritatis
ipsius ut
patet ex n metaphysicae. oportet igitur
scientem, si est perfecte cognoscens.
quod
cognoscat causam rei scitae. si autem
cognosceret causam tantum, nondum
cognosceret
effectmn in actu. quod est scire simpliciter,
'

l

sed virtute tantum, quod est scire
secundum
ideo oportet scientem simpliciter
cognoscere etiam
apphcationem causae ad effectum.” (PA I.4.n5)

quid

et

quasi per accidens.

Note

that

et

we

are referring to propositions here— ‘the
cause of the truth of P’
he parallel between premises and causes is a very
tight one for Aquinas, and he often
shuts from the language of propositions to the
language of things. In PA 1.3, he is very
1

on the close connection: "Now the principles in
demonstrative matters are to the
conclusion as efficient causes in natural things are
to their effects; hence in Physics II
the propositions of a syllogism are set in the
genus of efficient cause.” Thus, Aquinas
often speaks of scientia as if it concerned things,
not propositions. For instance, he
speaks of the certain cognition of a thing (res) rather than
a certain cognition of a
proposition referring to that thing. When using causal
language he often speaks of the
content of premises causing the content of conclusions.
The two modes of speaking can
be reconciled, I believe, by considering Aquinas to hold
clear

that the relations

between

propositions and the truth of propositions will typically reduce
to the objects (or their
essences) that are specified by their contents. So we can consider
the following sorts of
expressions to be equivalent, under appropriate contexts: an object
caused something,

match caused the fire an object caused a cognition, e.g. The match caused the
cognition that there is a fire ’; a cognition led to another cognition, e.g. The
cognition
that there is a match brought about the cognition that there is
a fire'. In each of these
e.g.

the

cases

we

causes B,

;

should understand Aquinas to have the following picture

A

is

the ground for the truth of proposition P,

B

is

in

mind: object

A

the ground for the truth of

Q, Q logically follows from P precisely because A causes B; however, A causing B
does not necessarily result in someone thinking Q, even if that person has already
cognized P. For more on this, see section 2.2.2.
26

Aquinas

calls this notion scientia simpliciter.

See

PA

1.4. n5.

27

“nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. unde de his, quae inventa sunt,
iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur.” (PA prologue.n6)
28

29

See

PA

I.4.n5, 1.44.n3.
.

“quia vero scientia est etiam certa cognitio

rei;

habere, non potest aliquis per certitudinem cognoscere”
30

See also

QDV

14.1. ad 7.

72

quod autem contingit

(PA

I.4.n5)

aliter se

1

1

1

QS 4

„

,

'I

Sc
'

‘certitude'
32

d 23 q 2 a 2 soL 3 This translation
and the next are by Griffin
;
Wh ° Pr0V deS
3 USetUl and th °r0Ugh accounl
of Minas's use of
'

'

-

-

’

-

'l!

,

'

HI Sent

d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.
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These two accounts of certitude - as determination
to one thing and as
firmness ot adherence - are not identical.
In cases of sciemia. they are
coextensive, but
they can separate in certain circumstances.
For more on this, see chapter 3.1 .2.D.

To help

explain this position, here’s a definitely
non-Thomistic explanationP. You decide to judge whether
or not P is

suppose you cognize some proposition
necessary, and you do so by "looking"

into other possible worlds. If you find
some
possible world where P has a truth value different
than this one, your attention would be
divided between these two options for the truth
value of P in any unspecified possible
world. Should you find no possible world where
the truth value of P is otherwise, your
attention would be fixed on the truth value of P
as set - you would consider P to be
necessary. This judgment about P is the same as
being determined to only one thing the truth value of P - and your adherence to
that truth value for P would be firm.

Note that the certitude as determination to one thing by judging
that the
proposition cannot be otherwise does not correspond well
to the certitude we have of
conclusions - presumably, this sort of certitude corresponds
more to self-evident
premises rather than conclusions. The certitude of conclusions of
deductive reasoning
for Aquinas, a by-product of the certitude of the premises
and of deductive inference.
discuss Aquinas's views on this derived certitude in section 2.4.1

is,
I

36

sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt,
gradus
attenditur (quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo
effectu), ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda
certitudine, gradus
aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem
acceditur.”

quidam

(PA

prologue. n6)

“...quod scire aliquid est perfecte cognoscere ipsum, hoc autem est perfecte
apprehendere veritatem ipsius: eadem enim sunt principia esse rei et veritatis ipsius, ut
patet ex

ii

metaphysicae. oportet igitur scientem,

cognoscat causam
effectum
quid

et

in actu,

si est perfecte cognoscens, quod
autem cognosceret causam tantum, nondum cognosceret
scire simpliciter, sed virtute tantum, quod est scire secundum

rei scitae. si

quod

est

quasi per accidens. et ideo oportet scientem simpliciter cognoscere etiam

applicationem causae ad effectum." (PA I.4.n5)
38

"cum

emm
.

intellectus concipit hoc quod est animal rationale mortale, apud se
similitudinem hominis habet; sed non propter hoc cognoscit se hanc similitudinem

habere, quia non iudicat

secunda operatione

hominem

esse animal rationale et mortale: et ideo in hac sola

intellectus est veritas et falsitas,

secundum quam non solum

intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super

73

ipsam similitudinem

C ° gn ° SCendo et

itU

rehnf
H solum
ebus, sed
“et

diiudicando ipsam. ex his igitur
patet, quod veritas non est
mente, et etiam in compositione et
divisione.” (M VI.4.cl236)

hoc ideo, quia esse

emm

“99)

in

"

6t

n°n GSt

rei est

causa verae existimationis
S£d m meme Ut diCetU

m rebUS

’

quam mens

in

habet de

^n -toTmu?(M

'

s

The examples used here concern
propositions that represent material
and thus it is natural to refer to the ‘state
of affairs' represented by the
proposmon 8 This is not meant to suggest that
propositions only represent states of
affairs of material particulars Aquinas holds that propositions about non-material
objects (e.g., mathematical objects) can
also be true. For the sake of brevity,
I will
continue to refer to states of affairs as the
referents of propositions, but we should
understand this expression to refer not only to
states of material objects but also to nonmaterial ones. Some readers may prefer
something like ‘relation of ideas’ in cases like
these, to ‘states of affairs.'
mean for ‘states of affairs' to be metaphysically broad
enough to cover all such cases, both sensible and
intelligible.
particulars,

.

I

41

“sciendum

est

autem, quod

cum

quaelibet cognitio perficiatur per hoc quod
cognitae est in cognoscente; sicut perfectio rei cognitae
consistit in hoc
quod habet talem formam per quam est res tabs, ita perfectio
cognitionis consistit in
hoc, quod habet similitudinem formae praedictae.
... ita verum et falsum designant
perfectiones cognitionum.” (M VI.4.C 1 234)

similitudo

rei

In
43

44

M V.l 8.cl033.

See

PA

See

also,

P

III. 1

1x385.

I.4.n8.

“quia incertitudo causatur propter transmutabilitatem materiae sensibilis;
unde

quanto magis acceditur ad earn, tanto scientia
45

est

est

minus

certa.”

(PA

1.41. n3)

autem considerandum quod de his quidem quae sunt sicut frequenter,
quantum in eis est aliquid necessitatis, necessarium

contingit esse demonstrationem, in

autem, ut dicitur

in

ii

physicorum,

et deficiunt in

minori parte;

semper

(PA

vera.’’

“unde

aliter est in naturalibus,

et aliter in disciplinis, idest in

quae sunt vera

ut frequenter,

mathematicis, quae sunt

I.42.n3)

si fiat

demonstratio ex eo quod

est prius in generatione, non concludet
accipiamus hoc ipsum esse necessarium, semen olivae ut
frequenter esse generativum olivae, quia hoc facit secundum proprietatem suae naturae,

ex necessitate;

nisi forte

nisi impediatur.” (PA.I.42.n3)
47

“huiusmodi tamen demonstrationes non faciunt simpliciter scire verum esse
quod concluditur, sed secundum quid, scilicet quod sit verum ut in pluribus; et sic etiam
principia quae assumuntur, veritatem habent. unde huiusmodi scientiae deficiunt a
scientiis, quae sunt de necessariis absolute, quantum ad certitudineni demonstrationis.”

(PA

II.12.n5)
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48
t thls point 1 d hkc
to raise a red flag: this
certitude-weakened form of
cientw does not allow one to know
conclusions as absolutely necessary but
only “that
H maJOnty ° f cases/ But the reader
wil1 recall that acts of contingency
__
are
th
!?
f
kmd
WhlCh thC COgmtions are connected not
° !! aSOnm8
necessarily but only
contin
tl
?certitude-weakened scientia
contingently.
This sort of
would thus seem to be an act of
contingency, not an act of necessity. But
as we saw in section 2.1, acts of
contingency
yield opinion (or suspicion), and acts
of necessity yield scientia. So how are
we to
understand this certitude-weakened sciential
Is it actually a form of scientia
or is it
opinion? Or do the two shade into each other?
It is not entirely clear how
Aquinas

^

would resolve these questions. However,

in chapter 3.1.1, 1 argue that Aquinas
intends
opinion and scientia to be quite distinct from
the others. Allowing a
certitude-weakened scientia that counts both as scientia
and as contingent causes
problems for Aquinas's account of faith as I present it
in chapter
and for

each of

faith,

his solution

3,

problem of faith and reason as I present it in chapter
5. This is a thorny problem
and not easily resolved, and unfortunately, must be
put off because I do not have the
space to engage it here.

to the

Other ways one can have scientia quia but not scientia
propter quid are
in PA 1.24-25. I will not cover them here,
because it serves my purpose to
point out the distinction between knowledge that and
knowledge why but does not
serve my purposes to go into detail describing all the
various ways we can have scientia

considered

,

quia.

ergo primo quod scientia dicitur una, ex hoc quod est unius generis
subiecti. cuius ratio est, quia processus scientiae cuiuslibet est
quasi quidam motus
rationis. cuiuslibet autem motus unitas ex termino principaliter
consideratur, ut patet in
dicit

v physicorum,
scientiae. est

et

ideo oportet quod unitas scientiae consideretur ex fine sive ex termino

autem cuiuslibet

scientiae finis sive terminus, genus circa

scientia: quia in speculativis scientiis nihil aliud quaeritur

subiecti; in practicis

(PA

autem

est

cognitio generis

scientiis intenditur quasi finis constructio ipsius subiecti ”

1.41. n7)
51

52

See

PA

1.41. n7.

“cum ergo

scibile sit

proprium obiectum

secundum diversitatem materialem
eorum formalem.” (PA 1.4 1 .n
scientiae

1

53

“sicut
ita

quam

quod

non diversificabuntur
secundum diversitatem

scientiae,

scibilium, sed

1

autem formalis

ratio visibilis

sumitur ex lumine, per quod color videtur.

formalis ratio scibilis accipitur secundum principia, ex quibus aliquid

scitur. et ideo

quantumeunque sint aliqua diversa scibilia secundum suam naturam, dummodo per
eadem principia sciantur, pertinent ad unam scientiam; quia non erunt iam diversa in
quantum sunt scibilia. sunt enim per sua principia scibilia.” (PA 1. 41.nl 1)
54

“sicut patet

quod voces humanae multum differunt secundum suam naturam
secundum eadem principia attenditur

sonis inanimatorum corporum; sed tamen, quia

75

a

consonantia in vocibus humanis et sonis
inanimatorum corporum, eadem est scientia
musicae, quae de utnsque considerat. si
vero aliqua sint eadem secundum
naturam et
tamen per diversa pnncipia considerentur,
manifestum est quod ad diversas scientias
pertinent, sicut corpus mathematicum
non est separatum subiecto a corpore naturaliquia tamen corpus mathematicum
cognoscitur per principia quantitatis, corpus
autem
naturale per pnncipia motus, non est
eadem scientia geometria
”

(PA

et naturalis

1.41 .nl 1)

The

principles of a science serve as the grounds
for the truth of the
is, they cause the conclusion
to be true. This statement

conclusion, that
interpreted in

two ways:

it

can be
can be taken as an observation about epistemology
(earlier
thoughts), or about metaphysics (A, which
makes the first

oughts bring about later
thought true, causes B, which
t

just given

because

seems

we

to allow the

distinguish their

in turn

causes the later thought). The account of science
ambiguity to remain. Are the sciences divided as

they are

on purely epistemological grounds (by their
various modes of apprehension) or are the sciences
divided on metaphysical grounds
first, and lor this reason we make
subsequent epistemic divisions? Aquinas scholars are
divided on this issue. For a metaphysical division of
the sciences,

MacDonald

(1993),

p.

first

principles

see, for instance,
170. For the opposing view, see Jenkins
(1997) p. 258. fn 5.

6

should note here that Aquinas does not seem particularly struck
by these
epistemic worries. In considering them, am making a purely
dialectical move - by
considering the worries concerning how we get scientia and how
we know that we have
it, we can better understand Aquinas’s
account of scientia.
1

I

See MacDonald (1993) and Jenkins (1997). For a very thorough account of
an interpretation of how Aristotle understood these conditions, see McKirahan
(1992).
5g

which

Aquinas does seem

is less

"

g

than perfect

"nam

-

esse et esse

hold that other acts of the reason can produce scientia
example, scientia quia.

to

for

verum convertuntur.

conclusionem demonstrationis, quae facit
consequens eius propositiones.” (PA I.4.n.l3)
et sic

oportet ergo id

quod

scire, oportet esse

scitur esse

veram,

et

verum.

per

60

“detur ergo quod aliquis demonstrator syllogizet ex demonstrabilibus, sive
mediatis: aut ergo habet illorum demonstrationem, aut non habet: si non habet, ergo non
scit

praemissa,

et ita

nec conclusionem propter praemissa;

demonstrationibus non

sit

abire in infinitum, ut infra

aliqua immediata et indemonstrabilia.”
61

There

is

I.4.n.l4)

another sense of 'immediate’ beyond the meaning 'indemonstrable'

used here. 'Immediate'

is

understanding, in which

we

this,

(PA

autem habet, cum in
ostendet, tandem erit devenire ad
si

also used to pick out the result of an act of intellectus or
,

intellectually 'see’ the truth of a proposition.

see chapter 3.I.2.D.

76

For more on

sed de pnmis, quae non habent causam,
est alia
tabs eorum cognitio est certior omni

intel hguntur; et

scientia certitudinem habet.”
63

Aquinas seems

demonstration

ratio, ilia

scientia, quia

In

(PA

enim per

ex

tali

se

intelligent^

1.42. n. 8)

to recognize the limitations

of the applicability

M II.5.c336, he says that demonstration should be usedof“only in the

case of those things which have no matter”
for these things have certitude in
virtue of
being unchangeable. Mathematics, because

demonstrable, as

is

natural philosophy

it is abstracted from
matter, is
the science of celestial bodies, because
they are unchanging.

Since

concerned with changeable matter, “[demonstration]
does not
belong to natural philosophy” according to
Aquinas.
64

In

ST

1.46.1. prol.

In

SI

1.1.1,

come

reason
article,

Aquinas

states that truths about

only to a few, and are mixed with

think

I

is

clear that the reasoning

s

it

many

God

that are investigated

by

From the context of the
mind here is purported

errors.

Aquinas has

in

demonstration.
”...

modo

quod

tarn scientes,

quam non

opinantur
habent.”

sic se

(PA

habere

in

scientes, existimantes

tamen se scire, hoc
non scientes enim qui existimant se scire,
cognoscendo, sicut dictum est; scientes autem vere sic se

accipiunt scire sicut dictum

est:

I.4.n6)

“quandoque vero

intellectus possibilis determinatur ad

hoc quod totaliter
quandoque a voluntate. ab
intelligibili quidem quandoque quidem mediate, quandoque autem
immediate,
immediate quidem quando ex ipsis intelligibilibus statim veritas propositionum

adhaereat uni

parti;

sed hoc est quandoque ab

intelligibili,

intellects infallibiliter apparet. et haec est dispositio intelligentis principia, quae statim
cognoscuntur notis terminis, ut philosophus dicit. et sic ex ipso quod quid est,
immediate intellectus determinatur ad huiusmodi propositiones. mediate vero, quando
cognitis definitionibus terminorum, intellectus determinatur ad alteram partem
contradictionis, virtute

primorum principiorum.

et ista est dispositio scientis.

quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem
contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum, sicut in principiis, nec
etiam virtute principiorum, sicut est in conclusionibus demonstrationis; determinatur
autem per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter
aliquid,

quod

est sufficiens

ad

movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum
bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire. et ista est

intellectum, utpote quia videtur
dispositio credentis, ut
vel utile.”

(QDV

cum

aliquis credit dictis alicuius hominis, quia videtur ei decens

14.1)

These are principles
69

principle,

that are

known per

se.

Using contemporary terms, we might say
it

is

in virtue

See, for example.

that

when we have

of its being analytic (which, for Aquinas,

77

is

PA

1.

10.

certitude about a

that the notion

of the

predicate

contained in the notion of the subject cf.
XI.4.c2210
IV 5 c 595t
we have certitude about a conclusion, it is in
virtue of self-evident premises
employed in a deductive inference
is

M

and when

M

70

oc
I

‘

a.

nA

m f
-

-

We Cannot err in und erstanding first principles.
See ST
wlU not give Aquinas’s account of the
reliability of our

dS ha

i

ln 15 n826

,

-

1

intellect here, but see

Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error and Ignorance”
(1991
thorough treatment on error according to
Aquinas.

)

for a

Sed cogmtio nostra adeo debilis est quod nullus
philosophus potuit perfecte
unms musce; unde legitur quod unus philosophus fuit
triginta annis
m solitudine ut cognosceret naturam apis.” ( The Sermon-Conferences
of Si Thomas
Aquinas on the Apostles Creed 1.4.)
lnuestigare naturam

’

,
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CHAPTER 3

AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF FAITH

3.1.

we

In the last chapter,

movement from one

The movement of reason

revisited

presented Aquinas’s account of reason
generically as a

cognition to another. The Posterior Analytics

concerned with one such

sort

to a cognition

of a necessarily true

conclusion. The ideal epistemic state resulting from
demonstration
is

primarily

of movement, demonstration, which involves
a movement

from cognition of necessarily true premises

which

is

is

perfect scientia

,

comprised of three different cognitions: a cognition of the
conclusion, a

cognition that the conclusion

is

necessarily true (certitude), and a perfect cognition of

the truth of the conclusion (which

conclusion true and

why

it

makes

amounts
it

proposition,

we have what amounts

However,

we observed

as

true).

to

an apprehension of what makes the

When we

have perfect scientia of a

form of knowledge of that proposition.

to a perfect

in the last chapter, the

occasions for perfect scientia are rather

limited: in order for us to have complete certitude in the conclusion, the
conclusion
itself

must be necessary, which

rules out

many

truths of natural science ;

1

and the

conditions for perfect apprehension of the truth of a conclusion would seem to limit

demonstration and perfect scientia to analytic or a priori

Complementing perfect
state opinion.

Though Aquinas

scientia (and

did not

its

weakened

comment on

79

truths.

variants)

is

the epistemic

Aristotle's Topics , a text devoted to

the treatment of opinion, he
does discuss

commentary on book

saentm

is

briefly in his last lecture

of the Posterior Analytics. In

I

opinion as being parallel

demonstration

it

in structure to scientia

this lecture,

Aquinas describes

and understanding

movement from premises immediately

a

of the conclusion, the dialectical
syllogism

is

a

from his

2
.

Just as

held (by understanding) to

movement from premises

immediately held (by opinion) to opinion of the
conclusion

from some immediately held premises. These
are premises

3
.

The

dialectician starts

that are

themselves

unproven, and from them he proves his conclusion.
Though Aquinas differentiates two
states involved in demonstration

- he does not

scientia ol conclusions

dialectical syllogism,

of the conclusion

- understanding
distinguish

is

the state of cognizing premises,

two separate

though the opinion of premises

is

states involved in the

distinguished from the opinion

by the former being unproven, and the

latter

being reached as the

conclusion of a syllogism. What differentiates opinion from scientia
or understanding
is

that the objects

of opinion are contingent propositions instead of necessary ones.

Aquinas says:
every truth belongs to either understanding or scientia or opinion, and there
are some contingent truths, and they belong neither to scientia nor
understanding, what is left is that opinion is concerned with them, whether they
be actually true or actually false, provided that they could be other than they are.
...

if

...

For opinion

because then a
opinion

is

that or not

is

not exclusively about things contingent in their very nature,

man

could not have opinion about everything he knows. Rather
is accepted as possible to be otherwise, whether it is

about that which
5
.

Opinion fundamentally

differs

from scientia and understanding

with what could be otherwise; however, ‘could be otherwise'
necessary,' but rather, ‘conceived as not-necessary.’

of premises “so

that the

immediate proposition

80

He

is

in that

it

is

concerned

not to be taken as ‘not

says that one can have opinion

in itself is

indeed necessary, but

it is

accepted by opinion as non-necessary .” 6

When

one cognizes

truth-value ot a proposition to be otherwise
than what

it

is,

that proposition (which, recall, is
a determination to only

that

one

it

possible for the

is

fails to

have certitude of

one possible truth-value

proposition). Thus, the primary distinction
between opinion and scientia

former lacks certitude
opinion, but what

is

7
.

That a proposition

is

only contingently true

is

is that

for a

the

not essential to

essential to opinion, namely, the lack of
certitude, can result

from a

proposition's being contingent.

The movement of reason from one opinion
parallels the

to another (the dialectical syllogism)

movement of reason from understanding

to scientia (the

demonstrative

syllogism), with the essential difference being that the
latter epistemic states include a

cognition of certitude, whereas the former does not.

of the Posterior Analytics

is

What we seem

a fairly detailed account describing the

to

have

at the

mechanisms of

reason which produce scientia and had Aquinas commented on the
Topics
,

,

we

expect a similar account behind the mechanisms of reason that produce opinion

have the acts of reason carved

at the joints in

two

end

could
8
.

We

different ways: acts of reason can be

divided by the logical connection between propositions (either a necessary or contingent
connection, or no connection between the propositions 9 ), and they can be divided by the

epistemic states that result from the
failing to include

now

it).

What we do

movement of reason

not yet have

to this.

81

is

(either including certitude or

Aquinas's account of faith.

We turn

3.1.1.

Faith, scientia. opinion

Aquinas does not give an account of
P°s,erior Analytics , so

Summa

from the

we must

compared and contrasted

faith (fides) in his

turn to his other

works

commentary on

for this

the

10
.

In his treatise

on

faith

Theologiae, Aquinas provides a characterization
of the difference

between scientia opinion and
,

faith:

Scientia cannot simultaneously be together
with opinion about the same thing
simply speaking, since it is part of the account
of scientia that what is known by
scientia cannot possibly be otherwise. It is
part of the account of opinion

what some °ne opines, he recognizes as possibly being
is

had by

because ot the certitude of faith,

faith,

possibly being otherwise.

is

that

another way. But what
also recognized as not
in

One

thing in one respect cannot simultaneously be
known by scientia and believed, for the reason that the known
is seen (visum)
and the believed is not seen ...
1

As we saw

in the last section, scientia is distinguished

has certitude but the

The

latter lacks

it.

Faith,

difference, according to Aquinas,

whereas
faith to

faith is of the 'unseen'

(

on the other hand, appears

that scientia is

non visum).

be of something 'unseen,’

something

is

from opinion

we must

the world, the

it

means

examine what Aquinas means

for

for

mind

s

a metaphorical

"eye” 'sees' things in the mind. Aquinas explains:

likeness to bodily sense, there

medium

is

to understanding things with the intellect. Just as the eye sees things in

This sense that

is

is

also said to be a sense about intelligence

about intelligence does not perceive

its

...

object through a

by some other medium, just as it perceives the
property, and perceives a cause through its effect.

ot bodily distance, but

essence of a thing through
is

certitude.

be ‘seen.’

to

way of referring

He

have

understand what

Seeing a proposition, or alternatively, having 'vision' of it,

By

to

former

of something 'seen' (visum)

In order to

first

in that the

its

said to be sharp in sense about intelligence

nature of the thing

when he has apprehended

its

who comprehends
property or even

its

at

once the

effect,

so far as he attains to the smallest conditions of the thing to be considered.
said to be dull about intelligence

who

82

and

He

is

cannot attain to apprehending the truth of

the thing except by

much exposure

considering completely

to it, and even then cannot
attain to
belongs to the account of the thing 12

all that

.

Understanding

is

the epistemic state that results

sort described in the

animal'

We

passage above.

when we

that

manhood

or understanding ot principles,

man

is

includes rationality and animality.

we can

a rational animal'

conclusion that ‘horses are not men.’
this conclusion,

that

we

and see

is

of the

a rational

From

this vision.

then derivatively see that certain
conclusions are
So, for instance, from our understanding
or

we can
If

we

construct a demonstration yielding the

see the truth of all the premises that yield

premises yield the conclusion, then

we can

also say

see the truth of the conclusion. But this intellectual
vision of the conclusion

satisfies exactly the

same conditions

conclusion. With the

why

conclusion and

we can

that these

intellectual vision

understand the proposition ‘man

true as a result of the truth of the
principles.

seeing that

when we have

latter,

they do

take Aquinas

s

we
-

as perfect apprehension of the truth of the

understand both that the premises lead to the truth of the

this

amounts

to seeing

why

the conclusion

is true.

Thus,

account of intellectual vision to be equivalent to a perfect

apprehension of the truth of a proposition.

From our

definition of the previous chapter, perfect scientia that

P involves

three cognitions: cognition ot P, certitude of P, and perfect apprehension of the truth of
P.

Opinion, according to Aquinas, lacks the

two, but not the

last.

The

last

two cognitions, and

P and opinion

P and not have
necessary).

it

has the

first

three epistemic states perfect scientia opinion and faith are
,

mutually exclusive: one cannot have both perfect scientia
faith that

faith

that P,

because

it

is

that

P and opinion

that P, nor

impossible that one both have certitude that

(one cannot simultaneously hold P to be necessary and non-

One cannot have

both perfect scientia that P and

83

faith that

P because

it

is

impossible that one both have a perfect
apprehension of the truth that P and lack

cannot simultaneously apprehend

why P

the previous chapter, perfect scientia

principles that are understood

had by means

(i.e.,

is

is

true

and not apprehend

13
it ).

it

As we saw

in

had by means of a demonstration from

are seen) to conclusions that are
seen. Opinion

oi a dialectical syllogism

(one

from principles

that are

is

accepted as true (but

not seen to be true, nor are seen to be
necessary) to conclusions that follow from
those
principles (but likewise are not seen to be
true, nor are seen to be necessary).
But what

exactly

is

the

movement involved

lacking vision?

And how

in faith?

To address these questions,

3.1.2.

As opposed

,

bit

intellectual

to

Aquinas’s account of faith.

has been written recently on his account of faith.

and Voluntarists.

component

now

have certitude while

of recent work on Aquinas’s account of

Interpreters of Aquinas roughly tend to fall into

Intellectualists

turn

faith

Faith as belief

to the relative scarcity

reason and scientia quite a

we

does

one of two broad categories:

Intellectualist interpreters

of Aquinas tend to

of his account of faith. For these interpreters, faith

cognitive state, involving cognition of and assent to propositions
that

He

is

acquires

Under an

triune, etc.).

its

certitude

justification (or

its

is

Intellectualist interpretation, the question

primarily a

God

exists,

of how

frequently understood as a question of how belief acquires

warrant)

where Aquinas seems

(e.g. that

is

stress the

- and thus many

Intellectualist interpreters

to provide or appeal to evidence that
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faith

its

look for places

grounds belief and

The Intellectuals

certitude.

stance

well expressed by

is

Anthony Kenny,

in his

book

The Five Ways:

To me

it

seems

justified, there

that if belief in the existence of
God cannot be rationally
can be no good reason for adopting any
of the traditional

monotheistic religions. A philosophical proof
of God’s existence from the
nature ot the world would not be the only
form such a rational justification
might take: a man might, tor instance, come to
accept the existence of God
through believing something in the world to be
a revelation from God ... Those
philosophers and theologians who still consider
belief in God to need rational
justification frequently offer the arguments
of Aquinas as such a justification. 15

Many

critics find the Intellectualist interpretation
to

to provide

raises

an account of faith that

be unsatisfactory because

not characteristically Christian. Eleonore

is

some important questions about

faith that Intellectualist interpretations

seems

it

Stump

seem

unable to answer:

First, if there is

an omniscient and omnipotent God, why would he want
relationships with him to be based on faith? Why wouldn't he
make his

human

existence and nature as obvious and uncontroversial to all human beings
as the
existence of their physical surroundings is? Second, why should having
faith be
meritorious, as Christian doctrine maintains it is? And why should faith be
supposed to make acceptable to God a person whom God would otherwise
reject? Finally,
little

why

is it

that epistemological considerations

role in adult conversions?

seem

to play so

6

Often, critics of the Intellectualist interpretation will instead focus on the role of the will
in

Aquinas

more

s

account of

taith,

finding in

typical of Christian faith.

emphasis on the

will

and

its

it

the locus of the merit and salvation that

These Voluntarist

movement

Because Aquinas reserves a

to

interpreters tend to place

more

produce a characteristically Christian

role for both the will

and the

is

17

faith.

18

intellect in faith

it

is

not immediately clear whether an Intellectualist or Voluntarist interpretation (or

something

else) should be advanced.

voluntary component also makes

be.

In the

it

That faith involves both a cognitive and a

not entirely clear what Aquinas understands faith to

remainder of this section and the

rest
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of the chapter, we

shall

examine closely

what Aquinas does say about
exactly

is

the

faith,

movement involved

lacking vision'? The

first

question

keeping

That

we do

the following

faith

is

supposed

to

two questions: What

have certitude while

of fundamental importance

any Voluntarist interpretation of faith
fundamental for any

mind

And how does

in faith?

is

in

how

for understanding

work; similarly, the second

is

Intel lectualist interpretation.

not have a perfect apprehension of the truth
of matters of faith seems

quite appropriate. Perfect apprehension of the
truth of faith requires understanding

what made the matters of faith

Now matters of faith,
supposed

Aquinas
that

it

for instance, that

to be mysteries

says,

true as well as

— we

God

why

they

is triune,

or that

all

first

Him

is

less than

least

true

hold

incarnate, are

is

why

they are true.

{scire) about the first cause

what God

is.

...

that

state

[Dionysius] presents this proposition: The

of faith seems correct. However, many have objected

does not provide vision, then

an

it

it

could not provide certitude

20
.

truth

that if

This objection has

would seem

that if

you cannot see why a proposition

you lack perfect apprehension of its

truth),

you would not be determined

initial plausibility, tor

(i.e.

is

whatever one can think or

cause transcends description .” 10 Thus, excluding perfect apprehension of the

from the epistemic
faith

He

our knowledge ( scientiam ) and power of expression. For that one

apprehends ( cognoscit ) God most perfectly who holds
say about

the matters of faith true.

are not supposed to understand

The most important thing we can know

surpasses

made

it

at

is

to

as necessary (you'd have no reason for ruling out other possible truth values).

In order to see

why

faith

could include certitude,

discussion of the motion that leads to certitude that
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we need

we covered

to return to

Aquinas’s

in the last chapter (in

2.4.2.

1

).

I

include again a passage from the
Disputed Questions on Truth from that

section:

Sometimes, however, the understanding can be
determined to one side of a
contradictory proposition neither immediately
through the definitions of the
terms, as

is the case with principles, nor
yet in virtue of principles, as is the
case
with conclusions from a demonstration.
And in this situation our understanding
is determined by the will,
which chooses to assent to one side definitely
and
precisely because of something which is enough
to move the will, though not
enough to move the understanding, namely, since it
seems good or fitting to

assent to this side.

when someone
do
Certitude

And

this is the state

is

the result of a judgment, one

about either by the intelligible object (as

this

former case,

we

we have

vision

cannot help but hold that

intellectual vision of the truth.

(i

credere )

- something moves

result of this

which moves the

vision that

it

seems

may happen

fitting or useful to

movement of the

it

— we
is

necessarily true

in the truth

- our

is

true,

and

by the

in seeing

certitude follows

we have what Aquinas
(we lack

will.

from the

calls ‘belief

vision),

and as a

are determined to one side of a contradiction, and

comes with understanding, and

has certitude

can be brought

in the last chapter) or

the will, but not the intellect

we

consider only one

intellect

see that the proposition

In the latter case,

will

intellect to

movement of the

we examined

thus to certitude. Faith (fides ), for Aquinas,

but

believes. This
it

so.

side of a contradiction as possibly true. This

In the

who

of one

believes what another says because

is

a species of belief ( credere )

-

it

lacks the

thus lacks perfect apprehension of the truth,

of the object of belief, though the certitude comes

to the

believer as a result of an act of will rather than a result of vision. Under this account,
there are

two sources of certitude, vision and

of understanding, the
explain

how

latter

will.

The former source provides

certitude

provides certitude of belief. This account does not yet really

the will generates certitude, nor does

it

yet offer a satisfactory

the objection raised earlier (that certitude requires vision).
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answer

to

3.1.2. 1.

According

An

appetite

is

What makes

to

Aquinas’s account of belief

Aquinas, the will

is

a “rational appetite” ( appetitus rationalis 22
).

“an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards
23
that thing .”

this appetite rational is that the thing that

we

desire

is

presented to us in an

apprehension. Rational appetites differ from other appetites
in that what

apprehended as desirable -

states,

object as desirable. In short, the will

is

good

whether or not the object
apprehend

it

as

do not present

good

is

that

to the intellect the desired

power by which something we apprehend

Whether or not we desire something by the

desired.

is

desired

natural and sensitive appetites, though they also incline

persons and things towards desirable

as

is

itself is actually

for us. All

good

for us, but only

will

does not depend on

whether or not we

goods except happiness are capable of being

apprehended by us as not good, as Aquinas explains:
Therefore

it the will be offered an object which is good universally and from
every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all;

since

it

cannot will the opposite.

object that

is

And

will

it

will not tend to

some good, can be regarded

will,

which can tend

.

Once something

is

apprehended as good and desired, one

in order to obtain this desired

that eating lunch

will

of

as non-goods, and from

of view, they can be set aside or approved by the
24
one and the same thing from various points of view

this point

of action

it

an

since lack of any

so far as they are lacking in

to

will is offered

good whatever, is a non-good, consequently
good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing is such a good that the
cannot not-will it; and this is Happiness. But any other particular goods, in

necessity.
that

on the other hand, the

If,

not good from every point of view,

have willed

now would
to

is

then able to initiate a course

good. So, for instance, should one apprehend

be good and develops a desire for lunch,

have lunch. From

this a

person

88

may

in this

way one

initiate a deliberation as to

how

to achieve this goal,

which ultimately can lead

to

choosing and pursuing some course of

action aimed at getting lunch. 25

The

initial

movement of the

will, or

apprehension ol something as good lor
section (from

will "‘which

which

QDV

namely, since

it

to

(“it

In the

proceeds from

passage from the previous

Aquinas characterizes belief as the

14.1),

move

the will, though not

seems good or

more than simple
good

to desire.

26

state resulting

from the

chooses to assent to one side definitely and precisely because of something

enough

is

it

simple willing,

willing

seems good

to

move

the understanding,

We can

fitting to assent to this side.”

- though

...”)

enough

see that belief is

does involve an apprehension of something as

it

and involves desire

(“is

enough

to

move

the will

also

...”); it

results in

an action, namely assent to a proposition. That belief is more than simple

willing

clear

is

because
to

it

is

Irom the following:

sufficiently

moved by

“... the

understanding assents to something, not

the proper object, but by a choice of the will tending

one alternative rather than another.”

27

We can thus define

belief in P as follows.

S has belief that P =df ( 1 ) S apprehends P,
(2)

S apprehends that assenting

to

P would be good

for S,

(3) this leads to a desire in S to assent to P,

(4) this leads to a choice

(5) this leads

For Aquinas,

faith (fides) is

For the

to the question

state

What

of the believer

something through the

will,

S to assent to

to assent to P,

same model
is

and

2X

P.

simply a species of belief (credere).

assent to matters of faith follows the

Aquinas gives

by S

We

see that the

as that of belief from this response that

faith? in the

Disputed Questions on Truth

such that the intellect is determined to
and the will does nothing except in so lar as

:

... is

89

it

is

moved by

its

object,

which

the good to be sought for and its end.
In view of
needs a twofold principle, a first which is the
good that moves the
will, and a second which is that to which
the understanding gives assent under
the influence of the will.
is

this, faith

un<fer the

something which

movement

ot this good, proposes as

worthy of assent

not evident to the natural understanding. In
this
the understanding a determination to that which
is not evident, the
is

way

it

gives

determination, namely, to assent to it. Therefore,
just as the intelligible thing
which is seen by the understanding determines the understanding,
and for this
reason is said to give conclusive evidence to the mind;
so also, something which
is not evident to the understanding
determines it and convinces the mind because
the will has accepted it as something to which assent
29
should be given.
In faith, as with other acts

of belief there

generates a simple willing to assent to

is

a “twofold principle”: the

some matter of faith,

chooses to pursue the desired good and influences the
faith

counts as a species of fte/ze/because

definition of belief.

I

it

,

the second in

intellect to assent.

satisfies the five conditions

have not yet provided the

other acts ol belief nor have

first

criteria

by which

we examined how Aquinas

does, in tact, satisfy the five conditions given above.

I

explains

which

which the

For Aquinas,

given in the

faith differs

how

will

from

Christian faith

turn to the latter issue in the next

section (the former will be visited in section 3.1.3).

3.1. 2.2. Belief and the will

Conditions (l)-(3) of the definition of belief yield a simple willing to assent

some

proposition

- one apprehends

and subsequently desires
have a simple willing

come

to

apprehend

to

do

so.

to assent to

that

it

would be good

What we need

to

that assenting to

to assent to the proposition

examine

some matter of faith

first

is

how one might come

by looking

at

how one

some matter of faith would be good. Aquinas

repeatedly and tersely identifies what grounds this apprehension;

90

to

to

might

.

.

faith is called “the substance

.

of things hoped

initial participation of the eternal life
for

promise.

And

in this

good which moves
Thus, too,

we

are

way mention

the will in

moved

eternal life as a reward
to

what

is

said,

understands.

it

its

made of the

is

faith

and the

30

what God says because we are promised
And this reward moves the will to assent

although the intellect

this

between

intellect.

believe.

not

is

31

Aquinas also characterizes

relation

determination of the

to believe

we

inasmuch as it is for us an
which we hope by reason of the divine
for,”

good

in

moved by anything which

terms of an

evil to

it

be avoided:

Faith produces in us an apprehension of certain punitive
evils that are assigned
because of divine judgment. And in this way faith is the cause of the fear

by

which someone

We

fears to be punished

by God, which

can apprehend that assenting to matters of

apprehend

that if

we

accept them,

we

will be

taith

that accepting matters

apprehend that having eternal

life is

good),

servile fear.

would be good

rewarded with eternal

related motivation appears to be that if we reject them,

Once we apprehend

is

we

will be

of faith yields eternal

for us
33
life.

32

because

we

(A second,

punished by God.)

life

(and also

becomes understandable why we would

it

desire to accept matters of faith. These motivations will generate in us a simple willing

to assent to matters

of faith.

In order to understand

how

a simple willing to assent can lead to a choosing to

assent (condition [4]) and finally to assenting to matters of faith (condition

must

first

take a look at what Aquinas

faith is not

means by

simply accepting the proposition

to

‘assent.’

be

true, for

[5]),

we

For Aquinas, the assent

in

opinion includes such

acceptance but lacks the assent of faith:

Sometimes, however, the understanding tends more to one side than the other;
still, that which causes the inclination does not move the understanding enough
to determine it fully to one of the members. Under this influence, it accepts
one member, but always has doubts about the other. This is the state of
one holding an opinion, who accepts ( accipit ) one member of the contradictory
{accipit)

proposition with

some

fear that the other is true.
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one who has an opinion does not give
assent, because his
acceptance (acceptio) of the one side is not
firm.
us, also,

The Latin word sententia as
a clear or very certain certissima
(
) comprehension of
of a contradictory proposition. And
assentire is derived

saac and Avicenna say,

one member

is

from

sententia.

Aquinas

links assent with firm acceptance

and certain (certissima) comprehension,

in

other words, certitude. 35 Here he explicitly
links certitude and assent:

second way, the understanding assents to something,
not because it is
sufficiently moved by the proper object, but
by a choice of the will tending to
one alternative rather than another. And if this occurs
with doubt and hesitation
about the other alternative, there is opinion. If it
occurs with certitude and
without any such hesitation, there is faith. 36
In a

Opinion and
certitude,

faith differ generically

because

faith involves firm assent,

whereas opinion lacks both. The assent of faith

differs, as

the assent of understanding or scientia because the
former

inducing certitude, whereas the
then,

If the

is

latter is a result

simply the act by which the

cause of the assent

is

back to the concern raised

intellect is

at the

end of section

is

is

how

is

brought to certitude about a proposition.

3.1.1:

how

that the will (in

is

assent in the next section, and

how

:

brought

producing belief) generates

simply analytic: belief is defined

defined as producing certitude.

We turn now to

We are now

can the will (without vision)

a simple willing can result in assent, and

certitude in a believer.

seen, from

of vision determining certitude. Assent,

assent and assent yields certitude. But this answer
as producing assent and assent

we have

a result of the will

vision, the assent yields understanding.

generate certitude? The answer to this

understand

is

which includes

how

these issues, considering

What we

still

need

this assent induces

how

the will produces

this assent induces certitude in section 3.1 .2.4.
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to

The

3. 1.2.3.

will

That one might have a simple willing

life,

a bit

is

which one proceeds from a
will

can

good,

to the

is

is

said,

How one

more complicated. Aquinas

can lead

to

proceeds from a simple

two causes by

identifies

desire to assent to actually assenting:

the intellect in

two ways.

way

is

First, from the ordering of the will
a praiseworthy act. In another way, because
convinced in judging that there is something to be believed in

in this

the intellect

what

move

of faith seems

that assent to these matters

a desire to assent follows fairly naturally.

desire to assent to assent

The

to assent to a proposition

- once someone recognizes

quite understandable

eternal

and assent

even

if

some prophet might

believing

not convinced by the evidence of the thing. Just so
predict some future thing with the word of the Lord, and

it

is

add

to it the sign of raising the dead, and might convince by this sign
the
understanding of an observer, so that the observer might clearly apprehend that
the things said were said by God, who does not lie. Even so the predicted
future
thing would not be evident in itself, so that the account of faith would not be

away

taken

The second

some

sort

sort

37
.

of cause mentioned

of evidence

that

in the

what someone

above passage suggests

tells

us

is

true if that person accurately

prophesies or performs miracles. In these sorts of cases,

God

is

speaking through

Notice that

this

this

- even

if

we may

This sort of evidence, evidence that P

faith.

(as

If faith

are supposed to infer that

is

is true.

perfect apprehension) of the truth of what

(i.e.

we know that

those things are true; however,

would count

we

messenger, and thus, that what the messenger says

does not give us vision

the messenger says

we can have

that

everything he says

why we might

see

true

true,

be justified

we do
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why

them.

asserts,

the justification of belief of matters of

this

interpretation of Aquinas.

not see

in believing

on the basis of what someone

Kenny admits above) towards

were based on such evidence,

is

would seem

to support

an Intellectualist

Suppose we witness John performing miracles,
then
about

God

(perhaps that

He

is triune).

uttering

some statement P

We might think that this constitutes conclusive

evidence for P, along the lines of the following argument,
which

shall call the veracity

I

argument.
(a)

John performs miracles and

(b)

It

someone performs a

(c)

If

someone

is

1

If an assertion

.'.(e)

P

is

why P

is true),

that assertion

is

true

scientia of the conclusion (this argument does not

one might plausibly hold

,

that the conclusion

2.3.2). Scientia

a messenger of God

true

demonstration quia and hence that

knowledge

is

God

comes from God, then

hough we do not have perfect

us

miracle, then that person

a messenger of God, then any assertion uttered by that

person comes from
(d)

P

utters

is

that the

we have

argument constitutes a

scientia quia of the conclusion, that

true (recall the account of scientia quia

quia lacks the perfect apprehension that

does have certitude, which
faith lacks the vision

is

show

also the case for faith.

is

is,

from section

part of perfect scientia but

As we saw

in section 3.1.1

above,

of perfect scientia but so does scientia quia. Thus, one might be
,

inclined to interpret faith as a species of scientia one that lacks vision because the
,

faithful

to

do not understand why matters of faith

are true, but do understand

why

they are

be believed. This interpretation, though tempting, cannot accurately capture what

Aquinas means by
Aquinas

faith,

identifies a

and

this for several reasons.

First,

second and separate cause of faith and

directed to the good,’' and faith that

comes from
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this

cause

from the passage above,

that is “the will being

is

that

of the “faithful of

Christ

,

whereas the

(tor

more on

rely

on evidence, seems

this see section 3.2.2 below).

to be

has been developed thus

tar.

evidence alone

faith, this

from evidence of the veracity argument

faith

is

more

in line

is

that

of the demons

This other cause of faith, one that does not
with the conception of belief and the will that

Second, though evidence without vision can be a cause
of

not sufficient for faith, according to Aquinas.

external inducement (e.g. by evidence of miracles)

He

not “a sufficient cause.

is

says that

Among

those seeing one and the same miracle, and those hearing the
same preaching, some

some do not

believe and

believe.

which moves man inwardly
evidence

is

not sufficient tor

scientia)

so another inward cause must be recognized,

to assent to the things that are

not sufficient, then taith cannot be

demonstration quia

that the act

And

is

sufficient for this

Finally,

faith.

of believing

is

some

Aquinas

but, as

Aquinas claims,

distinguished from

all

He

it is

says

other acts of the intellect (including

4I

first

rejected interpretation for faith

this, certitude) that

conclusive evidence
will being directed

internal cause,

does

grace

,

explicitly rejects this interpretation.

was

that

conclusive evidence for the veracity of testimony - one

how

If this external

.

This

from

40

of scientia quia< for a

sort

form of scientia

of faith/’

it

is

was

it

who

matters of faith are true. Aquinas

assent brought about by

has faith has proof (and

tells

us that this sort of

not sufficient for faith, and that Christian faith

towards the good.

He

also tells us that assent

which moves man inwardly

to assent.

What

is

caused by the

comes from some

is this

internal cause,

lead one from a simple willing to assent? In short, this cause

:
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is

and

God's

.

.

believing does

.

man

lie in

the will of the believer. But

be prepared by

God

through grace

are above nature, as

was

said above.

And

so as regards assent, which

moving inwardly by

grace.

is

43

is required that the will of
be elevated to the things that

in order to

42

it

the principal act of faith, faith

is

from God

Nicodemus, having an imperfect opinion about Christ, affirmed
that he was a
teacher and performed these signs [i.e., miracles]
as a mere man. And so the
...

Lord wishes

to show Nicodemus how he might arrive at
a deeper understanding
cognitionem ) of him. And as a matter of fact, the Lord might
have done so with
an argument, but because this might have resulted in a
quarrel - the opposite of
which was prophesied about him: u He will not quarrel” (Is
42:2) - he wished to
lead him to a true understanding cognitionem with
(
gentleness.
As if to say: It
)
(

is

not strange that you regard

(scire) these secrets

regeneration.

And

44

provide evidence for the truths of matters of faith, this

to

not sufficient for instilling faith in a person. Nicodemus, according to

is

the Gospel of John (3:5), explicitly

seemed

to accept the veracity

passages above

mere man, because one cannot know

of the divinity unless he has achieved a spiritual
what he says: unless one is born again, he cannot see

Though miracles would seem
evidence alone

as a

this is

kingdom of God.

the

me

it is

acknowledged Jesus

as a divine messenger, and

argument. Yet Nicodemus did not yet have

God's grace

necessary for

In the

faith.

that

is

first

apprehends a proposition, and then apprehends

faith,

not the evidence of the

veracity of the messenger.

In

as

coming

to believe

good (conditions

[1]

&

one

[2]).

The awareness of the proposition comes from

testimony of another - someone
that assenting to

to

it,

and desire

it

can give us eternal

to assent to

choose to assent

tells

it

us about

life,

(condition

it

Once we hear

we apprehend

[3]).

that

Aquinas says

to the proposition (condition [4])

for the veracity of the testimony of the person

assent to

it.

we

it

the

the proposition and hear

would be good

that for faith,

to assent

we do

not

on the basis of conclusive evidence
heard

it

from -

instead,

we choose

because of an inward cause, namely, the grace of God. Scripture
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it

(e.g.

to

John

3:5) tells us that grace

necessary for

is

necessary for eternal

We move

faith.

from a desire

life,

and Aquinas construes grace as also

to assent to matters

of faith to a choice to

assent not by mere wishful thinking,
and not by evidence, but by grace.

God moves
shall

(or helps

move)

merely observe here

the definition of belief by

belief,

how we

The grace of

the will from simple willing to choice.
For our purposes,

that, for

Aquinas, one proceeds from conditions
(3) to (4)

means of grace. 45

proceed from a choice

wish

I

now

to

examine the

to assent to assent itself,

and

last stage

how

I

in

of

that assent

yields certitude.

Assent and certitude

3.1. 2.4.

Assent

is

the act that brings about certitude

yields certitude that P.

from

- one

assents to P only

the last chapter (section 2.2.1),

we

when

it

presented Aquinas's

definition of certitude as determination of the intellect to one thing,
or, as firmness of

adherence ol the

moves

intellect.

That the intelligible object

a self-evident proposition)

the intellect to assent in cases of understanding seems fairly straightforward:

simply see that some proposition
assent to

it,

think that

we

(e.g.

is true,

and

in

and we can’t help but firmly adhere

it

must be

understand, that

propositions,

even though

it

is

true (that

is,

that

also clear

in this

we

it

seeing

to

its

it

to

be

true,

we

being true, and

couldn't be otherwise). Taking

we

can’t help but

we

can’t help but

some propositions

that

see to be true, and from them demonstrating other

how we

case the assent

can't help but assent to these conclusions as well,

is

a result of a
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movement of reason

rather than an

immediate

intellectual vision as with self-evident propositions.

Of the

assent in faith.

Aquinas says the following:
But, in faith, the assent and the discursive thought are
more or less parallel. For
is not caused by the thought, but by the will,
as has just been

the assent

said.

However, since the understanding does not
terminated

at

one thing so

sight of

some

to rest.

Rather,

that

it

intelligible object,
it still

believes, even though

is
it

way have

in this

conducted

its

action

to its proper term,

follows that

movement

its

is

which

is

the

not yet brought

thinks discursively and inquires about the things which
its assent to them is unwavering. For, in so far
as it

it

depends on itself alone, the understanding is not satisfied and is not limited to
one thing; instead, its action is terminated only from without. Because of this
the understanding ot the believer
its

own

is said to be “held captive,” since, in place of
proper determinations, those of something else are imposed on it
Due
.

movement

to this, also, a

firmly can arise in him, although this

has scientific knowledge

The assent of faith
intellect is not

is

to

the object by the object

46

will, not

by the

determine one thing or

itself, in

as John

not see that

is

it

is true,

intelligible object.

moved

to

Since the

adhere firmly to the truth of

a way, the intellect has not stopped moving.

explain this situation as follows. Suppose John

He does

.

.

caused by the

moved

.

what the believer holds most
cannot happen to one who understands or

directly opposite to

is

We can

considering whether or not P

so both truth values for P are

still

is true.

possible options as far

concerned. His attention moves back and forth between the two possibilities.

Should John see the evident

truth

of P, or have

it

demonstrated for him, he would then

no longer consider the falsehood of P as a possible option - he would be determined
the truth of P, and the

truth

can

movement of his

attention

would cease and

of P. In the case of faith, John does not see why P

still

move between

pushes the

is true,

only on the

and thus his attention

possible truth values for P, and yet, at the

intellect to assent to P.

settle

to

same time,

the will

There can be, somehow, simultaneously motion and

determination (non-motion) involved in the assent of faith. Aquinas acknowledges that

faith

has exactly this characteristic:
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In faith there is

some

some imperfection. The firmness which
a perfection, but the lack of sight, because
of which the
movement of discursive thought still remains in the mind
of one who believes is
an imperfection. The perfection, namely, the
assent, is caused by the simple
light which is faith. But, since the
participation in this light is not perfect, the
imperfection of the understanding is not completely
removed. For this reason
47
the movement of discursive thought in it stays
pertains to the assent

perfection and

is

’

restless

What we have with
sort

of firmness of assent, yet

because the
false.

intellect

Somehow

Aquinas
this

according to Aquinas,

faith,

tells

can

still

cannot be right — for

it

is

comes from

“caused by the simple

seems

justification for believing that P,

is

the will, and from the passage above,

which

light

is faith.”

that the Intellectualist interpretation

the certitude of faith stems from

it

which derives from some

entertain the possibility that the proposition assented
to

this assent of faith

faith, then,

certitude

firmness does not derive from intellectual vision,

this

us that the assent

account of

is

.

we would seem

to

some

sort

Under

of Aquinas

of rational

have reached an answer regarding

the truth of P, one which results from the termination of discursive thought. Since

discursive reasoning does not terminate in cases of faith, faith does not
this sort

of rational justification

Just as there

truth

is

48

a metaphorical light of natural reason, by which

thus the

we

can come to

intellect

that there is also a light

human understanding has

which of itself is

to involve

.

of propositions, Aquinas holds

And

seem

knowing

sufficient for

know through

cannot know, unless

of faith or prophecy which

is

we

‘see' the

of faith.

a form, namely, intelligible light

the senses. Higher intelligible things the

it

itself,

certain intelligible things, namely, those

be perfected by a stronger

light,

called the light of grace, since

it

is

human

namely, the

added

light

to

49

nature.

...

the light of faith

habits of virtues a

makes one

man

see the things that are believed. Just as by other

sees what

so also by the habit of faith the

is

appropriate for him according to that habit,

mind of man

that are appropriate to right faith

and not

99

is

inclined to assent to the things

to others

70
.

The

light

of faith allows us to

'see'

what

it

is

we

are supposed to believe. In a way,

propositions that are potential candidates for Christian
'see' that they are

supposed

of vision, seeing by the
sees a proposition P
contrast,

when

of faith, which

light

apprehension of the truth of P —
will refer to

someone

perfect apprehension of

When we p-see

this

is

why P

that

P

- our determination

When we

q-see that P

whom

(i.e.,

probably

is true,

we

we

we

whom

it

up
see

to our free-choice

why

On

is

proposition itself to assent to

cannot help but assent to

P

is false,

I

when

we want

it,

is

its

being

absolute.

and we have certitude

Even were we

less strong.

even though

P,

it

seems we could

we might

at

adhere firmly

knowledge from p-seeing

wef-see that

to assent to

(we don't p-see

we

and we have

characterizes the knowledge from q-seeing

the other hand,

it;

it,

of P and the firmness of adherence

why Aquinas

true

Finally.

simply cannot entertain the possibility of

whether or not

the proposition

one has a perfect

does not provide

cannot help but assent to

scientia quia) as having less certitude than the

scientia propter quid):

In

51

least clearly entertain the possibility that

is

One/:

the light of natural reason

persuaded by the veracity argument to accept some proposition

This

can

is true.

about the truth of P, though the certitude seems to be

to its truth.

that

shall refer to as perfect- or p-seeing.

I

to the truth

is true,

we

to be believed.

is

way

such a

in

true ( scientia quia), but for

certitude about the truth of P, for

false

of natural reason

as quia- or q-seeing P for

provides knowledge that P

up' so that

shall refer to as faith- or f-seeing.

I

the light of faith reveals to one that P

one may see by the

'lit

be believed. Aquinas has here introduced another
notion

to

light

beliefs

it),

M
it.

P

is

to be believed,

When w ef-see, we

it

is

don't

and thus we aren't compelled by the

also don't see that the proposition

100

(i.e.,

is

true

(we don't

q ~See

it} ’

and also for

the proposition

is

to

this

reason are not compelled to assent to

Instead,

it.

be believed as part of faith. As a Christian

faithful,

we

see that

one already

desires to assent to certain propositions, the
assenting to which promises eternal

Grace helps the

faithful

this infused light

move from

of faith (which

a simple desire to assent to a choice to
assent, and
also a result of grace ) 54 allows the faithful
to f-see

is

what propositions are worthy of assent. Confident
out the propositions to be believed that
,

of faith will help bring one eternal

life.

life,

God

is

that the light

of faith correctly picks

not a deceiver, and that believing matters

the Christian believer willingly and confidently

assents to matters of faith, and derived from this confidence,
the believer will have a

very firm adherence to the truth of these propositions - and

this satisfies

Aquinas’s

definition of certitude.

Aquinas

is

sensitive to the

worry

that the certitude

of faith does differ in

important respects from the certitude of understanding, and on numerous occasions he
points out that ‘certitude’ can have multiples senses, as he does here in the Disputed

Questions on Truth

mean two

The first is firmness of adherence, and with
more certain than any understanding [of principles] and
scientia. For the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful
cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or
scientia. The second is the evidence of that to which assent is given. Here, faith
Certitude can

reference to

things.

this, faith is

does not have certainty, but scientia and understanding do.
55
too, that understanding has no discursive thought

It is

because of this,

.

Understanding and perfect scientia have both the certitude of firmness of adherence and
the certitude of evidence, and faith only has the former.

What

is

striking

claim that faith has more firmness of adherence than understanding assent that

results

is

subject to a free choice of the will

from the

intellect

would be

it

is

Aquinas's

would seem

that

less firm than assent that

being completely unable to entertain other possible truth values

101

We

tor a proposition.

shall return to this

worry when

consequences of Aquinas's account of faith

have thus

far

act.

Aquinas takes

in section 3.3.

been concerned with the act of faith

belief), that is, the particular

assenting to matters of

consider the epistemological

Faith as habit and virtue

3.1.3.

We

we

faith.

movements of the
However,

intellect

and the will

for Aquinas, faith

his definition tor faith

(as a species

of act of

that result in

properly a habit, not an

is

from Scripture: “Faith

is

the substance of

things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that
appear not.” (Heb. 11:1). In the

Summa

Theologiae, Aquinas explains

how this

passage

is to

be interpreted. From

it.

he

extracts the following definition for faith:

If therefore

definition,

begins
Since faith

closely

we

is

it

in us,

making
is,

What

powers involved

in the act

words of this kind

to the form of a
a habit of mind, by which eternal life

what does not appear.” 57

a settled state of mind, by examining this habit

its

is this

principal act: the act of faith that

habit of faith?

powers of the soul

in those

is

the understanding assent to

can better understand

far.

to reduce

could be said that “faith

a habit, that

considering thus

do well

someone wanted

of faith:

A habit

is

second, a power to assent or not to assent (condition
59

The

defined as “a disposition to
58

There are two

a power to choose to assent or not to assent

(condition [4] in the definition of the act of belief), and this

intellect.

we have been

that stand in relation to opposites.”

first,

more

[5]),

is

and

a

power of the

this is a

will;

power of the

habit of the will that disposes one to choose to assent Aquinas identifies

as the habit of charity, and the habit of the intellect that disposes one to assent to

matters of faith

is

the habit of faith.

102

As we saw

in the

account of the act of faith, assent to
matters of faith are

provoked by freeing them by the

of faith. The habit of faith

light

is

simply a

disposition to assent to propositions that on
ef-sees. Here he identifies the disposition
to
assent:

“The

habit of faith helps our

minds

in

two ways:

makes us easy and assured

it

about what should be believed, and discerning about
what should be rejected .” 60 And.
as

we saw

by f-seeing we can

before,

which should

tell

which propositions should be believed and

Because f-seeing by the

not.

grace ol God, so too the habit of faith (which
sees)

comes from
The

act

the grace of God

of

-

faith satisfies the

it

is

of faith

light

is

available to us only by the

is

a disposition to assent to what one
f-

an infused habit.

necessary and sufficient conditions specified

in the

definition of belief, but not every act of belief need be an act
of faith. Beliefs are formed

when one

assents to a proposition after forming a desire to assent. There are a

of circumstances in

might assent

which

this

can occur without

to the proposition ‘Jesus

because he perceives that assenting

membership
as

in a heretical

good because

faith

from other

of faith: a

it

yielded

group (membership

him more sensual

of character

in

revealed by the light of faith. Even

A

faith if he

And

grace

is

for instance, a heretic

from a habit of faith but

divine' not

if

in

which he could,

What

pleasures).

from

which one

is

faith

good of his

for instance, perceive

distinguishes acts of

stems from the infused habit

disposed to assent to propositions

a heretic believes most of the matters of faith, he

have the habit of faith even

to believe.

if

it

For infused habits are

the habit of faith has this power, that through

believer

—

does not have the habit. Aquinas explains:

heretic does not

which he refuses

s

to the proposition will result in the

acts of belief is that the assent

settled state

does not have

was not

God

number

is

only one article of faith

lost
it

through one contrary

withheld from giving assent to things contrary to
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act.

the understanding of the
faith, just as chastity

restrains us

from acts opposed to

chastity.

Now, when

a heretic believes

a, so

pagans

Take some matter of faith
knowable by

someone

human

natural

-

the habit of faith

faith,

faith (that

God

once
is

it

-

that

is

-

for instance, that

God

is

is,

God

is

Aquinas argues

have the habit,

it

would

someone who has

that this

direct

him

that

not

is,

- and suppose

triune

triune but does not assent to

resurrected).

for if he did

object of faith equally

matter of

was

beyond the seope of natural knowledge,”

reason

(a heretic) believes that

of faith (e.g., that Christ

denies

that “is

with

some

other matter

person cannot have

to assent to every

the habit of faith

would assent

to

any

proposed to him. That the heretic believes
some matter of

triune) does not

show

some matter of faith shows

that he has the habit

that he

does not have

it.

of faith, but that someone

When

the heretic assents to

or denies a proposition he does so not on
the basis of an infused habit, but rather
on the
basis of his

own

reasoning and his

own judgment on

the matter

-

the heretic judges that

he should assent to the triune nature of God, while
judging that he should not assent

to

the resurrection of Christ. Instead of assenting
as a result of/-seeing, heretics assent on
the basis of their

own

matters of faith and

...

just as

determinations. But there can even be

still

some who

believe

all

the

lack the habit:

one who remembers the conclusions of geometry does not have the
if he does not assent to these conclusions
because of the

science of geometry

reasons of geometry, but he holds these conclusions only as opinion;
so also one
holds those things which are of faith but does not assent to them because
of
the authority of Catholic teaching, does not have the habit of faith. For,
he who
asserts to anything because of Catholic teaching assents to all those things
which

who

that teaching contains. Otherwise, he

teaching of the Church.

From

this

it

would believe himself more than

is

clear that he

who

the

obstinately denies an

article of faith does not have faith in the other articles - that faith. I say, which
an infused habit - for he holds the conclusions of faith as opinion 62
.
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is

In the passage above,

Aquinas

refers to the “virtue

Aquinas, “Virtue denotes a certain
perfection of a power.
considered chiefly

in relation to its end.

said to be perfect, according as
faith to

it

is

of faith.” According

Now

But the end of power

determined

to its act .”

to

a thing's perfection

is act.

is

Therefore power

is

63

In order for the habit

of

be perfected, and thus be a virtue, the
acts that result from the habit
must

themselves be perfect. Aquinas explains
...

two things

found

the act of faith can be perfected:

are required for completing this act.

infallibly tends to its good,

ordered to the

how

last

in the act of

which

is

One

the truth; the other

is
is

that the understanding
that

end, because of which the will assents.

formed

faith.

It is

infallibly

it

be

And

both of these are
part of the very account of faith that it

always carry the understanding to the truth, since the
false cannot come under
faith, as was had above. From charity,
which forms faith, the
soul has

infallibly ordered to the

The

act of faith

is

good end. And so

“last

formed

faith is a virtue

end” which

is

by a

will that seeks

union with

God

in

something that

an eternal

afterlife.

only because onef-sees that the proposition should be assented
assent to anything false

- and

of the person

this is the case

In order for the will to identify properly the ultimate

to assent

on

this basis, the will

good

to,

who

that

willing the ultimate good (rather than

has the virtue of faith, then,

perfected: faith and charity.

when one forms
goal

is

is

some

lesser

good.

one assents

has the habit of faith.

and

to

choose

When one

can be sure that he or she

good misperceived as the ultimate

good).

One

it

then one will not

to be desired,

that person

is truly

If

must be perfected by the habit of charity.

chooses to assent with a will perfected by charity,
is

it

64
.

perfected if one always assents only to true propositions,
and further.

that the choice to assent is motivated

namely, the

all

habits that have been

Having perfect habits of faith and charity ensures

beliefs about matters

the ultimate good.

when one has two

of faith, the proposition

As we saw above,

it
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is

possible for

is

true,

that

and the desired

someone

to believe

matters of faith while lacking the
habit of

examine how

it

is

possible for

someone

to

faith.

In the section 3.2.1 below,

have

faith that P,

we

shall

without having the virtue of

faith.

3.2.

In the

Issues related to Aquinas’s
account of faith

account of

faith

given thus

far,

we

see that the act of faith

an act of belief. The act of faith involves
God’s grace
helps

someone move from

which grace allows one

at

two

points:

is

one

a species of

in

which grace

a simple desire to assent to a decision
to assent, another in

to f-see that matters

of faith are

to

be assented

to,

and thus

allows one to assent with the firmness of
adherence that constitutes certitude. In the
next two sections,
section

we

will

we

shall consider

some

issues that arise from this account: in the
next

examine how one might assent

virtue of faith; in the following section
(3.2.2)

to matters

we

will

of faith without having the

examine the

faith attributed to

demons.

3.2.1.

There

is

Lifeless faith

-

faith

without charity

a sort of faith that one can have without having the habit of charity, and

this is called Tifeless' or

‘unformed’

faith.

Lifeless faith, because

it

lacks charity,

a virtue, because the habit of the will has not been perfected, 66 though
faith

because

it

includes the habit of faith.

The

virtue of charity,

lacks, involves a special sort of relationship with
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God:

it

which

is

not

does count as
lifeless faith

Accordingly, since there

a communication between

man and God, in so far as
must be some kind of friendship
based on this same communication, of which it is
written ( 1 Cor. 1 :9): “God is
faithful: by Whom you are called unto
the fellowship of His Son.” The love
which is based on this communication, is charity. And
so it is evident that
charity is the friendship of man for God. 67
is

He communicates His happiness

Charity

If

is

an infused habit

we have

As

that arises within us

we form

charity,

we

a result of this bond,

to us, there

by means of communication with God.

a special friendship or union with God, a particular
bond.

properly see

God

to

be the ultimate good that our wills

always desire - for the blessed, because they have charity and union
with God,
entirely

fills

mind

directed to God."

is

the potentiality ot the rational mind, since every actual
68

“it

movement of that

For ordinary men, the will can tend towards other perceived

goods, and those infused with less than perfect charity sometimes

may

desire something

other than God:

incumbent on man

For

at first

this

concerns beginners, in

occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin
and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity; and
it

is

whom

to

charity has to be fed or fostered lest

destroyed. In the second place man’s chief pursuit

and

this is the pursuit

charity by adding to

Beginners,

we

who do

aim

to

of the proficient, whose chief aim

it.

Man's

third pursuit

enjoyment of God, and this pertains
69
and to be with Christ.”
For our purposes,

is

is

to

is to

aim chiefly

to the perfect

who

communion with God,

it

be

progress in good,

strengthen their
at

union with and

“desire to be dissolved

can conceive charity as a habit of the will

not have a close

at

in desiring better goods.

try to

develop a habit to

avoid sinful desires. Those further along try to develop a habit to pursue only goods,

and those approaching perfection of charity desire only

the best

enjoyment of God - no other goods are desired over God.
desire inordinately

when we should

- by

desire

We

good - union with and

lose charity

desiring sin over goodness, or by desiring

God - we withdraw from

lesser

good

our friendship with God, and thereby

lose the charity that results from such a closeness.
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some

when we

Charity perfects faith because

who

it

orients the will to desire the proper
goods.

One

has the virtue ot faith both /-sees that matters
of faith are to be believed but also
,

has charity and desires them easily and without
struggle.
lifeless faith

filial fear,

and the

which

is

faith

formed by charity

to assent to matters

for union with

God

servile fear, in

which one desires

in

punishment by God.

though

it

one

that

who

clear difference between

has the

latter is subject to

a fear of being separated from God, and in
response to such a fear,

one desires eagerly and easily

to matters of faith,

is

One

heaven. With lifeless

70

faith,

of faith, such assent being necessary

on the other hand, there

to assent to matters

is

merely

of faith merely to avoid

Faith formed by charity easily and, so to speak, naturally assents

whereas

lifeless faith

does so uneasily. Finally, unformed

involves assent to matters of faith,

is

faith,

not sufficient for salvation, because the

heart has not been purified:

when the human understanding inordinately inheres in
it, namely, when it wills to measure divine things according to the
accounts of sensible things. But when it is formed by charity, it admits no

This impurity happens
things below

impurity within

itself,

since “charity covers

all faults,"

as

it

is

said in Proverbs

71

10.

3.2.2.

A

Faith of the

demons

source of great controversy in interpreting Aquinas's account of faith

surrounds the claim he seems to make that demons also have

faith.

Motivated by a

passage from James 2:19, “The devils believe, and tremble," Aquinas seems
faith to

demons - he

through faith,"

72

says that they cannot perceive certain truths about Christ “except

and he says “the

“the faith which the

to attribute

first sort

demons have.”

74

of faith exists

Attributing faith to

108

in

demons"

demons

is

73

and also

refers to

problematic.

because the idea that demons have

have presented thus
lacks charity,

faith

seems inconsistent with

Unlike the virtue of faith that

far.

7
-

assent

is

not a result of grace

76
,

we have

the account of faith

discussed, demonic faith

and belief results from the evidence of

miracles and other signs, rather than by a will being
directed to the good

holds that the demons don’t assent on the basis of
their wills
intellects are

demons

compelled by the evidence of miracles:

to assent to

what they are said

to believe.

demons seems

to present a

is

at all; rather, their

not their wills which bring

faithful believe is true .”

faith,

appears to be compelled by evidence. This apparent inconsistency

that

jettison

that there are

human

faithful

demons from

any demons

have accessible

James Ross denies

thus can be said to have faith

that

to

have

79

faith );

assent

will

their assent

allowing for

81
;

is lifeless,

and

problem by

Terence Penelhum suggests

them the same conclusive evidence

that the

demons

sort

to hold a position similar to

of faith, that the

that the evidence motivates (rather than

82
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that the

as not involving q-seeing

and Eleonore Stump seems

.

that

are really compelled to believe, and

Ross’s in which demons and humans have the same

demons

in

and

his theology (thus solving the

demons have (which would render our account of faith
incorrect);

The

motivated various complaints against Aquinas: John Hick believes

Aquinas should

denying
the

faith has

78

depends essentially on the

far, faith

not compelled by evidence, but the demons seem to have

demonic

Aquinas

problem for Aquinas’s account of faith:

according to the account of faith provided thus

and

“It is

77
.

Rather, they are forced by the

evidence of signs which convince them that what the
case of the

we

faith

of the

compels) demons

to

These responses suffer from one of two problems:
they seem
change Aquinas’s position (Hick, Ross, Stump),
or
differs

from the one

that

I

to

either to correct or

advocate an account of faith that

have been presenting (Penelhum, Ross).

I

wish

to present an

explanation of demonic faith that does not undermine
the account of faith provided thus
far

and does take Aquinas seriously and

demons' assent

that the

not

seem

to be the

same

faith is not exactly the

demons and
the demons.

for

why

is

it

faith

83

If

as

human

we

as

human

does not result

demonic

Aquinas does hold

faith.

“... belief is

Aquinas does clearly hold

faith

- he holds

that ‘faith’ is equivocal for

them from any infused

same

faith is not the

as

demonic

explicitly that

predicated equivocally of

in

does

faith

human

men who
light

faith,

believe and of

of grace as

then what

is

it,

it

does

and

called ‘faith’?

When we examined
truth

that

compelled, unformed and lacking grace, demonic

same

humans:

And

in the faithful.’

is

Given

literally.

of some proposition

is

the veracity

argument

in section 3.1 .2.3

above,

in

which the

proven by evidence for the veracity of the person uttering

it,

considered the possibility that belief might be a form of scientia quia: knowledge

that the proposition is true, but not

Christian faith, but Aquinas

tells

why

it

This interpretation was rejected for

is true.

us that the demons, unlike

on the basis of the veracity argument: “Demons see many
they perceive that the doctrine of the Church

that the

kind.”

Church teaches,
Aquinas seems

for example, that

is

God

to think that assent

would not be taken away.”
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is

if

to believe

from which

they do not see things

three and one or something else of this

of this

Aquinas seems
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clear indications

from God, even

sort

since the proposition believed “would not be evident in

faith

humans do seem

still

should be called

itself,

‘faith,’

so that the account of

to construe an essential characteristic

of faith as lacking p-vision of the truth of
propositions “faith

a habit of the mind, whereby eternal

is

assent to what

to

what

is

non-apparent.”

is

Demons can be

Though

demons have

the

was defined above,

assent (condition

choose

vision.

the intellect

is

not motivated by eternal

In the

because the

demons do

since the

not apprehend that assenting to
86

[2]),

and thus do not desire

faith,

of faith (condition

to

I

[4]).

think that what Aquinas has in

mind

as primary

is

and there are two kinds: assent with p-vision and assent without p-

former kind of assent, one has p-vision of the truth of the proposition

intelligible object forces the intellect to assent. This

the epistemic states of perfect scientia and understanding.

lacks p-vision because the assenter does not see

two kinds of assent

that lack p-vision

of veracity argument q-sees

:

why

on the basis of the

will,

in the first, the assenter,

that the proposition is true,

demons

the similarity between

,

human

kind of assent

latter

is true.

There are

on the basis of some

sort

which yields something merely

;

in the

which yields belief proper. Demonic

former kind of assent without p-vision
that the

The

form of assent yields

the proposition

resembling belief that results from a demonstration quia

Aquinas says

with God.

a sort of faith, demonic faith cannot be a species
of

to assent to matters

itself,

life

and because they are compelled by the evidence, they also do not

[3]),

Rather than belief or
the assent

making

in us,

said to have faith because they assent

matters of faith would be good for them (condition

freely

begun

of faith:

non-apparent, though they have a different sort of faith
from that of the

Christian faithful, since their faith

belief as

life is

recall his definition

second kind, one assents

faith is a species

faith a species

of the

believe, or that they have faith, he

is

latter.

of the

When

calling attention to

demonic assent from evidence ( q-seeing ) and human assent from

taith

proper (/-seeing). These are similar to
each other because neither of them has

vision {pseeing) though both involve
assent, and neither results in the sort
of complete
certitude of evidence

(i.e.,

the contradictory of what

though they both involve the certitude

that is firmness

understanding or perfect scientia demonic and
,
.

each other than different, and

when he
above,

faith

he does

faith (as

- one

that results

solutions presented by Hick,

et. al.,

in the

we

conceivable),

is

When compared

demons have

see that

two

enough

to

same

sort

be called

of

faith that

"faith,’

According
for belie/ that

we

to

3.1 .2.3

different acts

from /-seeing, one from q-seeing. So, unlike the

my

solution to the problem of demonic faith

humans

have. But what

and thus we can do

3.3.

But

faith.

passage in section

demons, unlike humans, have assent compelled by evidence, and

not have the

with

appear to be more similar to

says that the

discusses two different causes of faith),

are being described

the

of assent.

human

why Aquinas

human and demonic

contrasts

when he

this is

assented to

is

for this reason

demons have

so, at least in

some

is this:

is

contexts.

do

similar
88

The epistemology of faith

Aquinas, the act of faith

is

a species of belief. Recall the definition

presented earlier:

S has belief that P =df

( 1 )

S apprehends

(2)

S apprehends that assenting

P,

to

P would be good

(3) this leads to a desire in S to assent to P,

(4) this leads to a choice

by S

S to assent

to P.

(5) this leads
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to assent to P,

and

for S,

For matters ot

faith, the first

by someone

directly

someone who

that

P

condition

is true,

is

brought about by testimony:

for instance,

we

are either told

from hearing a sermon or from hearing

presented to us as a messenger of God; or indirectly
by, for instance,

is

reading about the truth of P from Scripture. In
conjunction with learning about the
proposition,

we

eternal

1 his leads to the satisfaction

life.

believe,

learn that assenting to the proposition

one must proceed from desire

desire, but

presumably we decide

paradigmatic case ol
to

P because one

charity.

is

In cases

faith, faith

to

necessary for and promotes

of the second and third conditions.

to choice

-

there are

many

In

things which

order to

we may

pursue only a very limited number of them. In the

formed by

strives to maintain or

of lifeless

is

faith, the

charity,

one

is

motivated to choose to assent

promote the union with and love of God

motivation to assent

is

that is

not from charity, and so

it

not love of God but something else that motivates one to choose to assent. Aquinas

identifies

one

is

one motivation,

afraid of the

fear

of punishment, so

punishment

one chooses

that

that will accrue if

one

fails to

do

P because

to assent to

so.

There are likely

other motivations beyond servile fear that could lead one to choose to assent.

Regardless of motivation, what
If

one has

faith

(whether

is

key to

lifeless or not),

established habit of faith. This habit

of faith. The will moves the

movements of the

has p-vision) and

God moves one

is true,

this ‘seeing’

moves

choose by grace.

the faithful actually to assent to the matters

by a process analogous

to other

For self-evident propositions, for example, one

because

moves

to

then the act of faith follows from an

intellect to assent in faith

intellect to assent.

‘sees’ that the proposition

faith is that

it

is

‘illuminated’ by the light of reason (one

the intellect to assent. Similarly, those

who have

the habit of faith have an infused light of faith, and by this light they ‘see’ that the

proposition

who

is to

be believed (they havef-vision), and the
habit of faith disposes one

‘sees' in this

way

to

move

the intellect to assent.

The movement

in faith initially

resides in the will because the will chooses
to assent, and by so choosing,
intellect to

move

to assent to

As was mentioned
Aquinas

what

it

proposition assented

to.

earlier (in section 3. 1.2.4), the assent

it

claims

Further, the assent of faith

even seems

made by Aquinas

to

We

scientia.

hold that faith

shall

is

devote the

of faith

is

held by

engenders firmness of adherence to the

perfect scientia or understanding, and faith
latter

the

f-sees.

produce certitude, because

to

moves

is

is

held to be firmer than that of

held by Aquinas to be infallible. These

put faith in a rather extraordinary epistemic position

more epistemically secure than understanding

rest

- he

or perfect

of this section to examining these epistemic

properties of faith.

d hat faith should be

more firmly adhered

propositions seems counter-intuitive.

have one demonstrated
‘see' that

truth

it

is true,

why

to us so that

it

is true,

When we

to than understanding

understand a proposition or

we have perfect scientia

and

further,

of self-evident

we

,

w e p-see

its

when we

truth:

we

cannot even entertain the idea that the

of the proposition could be otherwise. This would seem

to generate certitude

of

the highest degree. Faith, on the other hand, being a product of the will choosing to

assent,

would seem

to

have

less certitude, particularly since the intellect is not

determined by the object - one
the idea that the proposition

who

is false.

has faith can

And

still

yet, faith,

continue to entertain intellectually

according to Aquinas, has more

certitude than understanding. Here he explains:

.

.

.

other things being equal, vision

that

is

is

more

certain than hearing.

heard far exceeds the vision of the seer,
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in this

way what

But
is

if

the thing

heard

is

more

certain than

what is seen. Just so someone with little
knowledge ( scientiae
might be more certain ot what he hears from
another, who is most learned
(scientissimo), than ot what might seem to
him according to his own reason

And much more
tail,

is

man more

a

certain of

than ot what he sees with his

What Aquinas

own

here reters to as vision and hearing,

and apprehending by testimony. Aquinas seems
(ia)

it

testimony

more
(ib)

what he hears from God, who cannot

it

is

not

more

we have been

to be

testimony

is

more

(iii)

The source of assent from

faith is the

(iv)

God

(v)

P-vision

from vision has

less

is

p-vision.

testimony of God.

is fallible.

The testimony of God

(vii)

Assent from

In the passage above,

faith has

is

a

more

more

reliable source than p-vision.

certitude than assent

Aquinas provides justification

reliable than testimony

more

from vision has

is infallible.

(vi)

generally has

the following argument:

from testimony
scientia

more

discussing as p-vision

reliable than vision, then assent

The source of assent from

is

making

.

reliable than vision, then assent

(ii)

p-vision

fail

certitude than assent from testimony

certitude than assent

.'.
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reason, which can

certitude than assent

from

for premises (ia)

scientia.

&

(ib):

generally

(which explains why assent from p-vision

from testimony), but there can be cases

in

which one has very weak or limited p-vision while simultaneously having testimony
,

from a

reliable source

- and

in this case assent

from the testimony has more certitude

than from the p-vision. But this reasoning seems unsound. If one has p-vision that
,

one sees why a proposition

And

is true,

then

it

is,

seems one would have understanding of it.

should one perform a proper demonstration from
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this,

then one would have perfect

saemia. Even

by p-v, sion
will also

if

my

perceptiveness were limited, so that

to others are not so for

have certitude, and

me,

it

would seem

that this certitude

would

many

that

far

when

Aquinas describes

about P

may be

is

that the authority

I

do have p-vision,

exceed that which

have from relying on the testimony of
any expert. What seems
that

things which are evident

to

1

would

I

be true about the case

of an expert can provide more certitude

when we

lack p-vision about P, even though

possible.

The lesson of this case would seem

P

is

something for which p-vision

to be that assent based

on expert

testimony has more certitude than assent based
on a mistaken apprehension that one had
perfect scienlia

testimony

is

- when

the intellect can’t obtain for itself
perfect scientia , then expert

the best source of certitude available.

Perhaps, however,

When
what
(v

)

we

can understand Aquinas

to be

making exactly

he says, in the passage above, reason can be mistaken,
perhaps he

I've presented as: (v) p-vision

human

we saw

reason

Aquinas does hold

that

fallibility

is fallible in

of reason appears

Human

reason

is

instead, he

self-attributions
90
(v'),

to be

much

is fallible;

and

may

not asserting

be advocating:

of perfect scientia.

in the

is

this point.

In the last chapter.

context of matters of

faith, the

even more common:

deficient in divine things.

philosophers, investigating

human

A

sign of this

things naturally, erred in

is

many

that the

things and

held opinions ( senserunt ) contrary to themselves. Divine things had to be

handed down
lie,

to them in the manner of faith, as being said by God, who cannot
so that there might be indubitable and certain apprehension of God among

men.
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Aquinas's example comparing the expert and one's

Though we
absolute

own

reason would work as follows.

are fallible in self-attributions of perfect scientia the fallibility

— we have

,

certain talents

and training

that

is

not

make demonstrations about

certain

topics infallible (e.g., simple arithmetical demonstrations), but with topics that are well
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beyond our

skills or expertise

falsely to ourselves

- we

we

are very susceptible to attributing
perfect scientia

are quite fallible. In these latter cases,
believing

authority ol an established expert should yield

reasoning. If this

(i)-(vii),

Aquinas

is

s point,

then he

more

is

not

certitude than by our

making

the

on the

own

argument presented

in

but this modified argument:

(ia)

if

testimony

more
(ib)

if

is

more

not

reliable than vision, then assent

certitude than assent

testimony

is

more

from testimony

reliable than vision, then assent

certitude than assent

is

(iii)

The source of assent from

(iv)

In all matters,

(v')

Concerning matters of faith, human reason

God

from vision has

less

from testimony

The source of assent from perfect scientia

(ii

from vision has

faith is the

human

reason.

testimony of God.

is infallible.

is fallible

in self-attributions

of perfect scientia.

Concerning matters of faith, the testimony of God

(vi')

source than

The

(vii')

human

is

a

more

reliable

reason.

assent to matters of faith by

means of faith has more

certitude than

such assent by means of human reason.

Thus, the assent of faith has more certitude than the assent stemming from human
reason because

of what

it

is

more

reliable.

to believe (via the light

believed), and

God

never

lies

is

based on God's informing you

of faith which identifies the matters of faith

and

that these propositions are true.

The assent of faith

is

to

be

never wrong, so one can have absolute certitude

Assent from human reason, on the other hand, can be
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misplaced
limited,

- when

and when

demonstration,

comes

it

we

assent to

we may,

Notice that

to matters

some

in fact,

would have

proposition on the basis of what

in the revised

argument above, premise
If the

or an angel

considered the testimony ot

of a

man

would lead

God

speaking

or an angel

evidence of signs, for example, that the

know

that they serve as

argument, and assent on
to the

this basis

from God, we don't have human

is

a

asserts that the

in

them.”

to the certitude

9

man

"

of faith

how would

speaking

in

a person

we

know

them? With

the

or angel performs miracles, one could

faith: if

this leads us

faith

back to the veracity

This seems to lead us back

faith.

we have proof that

but if we have

is

But

God

does not constitute

faith,

“to assent to the

infallibly to the truth only in so far as

a result of

is

comes from God, and thus

The key

(iii)

same worry:

God's messenger; however,

dilemma we faced with demonic

the testimony

think

certitude only if the intermediaries were infallible,
at least in

man

that the testimony

we

testimony were through intermediaries,

transmitting God’s message. Aquinas raises this

testimony of a

intellectual capacities are rather

be mistaken.

testimony comes directly from God.
assent

of the divine, our

human

would seem

the testimony

faith,

we

don't

comes

know

that

to lack certitude.

God's grace. Though we may

initially

apprehend a proposition on the basis of testimony of other humans (or angels, or
Scripture), our assent

is

not caused by this testimony, but by

some inward

has faith formed by charity, then one has a friendship with God, and
direct connection to

Him, thereby ensuring

don't have faith formed by charity, but

still

that

what

have
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is

believed

lifeless faith,

this serves as a

is true.

God

cause. If one

still

For those
infuses

who

them

With the light of

This illumination of what should be
believed comes directly

faith.

from God, and again,

will guarantee the truth

In order to

is

is

believed.

Conclusions

3.4.

faith

of what

a rather extraordinary act, according to the
account given by Aquinas.

have

faith

about some proposition, one does not need evidence
that proves

that the proposition is true,

and yet

has certitude and

faith

is infallible.

characteristics as a result of God's gratuitous grace
acting within

charity brings

light

it

humans

into a special loving relationship with

of faith allows humans

infallible

scientia

-

and has

to infallibly identify

certitude, but

it

has

it

It

acquires these

humans: the grace of

God, and the grace of the

what should be believed. Not only

more so than understanding and perfect

the ideal epistemic states obtainable by the natural operations of the
intellect.

Similar to perfect scientia faith has rather ideal epistemic qualities, but also
,

clear that

is

many

it

is

not

people even have the sort of faith that Aquinas describes.

In order to

must one have a

have

faith

formed by

charity,

and thus the virtue of faith, not only

special loving relationship with

God, but the goods one desires must be

properly ordered. According to Aquinas the wayfarer
earnest endeavor to give his time to

God and

except in so far as the needs of the present

has charity “makes an

Divine things, while scorning other things

life

allows one to give one's “whole heart to

God

desiring anything contrary to the love of

God ."

1

who

demand."

A weaker

habitually, that

19

93

is,

form of charity

by neither thinking nor

Thus, charity, even

among

self-

ascribed Christians,

one

•

is

a difficult state to achieve, particularly
since charity

should

is lost

94

sin.

Lifeless faith requires that one have the
light of faith infused by God.
Aquinas

holds that this

is

“common

to all

disbelieves an article of faith, he

of

faith is

in

an infallible

withdrawn. The

members of the Church .” 95 However, once someone
becomes a

faithful is

heretic,

and the gratuitous grace of the

one “who inheres

rule, assents to all that the

Church

in the doctrine

of the Church, as

teaches. If he holds and does not hold

whatever he wants from among what the Church teaches, he does
not inhere
teaching of the Church as

someone no longer

in

an infallible

light

rule, but rather

by his

own

believes even one proposition taught by the

will .”

96

in the

Once

Church (which

held to

is

align with what the light ol faith illuminates), then one loses faith
and only has opinion
in

what one holds. At

first, this

condition on faith appears to be excessively stringent:

one who disagrees with the Church

would under

this

that contraception or premarital sex are in fact sinful

account not have faith at

perhaps not quite as draconian as

all

- he merely has

opinions. Aquinas

this in his Quodlibetial Question.

listening to different teachers of Theology

who have

is

“Whether those

contrary opinions are excused from

sin if they follow the false opinions of their teachers.” In his response to the question.

Aquinas holds
“faith or

that following

good morals .”

97

such opinions are acceptable only

So some

if

they don't pertain to

Scriptural interpretations or rules of conduct that

disagree with official Catholic doctrine might not prevent one from having faith;

9S

however, Protestant rejections of the sacrament of the Eucharist presumably would
result in

one disbelieving, a matter of faith held by the Church, and

from having

faith at all,

according to Aquinas’s account

120

99
.

thus, prevent

one

The

virtue of faith

would appear

to

be a rare and

even the habit of faith would appear not

to

be had by a significant number of
self-

ascribed Christians,

when

By Aquinas's

morals.

Christians

they disbelieve

some

difficult state to obtain.

But

proposition pertaining to “faith or good

account of faith, then, most contemporary
self-ascribed

would not seem

to

have

it.

nor perhaps ever have. This could be
construed as

a virtue of the account: Aquinas does speak
of both believing and of opining about

matters ot

faith,

but for most

weakness

it

so perhaps having faith

is

ot the account:

many would be

It

can also be construed as a

inclined to hold that

which produces a

most Christian believers

different result

must be

100

In pointing out the inadequacies

we

a lofty goal to which Christians must aspire,

something they have not yet achieved.

do, in fact, have faith, and any account
incorrect.

is

number of questions

earlier cited a

interpretations

First,

it

of an

Intellectualist interpretation

raised by

Stump

of Aquinas.

that the Intellectualist

were incapable of answering:
there

is

an omniscient and omnipotent God, why would he want
him to be based on faith? Why wouldn't he make his

human

relationships with

existence and nature as obvious and uncontroversial to all human beings as the
existence of their physical surroundings is? Second, why should having faith be
meritorious, as Christian doctrine maintains

supposed

to

make

reject? Finally,
little

why

is

it

that

faith, as

I

a person

because “faith

it,

[is]

seem

to play so

allows us to answer these questions.

relationships with

Him

to

be based on

faith,

and

that

the beginning of a moral reform of the will, of a

kind that simple knowledge of the propositions of
about.”

And why should faith be
whom God would otherwise
is?

01

have presented

God would want

taith is meritorius

God

it

that epistemological considerations

role in adult conversions?

Aquinas's account ot

Stump holds

acceptable to

faith

by

The account of faith we have given here (which

121

itself

is

could not bring

largely consistent with

Stump
charity,

s) easily

explains

this.

We can pursue the

virtue of faith,

and by doing so we not only bring ourselves
closer

to

and

its

component,

God. but develop habits

ot increasingly well-ordered desires
while diminishing the desire to sin.

A

faith

based

on charity promotes unity with God. whereas
simple propositional acceptance of
matters ot faith does not. Stump's answer to
the final question

account of

faith,

conversions)

is

what

is

happening

not that the intellect

considerations but that the will

consequence moves the
the answer one

is

in

is

such cases

(or, at

any

is:

“On Aquinas's

rate, in the

case of true

weighing and judging epistemological

drawn

to a love

of God's goodness and

intellect to assent to the propositions

would expect given our

of faith .”

in

103

This. too.

is

interpretation of Aquinas's account of faith in

this chapter.
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ENDNOTES

1

Certain truths concerning the natural
world can
if they exemplify some sort
of necessity.

under the domain of
For instance, some conclusions
about celestial bodies can be demonstrated
because the bodies themselves are
unchanging and thus they have a sort of physical
necessity.
fall

demonstration

2

-

Recall that understanding is the epistemic
premises of a demonstration. See section 2.4.

state

involving a cognition of the

1

In order to elucidate
i.e.,

what opinion

the grasping, ot a proposition that

understood

in

two ways:

indeed necessary, but

in

is

one way, so

he adds that opinion is the acceptance,
immediate and not necessary. And this can be
is,

that the

immediate proposition

in itself is

accepted by opinion as non-necessary; in another
way, so that
it is in itself contingent.
For an immediate proposition is one that cannot
be proved
through a middle, whether it be a necessary proposition
or not. For it has been shown
above that there is no process to infinity in predications,
neither on the part of the
middles nor on the part of the extremes. And this was shown
not only analytically in
demonstrations, but also logically in general as to syllogisms.
it

is

Hence what remains is that some contingent propositions are immediate
and
some mediate. hus, the man does not run, is mediate, for it can be proved
through
.

.

.

I

man is not in motion, which is also contingent, albeit immediate. This
acceptance of such immediate contingent propositions is opinion. Yet
this does not
mean that the accepting of a mediate contingent proposition is not opinion. For opinion

this middle,

is

the

related to contingent things, as science and understanding to necessary
things.”

“et ad exponendum quid sit opinio, subiungit quod opinio est acceptio,
idest
existimatio quaedam, immediatae propositionis, et non necessariae. quod potest
duobus

modis

intelligi:

uno modo

sic

quod propositio immediata

in se

quidem

sed ab opinante accipiatur ut non necessaria; alio modo, ut in se

sit

sit

necessaria,

contingens. dicitur

enim immediata propositio, quaecunque per aliquod medium probari non potest,
necessaria sive non necessaria. ostensum est enim supra quod non proceditur in

sive

infinitum in praedicationibus, neque quantum ad media neque quantum ad extrema;

hoc non solum analytice
ad omnes syllogismos.
...

non

in demonstrationibus, sed etiam logice

sit

et

communiter quantum

unde relinquitur quod sit aliqua propositio immediata contingens. sicut, homo
mediata; potest enim probari per hoc medium, homo non movetur, quae

currit, est

etiam est contingens, sed immediata. existimatio ergo talium propositionum
contingentium immediatarum est opinio: sed per hoc non excluditur quin etiam acceptio
propositionis contingentis mediatae sit opinio, sic enim se habet circa contingentia, sicut
intellectus et scientia circa necessaria.”

(PA

I.44.n5)
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° r Smce

[a dialectlcal

syllogism] aims at producing opinion,
the sole intent
proceed from things that are most probable,
and these are things
that appear to the majority or to
the very wise. Hence if a dialectician
in syllogizing
appens upon a proposition which really has a
middle through which it could be proved
but it seems not to have a middle because
it appears to be per
se known on account of
its probability, this is enough
tor the dialectician: he does not
search for a middle even
though the proposition is mediate. Rather he
syllogizes from it and completes the
dialectical syllogism satisfactorily.”
if a dialectician
t
,

is

to

quia emm syllogismus dialectics ad hoc tendit,
ut opinionem faciat, hoc solum
de intentione dialectics ut procedat ex his, quae
sunt maxime opinabilia, et haec sunt
ea, quae videntur vel pluribus, vel maxime
sapientibus.
est

et

ideo

si

dialectico in

syllogizando occurrat aliqua propositio, quae secundum
rei veritatem habeat medium
per quod possit probari, sed tamen non videatur
habere medium, sed propter sui
probabilitatem videatur esse per se nota; hoc sufficit
dialectico, nec inquirit aliud

medium,

licet

propositio

sit

dialecticum syllogismum.”
5

”... si

mediata,

(PA

et,

ex ea syllogizans, sufficienter

perficit

I.31.n4)

ergo cuiuslibet veri vel est intellects, vel scientia, vel
opinio,

quaedam vera contingentia, quorum non est neque scientia neque intellects;
quod circa huiusmodi sit opinio, sive sint actu vera sive sint actu
falsa,

et sunt

relinquitur

dummodo

possint aliter se habere.”

(PA

I.44.n4)

non enim opinio est solum de his quae sunt contingentia in sui natura;
quia
secundum hoc, non omne quod quis novit, contingeret opinari. sed opinio est de his
.

.

.

quae accipiuntur
”...

accipiatur ut
7

ut contingentia aliter se habere, sive sint talia sive non.”

quod propositio immediata in se quidem
non necessaria ...” (PA I.44.n5)

sit

(PA

1.44. n8)

necessaria, sed ab opinante

it someone proceeds through middles to immediates in
such a way that the
middles are not considered capable of being otherwise, but are considered to behave as

”...

definitions

which

are the middles through

which demonstrations proceed,

there will not

be opinion but science.”
”...

quod

si

aliquis per

media procedat ad immediata,

ita

quod

ilia

media non

arbitretur ut contingentia aliter se habere, sed arbitretur ea sic se habere sicut

dehnitiones, quae sunt media per quae demonstrationes procedunt, non
scientia.”
8

(PA

erit

opinio, sed

1.44. n9)

Potts (1971), starts with the account of belief and opinion from

QDV

14. rather

than the account from PA, which leads him to identify some problems for Aquinas's
account of opinion.
9

Recall this division discussed in section
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2.

1

He

how

the term

only uses the term fides a handful of times
in his PA commentary and
is to be understood is not
made entirely clear from
the contexts in

scientia

emm cum

opmione simul esse non

potest simpliciter de

de ratione scientiae est quod id quod scitur
existimetur esse impossibile
de ratione autem opimoms est quod id quod quis

which

eodem, quia

aliter se

habere;

’

existimat, existimet possibile aliter se

habere, sed id

quod fide tenetur, propter fidei certitudinem, existimatur
etiam
impossibile aliter se habere, sed ea ratione non potest
simul idem et secundum idem
esse scitum et creditum, quia scitum est visum
et creditum est non visum ut dictum
est.”

(ST

II-II.1.5

ad 4)

12"

“ad similitudinem autem corporalis sensus dicitur etiam
circa intelligentiam
esse aliquis sensus, qui est aliquorum primorum extremorum,
ut dicitur in vi ethic.,

sicut

etiam sensus est cognoscitivus sensibilium quasi quorundam
principiorum cognitionis.
hie autem sensus qui est circa intelligentiam non
percipit suum obiectum per medium
distantiae corporalis, sed per quaedam alia media, sicut
cum per proprietatem rei
percipit eius essentiam, et per effectus percipit causam. ille
ergo dicitur esse acuti
sensus circa intelligentiam qui statim ad apprehensionem proprietatis
rei, vel etiam
etfectus, naturam rei comprehendit, et inquantum usque ad

minimas conditiones

considerandas pertingit.

ille

autem

rei

dicitur esse hebes circa intelligentiam qui ad

cognoscendam veritatem rei pertingere non potest nisi per multa ei exposita, et tunc
etiam non potest pertingere ad perfecte considerandum omnia quae pertinent ad
rei
rationem.” (ST II-II.15.2)
13

14

Aquinas argues

for this in

Some who seem

ST

II-II.l .5

16

Kenny

(1969),

Stump

(1991), p. 179-80.

See, for example.
“... this act

Hick (1966),

(1986).

p. 4.

1

18

4.

to hold this Intellectualist position include

Penelhum (1977), Plantinga (1983), and Pojman
15

ad

Stump (1991) and Ross

(1985).

[of faith] proceeds from both the will and the intellect ...”

(ST

II-

II.4.2)
19

quod potissime scire possumus quod omnem
scientiam et locutionem nostram excedit; ille enim perfectissime deum cognoscit qui
hoc de ipso tenet quod, quidquid cogitari vel dici de eo potest, minus est eo quod deus
est. unde dionysius dicit
capitulo mysticae theologiae, quod homo secundum melius
suae cognitionis unitur deo sicut omnino ignoto, eo quod nihil de eo cognoscit,
cognoscens ipsum esse supra omnem mentem. et ad hoc ostendendum inducitur haec
propositio: causa prima superior est narratione.” (LC prop. 6, n. 43)
“de causa autem prima hoc

est

i
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II

II

4 8 0

^

UmaS considers and responds

to this sort

of objection. See, for instance, ST

2

quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari
ad alteram partem
contradictionis neque statim per ipsas defmitiones
terminorum, sicut in principiis

nec
etiam virtute prmcipiorum, sicut est in conclusionibus
demonstrationis; determinatur
autem per voluntatem, quae digit assentire uni parti
determinate et praecise propter
suthciens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem
ad movendum
intellectum, utpote quia videtur bonum vel
conveniens huic

aliquid,

quod

est

dispositio credentis, ut
vel utile.”

(QDV

cum

parti assentire. et ista est
aliquis credit dictis alicuius hominis, quia
videtur ei decens

14.1)

22

will in

What immediately follows is a rather quick and rudimentary account
of the
Aquinas. For a more detailed account, see Barad
(1992), chapter 2; also Stump

P

(1991), p. 180-183.
23

aliquid.”
24

cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est

(ST
it

quam

inclinatio appetentis in

I-II.8.1)

,

unde

si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati
quod sit universaliter bonum
secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid
velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum. si autem proponatur
sibi aliquod obiectum quod
non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas

et

feretur in illud. et quia defectus

cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud
solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non
potest non velle, quod est beatitudo. alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum
deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc
considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest

secundum diversas

For more on the post-willing process that leads
chapter

in

idem

ferri

considerationes.” (ST I-II.10.2)

to action, see

Barad (1992),

1

26

Following Barad (1992),

(from apprehension
27

“alio

p. 10,

1

shall refer to this initial

movement of the

will

to desire) as ‘simple willing.’

modo

non quia

moveatur ab
quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem
aliam.” (ST II-II.1.4)
intellectus assentit alicui

sufficienter

obiecto proprio, sed per

magis quam

in

Note

to the reader: this definition

of ‘belief used by Aquinas

term that does not match the

common

contemporary philosophers.

In order to avoid confusion,

account of belief

The reader may

I

it

I

refer to
it

a technical

by
Aquinas’s

from ordinary usage.

curious that an epistemic state has been defined partially in

terms of a sequential process. Aquinas,
state constituted

when

will italicize the term, in order to distinguish

also find

is

definition of belief frequently held

by assent - however,

it

I

believe,

would hold

is difficult to

126

that belief is the epistemic

characterize exactly what that

r

Wi h0U ' describin the rocess
w hich
8
P
k’ picking
l.
though
out an epistemic state, appeals

it

was generated. Thus, the definition
by which that state was

’

to the process

generated, in order to identify
29

it

uniquely and more easily.

44

cum enim dispositio credentis, ut supra dictum est, talis
sit, quod intellects
determinetur ad aliquid per voluntatem; voluntas
autem nihil facit nisi secundum quod
est mota per suum obiectum, quod est
bonum appetibile, et finis; requiritur ad finem
duple x principium: unum primum quod est bonum
movens voluntatem; et secundo id
cui intellects assentit voluntate faciente.
voluntas autem mota a bono praedicto proponit
aliquid intellectui naturali non
apparens, ut dignum cui assentiatur; et sic determinat
ipsum ad illud non apparens. ut
scilicet ei assentiat. sicut igitur intelligibile

quod

visum ab intellect, determinat
arguere; ita etiam et aliquid non apparens
intellectui determinat ipsum, et arguit mentem
ex hoc ipso quod est a voluntate
acceptatum, ut cui assentiatur. unde secundum aliam litteram
dicitur convictio. quia
mtel lectum, et ex hoc dicitur

convincit

intel

modo

lectum

est

mentem

praedicto; et ita in hoc

apparentium, tangitur comparatio

fidei

ad

quod

dicitur

argumentum non

id cui assentit intellects.”

(QDV

14.2)

quantum est in nobis inchoatio quaedam vitae aetemae, quam
ex divina repromissione speramus, dicitur substantia rerum
sperandarum: et sic in hoc
tangitur comparatio fidei ad bonum quod movet voluntatem
determinantem
et sic fides, in

intellectum.”

(QDV

14.2)

31

“et sic etiam

repromittitur,

si

movemur ad credendum

inquantum nobis
et hoc praemio movetur

dictis dei,

crediderimus, praemium aetemae vitae:

voluntas ad assentiendum his quae dicuntur, quamvis intellects non moveatur per
aliquid intellectum.”
32

(QDV

14.1)

per fidem autem

fit in nobis quaedam apprehensio de quibusdam malis
poenalibus quae secundum divinum iudicium inferuntur, et per hunc modum fides est
causa timoris quo quis timet a deo puniri, qui est timor servilis.” (ST II-II.7.1)

33

Implicit in such an apprehension

rewards those
first

who have

faith.

is

the assumption that

This assumption

is

God

a thorny one and

is

exists

and

considered in the

objection raised in chapter 5.5.2.
34

“quandoque vero intellects inclinatur magis ad unum quam ad alterum; sed
non sufficienter movet intellectum ad hoc quod determinet ipsum
unam partium totaliter; unde accipit quidem unam partem, semper tamen dubitat de

tamen
in

illud inclinans

unam partem contradictionis cum
cum non firmetur eius acceptio circa

opposita. et haec est dispositio opinantis, qui accipit

formidine

alterius.

...

similiter etiam nec opinans,

alteram partem, sententia autem, ut dicit isaac

et

avicenna, est conceptio distincta vel

certissima alterius partis contradictionis; assentire autem a sententia dicitur.”
14.1)
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(QDV

35

certitude:

Other passages where Aquinas holds
that opinion lacks the firmness of
ST II-II.2.9 ad 2; II-II.2.1; QDV 14.2.

36

“alio modo intellects assentit alicui
non quia sufficienter moveatur ab
obiecto propno, sed per quandam electionem
voluntarie declinans in unam partem

magis quam

en opinio,

in aliam. et si

si

autem

fit

quidem hoc

cum

fit

cum

certitudine absque

dubitatione et formidine alterius partis,
tali formidine, erit fides.” (ST
II-II. 1 .4)

^ uoc* autem voluntas moveat intellectum ad assentiendum potest
contingere
ex duobus. uno modo, ex ordine voluntatis ad
bonum, et
sic

credere est actus laudabilis.

modo, quia intellects convincitur ad hoc quod iudicet
esse credendum his quae
dicuntur, licet non convincatur per evidentiam
rei. sicut si aliquis propheta
praenuntiaret
in sermone domini aliquid futurum, et
adhiberet signum mortuum
alio

suscitando, ex hoc
signo convinceretur intellects videntis ut
cognosceret manifeste hoc dici a deo, qui non
mentitur; licet illud luturum quod praedicitur in
se evidens non esset, unde ratio fidei

non

tolleretur.”
38

II-II. 5. 2)

Jenkins (1997),

credibility
39

(ST

p. 163ff, calls this sort of argument from the evidence
of the
of the speaker “credibility arguments”.

rhat Aquinas rejects this position

according to Penelhum
the section on the Five

(

1977), p. 152. For

Ways

in

chapter

where he makes a mistake about faith,
more on conclusive evidence for faith see
is

4.

quantum vero ad secundum,

scilicet ad assensum hominis in ea quae sunt
duplex causa, una quidem exterius inducens, sicut miraculum
visum, vel persuasio hominis inducentis ad fidem. quorum neutrum est sufficiens
causa,
videntium enim unum et idem miraculum, et audientium eandem praedicationem,
fidei, potest considerari

quidam credunt et quidam non credunt. et ideo oportet ponere aliam causam interiorem,
quae movet hominem interius ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei.” (ST II-II.6.1)
41

See ST

II-II.2.1.

“ad tertium dicendum quod credere quidem in voluntate credentium consistit,
sed oportet quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a deo per gratiam ad hoc quod elevetur
in ea quae sunt supra naturam, ut supra dictum est.” (ST II-II. 6.1 ad 3)
43

interius

quantum ad assensum, qui
movente per gratiam.” (ST II-II.6.1)
“et ideo fides

44

est principalis actus fidei, est a

deo

“Sed notandum, sicut iam dictum est, quod Nicodemus imperfectam
opinionem habens de Christo, confitebatur eum magistrum et haec signa facere
tamquam hominem purum. Vult ergo ei dominus ostendere, quomodo ad altiorem
cognitionem de ipso posset pervenire. Et quidem poterat de hoc dominus disputare; sed
quia hoc fuisset versum in contentionem, cuius contrarium de eo scriptum est Is. XLII,
2: non contendet ideo cum mansuetudine voluit eum ad veram cognitionem perducere,
quasi diceret: non mirum si me purum hominem credis, quia ilia secreta divinitatis non
,
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potest aliquis scire, nisi adeptus fuerit
spiritualem regenerationem. Et hoc est
quod dicit
m.w quis natus fuerit demo, non potest
videre regnum Dei." ( Commentary
on the

Gospel ofJohn,

EX
•11

will

Ctly

.•,wfreely
?

still

room here

h° W Aquinas holds that race moves the will
B

assents to faith

engage

to

^

III, lect. 1)

is

in

such a

not easily understood. Unfortuntely,

I

way

that the

don't have

in this topic.

sed in fide est assensus et cogitatio quasi
ex aequo, non enim assensus ex
cogitatione causatur, sed ex voluntate, ut dictum
est. sed quia intellects non hoc
modo
terminatur ad unum ut ad proprium terminum
perducatur.
qui est visio alicuius

mde

quod eius motus nondum est quietatus, sed adhuc habet
cogitationem et inquisitionem de his quae credit,
quamvis eis firmissime assentiat.
quantum enim est ex seipso, non est ei satisfactum, nec est
terminatus ad unum; sed
intelligibilis;

est

terminatur tantum ex extrinseco.

et inde est quod intellects credentis dicitur
esse
captivatus, quia tenetur terminis alienis, et non
propriis. ii corinth. x, 5: in captivitatem
redigentes omnem intellectum etc., inde est etiam
quod in credente potest insurgere
motus de contrario eius quod firmissime tenet, quamvis non in
intelligente vel sciente/’

ad quintum dicendum, quod fides habet aliquid perfectionis,
imperfectionis. perfectionis

quidem

et aliquid

est ipsa firmitas,

quae pertinet ad assensum; sed
imperfectionis est carentia visionis, ex qua remanet adhuc motus
cogitationis in mente
credentis. ex lumine igitur simplici, quod est fides, causatur id
quod perfectionis est,

quantum

scilicet assentire; sed in

illud

lumen non perfecte

participatur,

non

totaliter

tollitur

imperfectio intellects: et sic motus cogitationis in ipso remanet inquietus ”

(QDV

14.1
48

ad 5)

Penelhum (1977),

151-3, holds that if faith

is based on inconclusive
evidence does not determine the intellect), then this would be a
weakness of the account. He holds this, I believe, because he does not see how one can
have certitude without evidence that at least seems conclusive to ground the certitude.

evidence

As

(i.e.

p.

that the

discuss next, Aquinas does provide an account of faith that yields certitude without
having conclusive evidence.
I

49

“sic igitur intellectus
intelligibile

lumen, quod

est

humanus habet aliquam formam,

de se sufficiens ad quaedam

scilicet

intelligibilia

ipsum

cognoscenda, ad

ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire, altiora vero
intelligibilia intellectus

sicut

lumine

superadditum.” (ST
50

enim per

humanus cognoscere non potest nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur,
quod dicitur lumen gratiae, inquantum est naturae

fidei vel prophetiae;
I-II.

109.1)

“ad tertium dicendum quod lumen
alios habitus virtutum

homo

fidei facit videre

habitum ilium, ita etiam per habitum fidei
quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis.”

ea quae creduntur. sicut

quod est sibi conveniens secundum
inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his
(ST II-II.1.4 ad 3)

videt illud
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51

Aquinas does not say much about q-seeing.
Generally, his discussion of
of p-seeing.
have introduced this notion

intellectual vision is limited to cases

because

it

I

here

helps illustrate the differences between
p-seeing and f-seeing.

52

In

PA

1.41.

53

See, for instance,

ST

II-II.2.9.

See, for instance,

ST

II-II.2.3

54

ad

2; also III Sent. 23,

ii.I

ad

4.

ad septimum dicendum, quod certitudo duo potest
importare: scilicet
et quantum ad hoc fides est certior etiam
omni intellectu et
scientia, quia pnma ventas, quae causat fidei
assensum, est fortior causa quam lumen
rationis, quae causat assensum intellects vel
scientiae. importat etiam evidentiam eius
cui assentitur; et sic Tides non habet certitudinem,
sed scientia et intellects: et exinde
firmitatem adhaesionis;

est

quod intellects cogitationem non habet.”
1 here are also habits

quis ergo in

si

(QDV

14.1

ad 7)

of scientia and understanding. See for example, ST

tormam

I-

huiusmodi verba reducere velit, potest
qua inchoatur vita aetema in nobis, faciens
intellectum assentire non apparentibus.” (ST II-II.4.1)

dicere

quod

detinitionis

fides est habitus mentis,

58

dispositio

autem ad bene agendum

in illis potentiis

opposita est habitus, ut supra dictum est.” (ST
59

See

60

ST

II-II.4.2

ad

animae quae

se habent ad

II-II.4.2)

2.

quidem in duobus nos adjuvat: in hoc scilicet quod intellectum facit
facilem ad credendum credenda, contra duritiem, et discretum ad refutandum non
credenda, contra errorem.” (Ill Sent 23.iii.2, translated by Thomas Gilby - see Aquinas
qui

(1955), p. 198).
61

“ad decimum dicendum, quod haereticus non habet habitum

unum solum

articulum discredat; habitus enim infusi per

tolluntur. fidei etiam habitus

hanc efficaciam habet,

unum actum

ut per

ipsum

fidei,

intellectus fidelis

detineatur ne contrariis fidei assentiat; sicut et castitas refrenat a contrariis

quod autem haereticus aliqua credat quae
aliquo habitu infuso, quia
est

ille

etiamsi

contrarium

castitati.

sunt supra naturalem cognitionem, non est ex

habitus dirigeret

eum

in

omnia

credibilia aequaliter; sed

ex quadam aestimatione humana, sicut etiam pagani aliqua supra naturam credunt de

deo.”

(QDV

14.10 ad 10)

“et ideo, sicut aliquis memorialiter tenens conclusiones geometricas,

habet geometriae scientiam,

conclusiones

illas

tamquam

si

non propter media geometriae

opinatas:

ita,

eis assentiatur, sed habebit

non assentit eis
Qui autem propter

qui tenet ea quae sunt fidei, et

propter auctoritatem Catholicae doctrinae, non habet habitum

130

non

fidei.

doctrinam Catholicam

alicui assentit,

a loquin magis credit sibi

uno

quam

omnibus

assentit

Ecclesiae doctrinae.

quae doctrina Catholica habet:

Ex quo

patet, quod qui deficit in
non habet fidem de aliis articulis: illam dico fidem
quae est
sed oportet quod teneat ea quae sunt fidei, quasi
opinata.” (QDC 13 ad

articulo pertinaciter,

habitus infusus;
6)
63

respondeo dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam
potentiae perfectionem.
uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine
ad suum fmem. finis

autem potentiae actus est. unde potentia dicitur esse
determinate ad suum actum/’ (ST I-II.55.1)

cum enim
ad hoc quod

iste

credere

actus

intellectus tendat in

sit

perfecta,

secundum quod

actus intellectus assentientis vero ex imperio voluntatis,
perfectus duo requiruntur. quorum unum est ut infallibiliter
sit

suum bonum, quod est verum, aliud autem est ut infallibiliter
fmem, propter quern voluntas assentit vero. et utrumque invenitur

ordinetur ad ultimum

nam ex ratione ipsius fidei est quod intellectus semper feratur in
verum, quia fidei non potest subesse falsum, ut supra habitum est, ex caritate
autem,
quae format fidem, habet anima quod infallibiliter voluntas ordinetur in bonum fmem.
in actu fidei lormatae.

et

ideo fides formata est virtus.” (ST II-II.4.5)
65

For a discussion of why assenting to matters of faith from the virtue of faith

is

truth-preserving, see section 3.3.
66

67

See

ST

“cum

II-II.4.5.

communicatio hominis ad deum secundum quod nobis
suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam
fundari. de qua quidem communicatione dicitur ad cor. i, fidelis deus, per quern vocati
igitur sit aliqua

i

societatem

estis in

unde manifestum

eius.

filii

est

quod

amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas.
quaedam est hominis ad deum.” (ST II-

caritas amicitia

11.23. 1)
68

.

.

•

“sic igitur caritas patriae, quia replet totam potentialitatem rationalis mentis,

inquantum

scilicet omnis actualis motus eius fertur in deum, inamissibiliter habetur.
autem viae non sic replet potentialitatem sui subiecti, quia non semper actu fertur
in deum. unde quando actu in deum non fertur, potest aliquid occurrere per quod caritas
amittatur.” (ST II-II.24.1 1)

caritas

69

peccato

“nam

et

prirno

quidem incumbit homini studium

principale ad

resistendum concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium

recedendum

caritatis

movent,

a

et

hoc

pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur.

secundum autem studium
proficiat. et

succedit, ut

homo

principaliter intendat ad

hoc quod

in

bono

hoc studium pertinet ad proficientes, qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt
augmentum roboretur. tertium autem studium est ut homo ad hoc

eis caritas per

eo fruatur.

principaliter intendat ut

deo inhaereat

et

cupiunt dissolvi

cum

(ST

et

esse

christo.”

et

II-II.24.9)
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hoc pertinet ad perfectos, qui

ut in

70

See ST

II-II.7.1.

ad secundum dicendum quod fides etiam
informis excludit quandam
sibi oppositam, scilicet impuritatem
erroris, quae contingit ex hoc quod

impuritatem
intellectus

secundum

humanus inordinate inhaeret rebus se inferioribus, dum
scilicet vult
rationes rerum sensibilium metiri divina. sed
quando per caritatem formatur.

tunc nullam impuritatem secum compatitur, quia
universa delicta operit caritas ut
dicitur prov. x.” (ST II-II.7.2 ad 2)
72

73

ST

HI Sent.

ST
75

76

77

III.76.7

See

23.iii.3.ii, sol.

ad

II-II.5.2

ST

See also the responsio for

2.

1.25.11 ad

See ST

ad

1.64.1

I

this article.

1.

5,

see also

ST

II-II.5.2

ad

2.

ST II-II.5.2. Refer back to section 3. 1.2. 3, where I present the veracity
argument based on belief caused by evidence of miracles. Aquinas holds that this sort
of belief is the kind the demons have. See also ST II-II.5.2 ad 1.
See

78

“•••

quod daemones non voluntate assentiunt his quae credere dicuntur, sed
verum esse quod fideles credunt ...”

coacti evidentia signorum, ex quibus convincitur

(QDV

14.9 ad 4). See also
79

80

81

82

Hick (1966),

p.

Stump

(1

p.

III. 76.7.

21.

Penelhum (1977),
Ross (1985),

ST

p.

1

46.

264.

99 l),p. 190-91.

“unde et credere quasi aequivoce dicitur de hominibus fidelibus et
daemonibus: nec est in eis fides ex aliquo lumine gratiae infuso sicut est in fidelibus.”

(QDV

14.9 ad 4)

“vident enim multa manifesta indicia ex quibus percipiunt doctrinam ecclesiae
esse a deo; quamvis ipsi res ipsas quas ecclesia docet non videant, puta

trinum

et

unum,

vel aliquid

“... licet illud

fidei

non
86

tolleretur.”

deum

esse

II-II.5.2)

futurum quod praedicitur

(ST

that the

huiusmodi .” (ST

in se

evidens non esset, unde ratio

II-II.5.2)

demons

are compelled to believe,

132

is

displeasing to them ...”

“

ad
f®

rtlum di cendum quod hoc ipsum
daemonibus displicet quod signa

sunt tarn evidentia ut per ea credere
compellantur. et ideo in nullo malitia
minuitur per hoc quod credunt .” (ST II-II.5.2
ad

fidei

eorum

3)

87

The reader here should note

that demonic belief is not the only
case that
involves this sort of assent. Demonstrations
quia that prove causes from their effects
(see section 4.4.1 in the next chapter on
the Five Ways), as well as demonstrations
of
subaltern sciences (see PA 1.25) also yield
this form of assent.
88

A

second reason to think that Aquinas holds demonic
and human
equivocal is that the demons, as fallen angels,
have the same kind of
and, in particular, do not reason discursively.

conclusions
as there

is

in the premises, but there is not

with humans. See, for instance,
‘ad

ille

faith as

intellects as angels

They can syllogize, in a way, by seeing
“movement” of the intellect towards belief

ST

1.58.3 including replies,

and ST

1.58.5.

secundum dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, visio est certior auditu.
sed
multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est auditus quam visus.

si

a quo auditur

sicut aliquis parvae scientiae

quam de eo quod
de eo quod audit
falli

potest.”
90

magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientissimo
secundum suam rationem videtur. et multo magis homo certior est
a deo, qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria
ratione, quae

(ST

sibi

II-II.4.8

See section

ad 2)

2.4.2.

enim humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens, cuius signum
quia philosophi, de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes, in
multis
ratio

est

erraverunt et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt. ut ergo esset indubitata et certa
cognitio apud
homines de deo, oportuit quod divina eis per modum fidei traderentur, quasi a deo dicta,
qui mentiri

non

potest.”

(ST

II-II.2.4)

92“

“unde neque hominis neque angeli testimonio assentire infallibiliter in
veritatem duceret, nisi in quantum in eis loquentis dei testimonium consideratur ”

(QDV

14.8)
93

“uno modo,

quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in deum. et
quae non est possibilis in hac vita, in qua impossibile
est, propter humanae vitae infirmitatem, semper actu cogitare de deo et moveri
dilectione ad ipsum. alio modo, ut homo studium suum deputet ad vacandum deo et
rebus divinis, praetermissis aliis nisi quantum necessitas praesentis vitae requirit. et ista
est perfectio caritatis quae est possibilis in via, non tamen est communis omnibus
caritatem habentibus. tertio modo, ita quod habitualiter aliquis totum cor suum ponat in
deo, ita scilicet quod nihil cogitet vel velit quod sit divinae dilectioni contrarium. et
haec perfectio est communis omnibus caritatem habentibus.” (ST II-II.24.8)
haec est perfectio

94

95

See

ST

ST

sic

caritatis patriae,

II-II.24.il.

II-II.4.5

ad 4
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ma " ltestum
•

autem quod ille qui inhaeret doctrinae ecclesiae
tanquam
omnibus assentit quae ecclesia docet. alioquin,

f

lnrallibili regulae,

d

7n

ae VUl 1 tCnet

uM

est

Gt

,

si de his quae ecclesia
qUae VUlt n ° n tenet non iam inhaeret ecclesiae
doctrinae sicut

imallibili regulae, sed propriae voluntati.”
97

(ST

II-II.5.3)

o

See Quodlibetal Questions

III, q. 4, a. 2.

98

Would, for instance, advocacy for the use of contraceptives
category? Aquinas is not clear on what counts as
relating to “good

fall into this

morals.”

" Although Aquinas holds that the

Sovereign Pontiff has the authority to draw
up new creeds (ST II-II. 1 0), he does not hold that the
matters of faith are subject to
the whim of the Church. The truths of faith, being of
and from God are substantially
unchanging (ST II-II. 1.7), though the explicit presentation of them
is subject to change
and addition by the Church.
.

100

0n

1

the other hand, Aquinas frequently discusses (see, for
instance,

that without faith truths about

God would be

available only to a

ST

1.1.1)

few (namely, those
capable of performing and understanding the proofs). This would seem
to imply that
truths about God are instead available to many, which would seem
to imply that
Aquinas thinks that many do have faith.
101

Stump

(1991),

p.

179-80.

102

Ibid., p.

207.
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CHAPTER 4

INTERACTION OF FAITH AND REASON

In chapters 2 and 3

we examined

Aquinas’s accounts of reason and

faith,

respectively. According to Aquinas, scientia (the
product of demonstrative reasoning),
faith (the

product of believing ), and opinion (the product of dialectical
or probable

reasoning), can

all

be placed along one epistemic continuum. Perfect scientia as
,

discussed in chapter

2, is

an epistemic

state that involves

we

an apprehension of a

proposition, certitude in the necessity of the proposition, and perfect
apprehension of
the truth of the proposition

(i.e.,

an apprehension of why the proposition

is true).

Faith

involves apprehension of the proposition as well as certitude, but lacks perfect

apprehension of

its truth,

and opinion lacks both certitude and perfect apprehension of

its truth.

We also
- one can have

saw

in

chapter 3 that these three epistemic states are mutually exclusive

faith, scientia ,

or opinion about a proposition, but cannot simultaneously

be in more than one of these epistemic states with respect to any particular proposition.
Since Aquinas holds that faith
1

is

not,

we need

to understand

is

necessary for salvation, but reasoning to divine matters

what

role

Aquinas thinks reason does or ought

Christian philosophers or theologians. In this chapter,

account of the roles for reason and

we

will consider Aquinas’s

view

faith

will

examine Aquinas’s

with regard to divine matters. In section 4.1,

that, for certain

incapable of providing us with scientia.

we

to play for

We will
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matters of faith, reason

look closely

at

is

simply

Aquinas’s discussion

of the possible eternity of the world
as an instance of how he
understands reason
limited in matters of faith. In sections
4.4 and 4.5,

we

Aquinas does believe reason can play with
respect

to matters

closely at Aquinas’s Five

understand better

Ways

how Aquinas

will consider

(his proofs for the existence

intellects are seriously limited in

Objects

Aquinas

in

s

thus, according to

is

roughly as follows.

the external senses and these impressions are copied
and

transmitted to the intellect as likenesses, or phantasms
(phantasmata ).

trom these phantasms we can apprehend

intellect

What

in the intellect the

By

intelligible species, that

when we apprehend

that

is,

abstracting

form and accidents of the

the senses respond to are individual particulars, but

apprehends are

abstraction.^ Thus,

order to

what we can know about God.

Aristotelian account of cognition

make impressions on

object sensed.

will look

thinks that reason can play a role in faith.

Aquinas accepts an Aristotelian account of cognition, and

In brief,

We

of faith.
of God)

roles that

Limitations of reason in divine matters

4.1.

Aquinas, our

some

what the

universals apprehended by

humans

are rational animals this

of first sensing one or more particular humans, forming phantasms of them
intellect,

and then abstracting from these phantasms

species, or form, of a

to be

human -

to

and, for instance, that

it

apprehend the

means of

is

a result

in the

intelligible

includes rationality.

Mathematical objects are a special case, yet our apprehension of their forms also

depends on our

first

sensing particular objects. Mathematical objects, such as triangles,

are only accidentally constituted by their particular matter (e.g.,
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some

triangular stone),

whereas ordinary objects

(e.g. Socrates, this

that constitutes them, since

are.

In the case

is this

it

essentially

matter that makes them the particular objects
they

of mathematical objects, once we abstract away

relating to the particular matter,

depend only on

house) depend essentially on the matter

we

intelligible matter

3
.

the accidents

are left with those accidents, such as
quantity, that

Though mathematical

objects do not depend

on particular matter, our knowledge of them does,

sensible objects and abstract from

all

them an

in that

we

first

perceive

intelligible species (e.g., triangles).

These apprehended universals serve as the principles of demonstration,
so
instance, from the universal that

humans

demonstrate that horses are not human
to the intelligible species

of a thing,

are rational animals

4
.

It

we were

we would

we might be

for

able to

unable to abstract from phantasms

be unable to develop any demonstrations

about that thing, so our ability to have perfect scientia about things depends on our
abilities to

apprehend something about these universal essences. According

account of cognition,

we

are unable to have perfect scientia about

composed of sensible matter
For the human

3
.

intellect is not able to
its

be grasped by the
is

human

is

not

reach a comprehension ( capiendam ) of the

natural power.

For, according to

in the present life, the intellect

origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not

them

God, since He

Aquinas observes:

divine substance through

cognizing ( cognitio )

to this

human

intellect

manner of

depends on the sense for the
fall under the senses cannot

except in so far as the cognition ( cognitio ) of

Now,

gathered from sensible things.
intellect to the point

its

of seeing

in

sensible things cannot lead the

them the nature of the divine substance;
6
power of their cause

for sensible things are effects that fall short of the

.

We cannot apprehend the essence of God not only because He is not sensible, but also,
as Aquinas observes in the last sentence from the passage above, because His sensible

effects inadequately represent

limited,

God,

their cause.

Effects of God are created, finite and

and what we can discern from them by way of abstraction are forms
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that are

also limited. But

effects

Thus,

God and

do not accurately

in virtue

God, and

thus,

His power are unlimited, so the forms
abstracted from God’s

reflect

God

as

He

is

-

that

of our current cognitive apparatus, 7

we

is.

we

they do not reveal His essence.

cannot apprehend the essence of

cannot have perfect scientia of God's essence.

Perfect scientia of divine matters that depend
on understanding God’s essence

is

unavailable to us, given our cognitive limitations.
These limitations also restrict in
principle our ability to ha xq perfect scientia
of other matters of faith that depend on

understanding God’s essence. For instance, that the world
was created with a
beginning, and thus has existed with a finite duration in
time,

Aquinas believes we cannot have scientia about.
Aquinas

s

reasoning

is

also something that

In the next section,

treatment ot the creation of the world as a case study in
is

how

will

examine

demonstrative

incapable of producing scientia about truths of certain matters of faith.

Later, in section 4.4,

4.2.

we

we

will

examine what reason can

yield in matters of faith.

Limitations of reason in the matter of the creation of the world

For early theologians, a key topic involving the intersection of philosophy and
Christian doctrine

days of creation

was

(in

the creation of the world. In

Genesis

1)),

Hexaemera

(treatises

on the

first six

theologians attempted to reconcile the account of

creation given in Genesis with accounts given by philosophers, and frequently, with the

account

in Plato's

Timaeus. Until the 12

th

century, Plato's cosmogonic account

primary philosophical account considered by theologians.

8

the

Unlike Plato’s, Aristotle’s

views on the origins of the world conflicted with Christian doctrine, particularly
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was

in that

he seems to have embraced the view

that the

world

that

and theologians of the 12 th and 13*
centuries divided

was sempiternal. 9 Philosophers

into

two camps

in

response to

this

apparent incompatibility between Aristotelian
cosmogony and the Christian doctrine on
the creation of the world in time:
etemalists (for instance, Siger of Brabant
and Boethius

of Dacia, inspired by Averroes) presented
arguments which purported

to

show

that the

world had existed forever, and temporalists
advocated (either by appeal

to doctrine or

arguments) that the world was created in time with
a beginning

that

(a

view

was

part

of

the orthodox Catholic doctrine, and held
by the late 13'" century theologians Giles of

Rome, Stephen Tempier, Robert
to

name

a few).

Grosseteste, John Pecham. Bonaventure. and
Aquinas,

10

The question

of the eternity

of the world was of great concern

to

many

Christian

philosophers and theologians of the 13 th century. In Collationes
in Hexaemeron

Bonaventure

details three

that the duration of the

the intellect,

punishment

men,

major errors made by philosophers:

world was everlasting, which led

which together with
in the afterlife.

( 1 )

,

(1) the etemalist error,

to (2) the error

of the unicity of

led to (3) the error of denying happiness and

Of those who hold these views, Bonaventure

says,

“These

therefore, have fallen into errors, nor have they been ‘separated from the

darkness’; and such errors as these are the very worst.
yet locked up.”

An

Nor has

the abysmal pit been as

11

orthodox response to the etemalist position was

to

condemn

it.

In

1270 and

1277, several etemalist positions were condemned in Paris. These etemalist positions

were not

to

be held or advocated, on pain of excommunication.

Christian temporalist theologians pursued less drastic, and
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12

In contrast,

more philosophical

some

approaches to etemahst positions. There were three
courses of action pursued

that did

not conflict with Christian doctrine:
(1) deny that Aristotle actually held that the world

was

eternal, (2) refute Aristotelian (or
neo-Aristotelian)

arguments

that purported to

demonstrate the eternity of the world, and
(3) offer counter- arguments that purported

to

demonstrate the temporality of the world. Bonaventure, for
instance, was agnostic with
respect to the

allowing that Aristotle

first,

may

or

may

not have argued for an eternal

world, and actively pursued the second and

third.

Bonaventure represented the most

Christian theological position of the period.

common

Aquinas, on the other hand, embraced the

from Bonaventure’s commonly held

first

By pursuing

and second, but not the

was

a very grave error,

Aquinas rejected the etemalist
did not often

Summa

make

show

that the

when Aquinas

considers the various arguments

world has existed forever, he responds with philosophical

appeals to the authority of Aristotle in giving his answers.

In contrast,

when Aquinas responds

virulent.

He

bad arguments: “ And
is

it

is

made, and he frequently

13

to temporalist arguments, his criticisms are

often expresses the view that bad arguments advanced in

support of the faith are worse than none

demonstrate what

Although

rather mild.

on philosophical grounds, and

rebuttals to the arguments, pointing out the philosophical errors

sometimes quite

stance that the

a point of chastising etemalists for their theological errors. In the

,

to

common

was temperamentally

position, he did so largely

theologiae for instance,

advanced

third, differing

position.

Aquinas's response to etemahst arguments, despite the
etemalist position

the latter two.

at all,

and

that the temporalists are

advancing

useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to

of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as
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to

give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking
that on such reasons
that are

of

faith .”

14

In the

Summa

contra gentiles for instance,
,

temporalist arguments, he shows that the arguments

describing them are particularly negative.

cogency and “weak.

mundi

aeternitate

,

is

Of these

arguments.

He

fail,

we

believe things

when he

considers

and the terms he uses

in

describes these arguments as “lacking

1

Further, Aquinas's only polemical

work on

the topic,

De

not directed at etemalists but at those advancing
temporalist

he comments sarcastically, “Therefore they

who do

descry such

inconsistency [between eternity and creation] with their hawk-like
vision are the only
rational beings,

Aquinas

s

and wisdom was

bom

16

with them!

contemporaries had with the etemalist

Given the concern

error, his

that

many of

mild treatment of etemalists

conjoined with his near-hostility to those advancing temporalist demonstrations
say the least, quite surprising

Setting aside the

is,

to

17
.

more personal nature of Aquinas's

attacks

on the temporalists,

an important question remains for our understanding of Aquinas’s epistemological
account of

faith

and reason -

demonstrations that prove the

why does Aquinas
finite

duration of the world, especially since he agrees

with the conclusion, namely that the world

answer
faith

to this question

makes

is

duration ?

Christian theologians look bad. But Aquinas has a

something

must be by

is finite in

faith,

that the duration

that

18

One pragmatic

was given above - advancing bad arguments

response to this question: the
such,

strive so ardently to discount

finite

duration of the world

cannot be demonstrated;

if

not by proof. In the next section

we

an

support of the

more principled

article

of faith, and as

are to have certitude about

we examine why Aquinas

of the world cannot be demonstrated.
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is

in

it, it

believes

Why the duration

4.3.

Though Aquinas considers
finite or infinite duration

arguments as

to

why

of the world cannot be demonstrated

several arguments purporting to prove either
the

of the world and refutes each

in turn,

Aquinas has systematic

the duration of the created world cannot be demonstrated.

He

finds that neither the temporality nor the etemality of
the created world can be

demonstrated, but uses premises in his arguments that will be accepted
only by
Christians, so these arguments

must be directed towards them. Aquinas considers three

arguments against any possibility of demonstration regarding the
of the world. These are the argument from
creatures, and the

argument from a consideration of

argument from a consideration of God.

4.3.1.

In the

faith, the

eternity or temporality

Summa

The argument from

faith

theologiae Aquinas considers the position that the eternity of the
,

world cannot be demonstrated because the non-eternity of the world
faith.

an

article

This argument, however,

is

advanced as part of the sed contra response

seem

to

advance

question, and he does not

given on theological authority. In

this

it

Hebrews

1 1

:

1

,”

|g

things not seen, that

so

much

faith is

things for which

we

of

to the

own, but as an argument
articles

of

faith

of ‘things that appear not' according

Presumably, what he means by

is,

as his

argument he observes, “The

cannot be proved demonstratively, because
to

is

this is that articles

of faith involve

cannot have scientia and which are thus not
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,

demonstrable. The argument continues by observing
that God's creation of the world

time

is

a matter of faith, one revealed to us by Moses,

when he

said, ‘In the

beginning

God

“prophesied about the past

created heaven and earth.’”

“Therefore the inception of the world
it

who

is

known

in

He

concludes:

exclusively by revelation. Accordingly

cannot be proved demonstratively.”
Despite the fact that this argument appeals to scriptural authority
(which,

presumably, Aquinas's temporalist peers would respect), most temporalists
would

remain unconvinced that demonstrations about the beginning of the world cannot be
given. That the temporality ot the world

is

an

article

of faith does not seem to warrant

concluding that matters of faith concerning creation are known exclusively by

To be

revelation.

Aquinas’s account of faith, as

we saw

and scientia are mutually exclusive. However,

that faith

that

sure,

what

is

it

He

it

seems,

says,

still

“The creation of the world

be investigated by reason.

provided that assent

is

given to

it

given

21
.

this

show

a temporalist, holds this

although

it

is

20

article

of the

we come

of faith, can.
faith,

to an

This argument by authority does not seem

and thus

it

must be bolstered by additional

that demonstrations about the duration

The next two arguments, which

an

this is not in prejudice

not because of faith but rather

sufficient to refute temporalist arguments,

that

in time,

And

understanding of it with the help of faith .”

arguments

does not follow from

holds

held by faith by one person could not be held by scientia by another. John

Pecham, a contemporary of Aquinas and Bonaventure and
view.

in the last chapter,

are Aquinas's
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of the world cannot be

own, do

this.

4.3.2.

One way

in

The argument from

a consideration of creatures

which the duration of the world might be demonstrated would
be

consider the essence or nature ot the world (or some creatures
in

from

this nature that

because
entity)

it

it

has either a

would explain why

finite or intinite duration.

the duration

would provide us with perfect

is

as

it is

it)

and

to

to

demonstrate

Such a demonstration,

(by appeal to the nature of the

scientia about the age of the world.

Aquinas

argues that no such demonstration could be provided by considering the world (or any
creatures, lor that matter), because the nature of demonstration does not permit
such a

He

consideration.

est)

of a thing.

says, “For the principle of demonstration

Now everything according to the

here and now; hence

it

is

notion of

its

(quod quid

the essence

is

species abstracts from

said that ‘universals are everywhere and always.’

Hence

it

cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone did not always exist .” 22 This

passage appeals to Aquinas's theory of cognition and
demonstration, as discussed earlier -

if

we

its

Some

consequence for

cannot form universals that contain

information about the duration of something,

concerning

its

we

cannot form demonstrations

duration.

help in understanding this argument

is

given in

considers whether a creature’s nature necessitates the form

been created. He answers

in the affirmative, but

it

De potentia

dei.

Aquinas

takes once the creature has

observes that

God

can choose which

nature to create:

.

.

.all

existing things have a definite quantity by nature. For, just as the divine

power

is

not restricted to one quantity rather than to another, so

restricted to a nature

(

naturam )

it

is

not

requiring a particular quantity rather than to a

nature requiring a different quantity.

And
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so the

same question [why

the world

is

of

some

particular size] recurs with respect to nature
as to quantity, even
that the nature of heaven is not wholly
indifferent

though we should grant
quantity, or that

Consider a world

it

God

that

to

has no capacity for any other than

(i.e.

quantity) for the world

also consider a different world that

cx,

and

of size
unless

it is

it

If

also true that

But

ct.

(3).

it

God were

God

(let

Its

us dub this size a).

God

it

A)

We can

could create, with a different nature (B). and

to create

A,

it

would be

does not follow that the world that
for

23

nature (call

true that

A

must be of size

our world has that nature (A), then our world

if

were impossible

present quantity.

could create (for example, our world).

includes a determinate size

different size (size

its

to create

B

(or

God

creates

is

necessarily

is

necessarily size

any other alternatives

to

A

cx,

with a size

different than a).

On

the other hand, Aquinas holds that duration, unlike quantity,

is

extraneous to

a thing’s nature:

For time, like place, is extraneous to a thing. Consequently even heaven, which
has no capacity for a different quantity or a different accident intrinsically
inhering, has such capacity with regard to place and position, since

it has local
motion; and also with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, just as there
is succession in movement and locality. Hence neither time nor locality can be

said to result

Thus

it

is

from the nature of heaven, as was stipulated

in the case

of quantity.

clear that the prefixing of a definite quantity of duration for the

universe, as also of a definite quantity of dimension, depends on the mere will of

God. Accordingly we cannot

arrive at

any necessary conclusion about the

duration of the universe, so as to be able to prove demonstratively that the world

has existed forever.

Here Aquinas argues

24

that time

and

spatial location,

the intrinsic nature of a thing. Thus, even were

we

still

would not be able

for a possible nature,

Summa theologiae

were

to

it

we

because these change, are not part of

to

understand the nature of the world

demonstrate what duration
to exist) since, as

in

Aquinas asserted

above, “the principle of demonstration

We cannot perform

time

is

it

has (or would have,

in the

passage from the

the essence of a thing."

a demonstration propter quid from the nature of the world to perfect
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scientia about

about

lts

duration because the nature of the world
does not contain information

duration.

its

The argument from

4.3.3.

Though we cannot have perfect

in

dei above,

which God

creates.

God chooses what

objects will have. If for

some

choosing
will.

In

if

reason,

it

in the

was necessary

(finite) duration,

of creation

there

were

to create a particular nature,

De potentia

could obtain

it

by considering the

De potentia

passage from

natures to create just as he chooses what durations these

this necessity

world. Aquinas argues that

we

As Aquinas observed

choose a world with a particular
demonstrate from

God

scientia about the duration of the world by

considering the nature of the world, perhaps

manner

a consideration of

it

dei he rules out the

to

then

that

it

God, as

creator, should

might be possible

to

to a conclusion about the duration

be some reason for

must
first

lie in

God

to

of the

be limited to

God’s power. His goodness, or His

two: “...a reason for the definite

disposition of the universe cannot be discerned either on the part of the divine power,

which

is infinite,

or on the part of the divine goodness, which has no need of created

things, the reason for

cannot be what limits

is

unlimited

it

must be found

Him

- His power

duration. Similarly,

He

is

in the

to create this

sheer will of the Creator .”

world (with

its finite

sufficient to create a different

25

God's power

duration), since His

world with an

power

infinite

can’t be constrained to create this world by His goodness, since

His goodness does not require the creation of this or any other world -
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that

is, it is

not

necessary that

God

God's goodness
In the

is

create a world of finite duration because of
His goodness, since

unaffected by creation.

Summa theologiae

by making an appeal

,

to

God’s freedom, Aquinas

argues that the duration of the world cannot be demonstrated:

For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as
regards those
things which God must will of necessity, and what He wills about
creatures is

among these, as was said above. But the divine will can be manifested to
man by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is
not

an object of

Because God
otherwise,

sure that

is

free to will as he wishes, unless he

God was

God

is

but not of demonstration or scientia

faith,

free to

make

is

absolutely necessitated to do

the world eternal if he so wished. But

not necessitated to

make

Aquinas gives an argument proving

that

necessarily wills the being of His

own

God's

God

to the extent that

cause of the act of will

is

its

act

of will

is

is

goodness. Aquinas adds, “But

attainable in

some

is

observes, “Hence, since the goodness of God

is

inasmuch as no perfection can accrue

to

God’s

acts

of will

creation, so

own goodness

other

way

that if

no

is

God

as their end .”

anyone

we do

attainable...” Finally,

27

wills

it.

then that

not will

Aquinas

perfect and can exist without other

Him from

them,

it

follows that tor

Himself is not absolutely necessary.” Thus, the

final

is

necessary for
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God

to perform.

Him

cause of

His goodness, and His goodness can be obtained without acts

act of creation

,

wills things

than by willing

not necessary in order for the end to be obtained: “But

to will things other than

Summa

be

wills concerning anything outside of Himself, the final

necessarily those things without which the end

things,

we

He

proper object, and thus

God's goodness. Aquinas observes

towards an end and that end

can

will is not necessitated with respect to

apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His

is,

how

the world temporal? Earlier in the

created things. God's will has His goodness as

That

26
,

ol

God
creation, for

durations),

s

creating a world ot a finite duration

God's power allowed Him

God

s

goodness allowed

create, did so freely, since the

not

He

created. There

to create

Him

was not

first

God's

act

of

worlds with other natures (and other

not to create at

all,

and God,

in willinu to

end of His willing would have been achieved whether
or

was nothing necessary about God's

there can be no necessary

necessitated by

principles about

act

of creation, and thus

God’s creating by which a

demonstration propter quid could be formed to demonstrate the duration
of the world.

4.3.4.

Another type of demonstration of the duration of the world

In the last

two sections we considered two ways

in

which the duration of the

world might have been demonstrated: from a consideration of the nature of the world
itself,

and from a consideration of God's creative

no demonstration propter quid

is

possible since

the immediate premises concerning

God

propter quid. Because God's essence

is

that

we

scientia ), since

it

is

true of

God's

unknowable

not necessary that

world of any particular duration.

We

act

God

the universals that

information about

its

we

abstract

to us,

we

we

for demonstration

cannot demonstrate

cannot demonstrate them from

of creation (and hence, subject to perfect
create at

all,

much

less that

He

create a

also cannot construct a demonstration propter

quid about the duration of the world because
itself,

act,

cannot have any understanding of

would be necessary

conclusions that follow from His essence. Further,

what must necessarily be

Concerning God's creative

act.

if

we examine

the essence of the world

from our experience of the world do not contain

duration in time, and thus
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we have no immediate

principles about

the world’s duration

from which

to construct

such a demonstration. Though Aquinas

has ruled out demonstrations propter quid he has
not yet ruled out demonstrations quia
.

some proof

that

shows

that the

Steenberghen raises precisely

,

world must be eternal or temporal but not why. Van

this difficulty for

Aquinas:

He well knows that besides the kind of demonstrations which Aristotle
proposes
as [demonstration propter quid], there are other types
of valid demonstration: for
instance, demonstrating a cause from an effect [demonstration
quia], the only
kind of demonstration which makes it possible to prove God's
existence. He
should have shown that no type of demonstration can enable one
to prove that
28

the world began

.

Demonstrations of causes from effects are a species of demonstration quia, the
sort

is

of demonstrations

true but not

that

produce scientia quia

knowledge why

We

might be able

to

is

true

we cannot

duration of the world, since
does.

it

29
.

see

,

that

is,

knowledge that the conclusion

We cannot have perfect scientia about the
why

the world should have the duration

have scientia quia about the duration of the world

if

it

we were

able to infer from our observations of the world, of creation or of duration in time, that
this

world must have been created

in a certain

Though Aquinas does consider and

way

(for instance, with a finite duration).

rebut demonstrations quia in favor of a finite world

throughout his works, he does not systematically rule them out

until

De

aeternitate

mundi.
This polemical

text,

which

is

clearly

aimed

at

Christian theologians

30
,

is

primarily concerned with demonstrations quia for a finite duration of the world -

demonstration can be provided that shows that
infinite in duration, then

finite in duration.

world has a

it

is

if

a

impossible for the world to be

such a demonstration would also show that the world must be

Such a deductio ad impossible

finite duration,

31

would,

if

successful, prove that the

and thus establish the correctness of the temporalist

149

position. Aquinas, following distinctions
previously

observes that there are two ways

“Now
not

if

it

is

said that this

since, as

That

we observed

However,

if

God

before,

- thus God has

durations

in

eternal, created

De potentia

32
c/e/,

world can be impossible.

impossible, this will be said either
[1] because

is

make something which always

could not be made.

which an

in

made

the

existed, or [2] because, even if

lacks the

God can
power

power

create

God

to create an eternal

world with an

could

could make

world

any nature, and natures don't

to create a

God

is

it, it

rejected,

entail their

infinite duration.

such a world could not be made (not as a limitation of God’s power, but
as

some problem with such
made) must be

a world), then

finite in duration.

it

There

would follow
Aquinas

are,

world of infinite duration might not be able

to be

that this

says, only

made:

world (which has been

two reasons why a

“... either [2a]

because of a

lack of passive potency, or [2b] because of incompatibility in the concepts involved.” 34

One

reason to think that a world of infinite duration could not be

that there could be

world ot

no appropriate passive

infinite duration

are created

when form

potentiality, that

to

no matter from which a

could be made. Under Aristotelian metaphysics, substances

(the active principle) informs matter (the passive potency).

problem with a world of infinite duration would seem
existed forever, there

is,

would seem

to

to be that, since the

is

made. Aquinas appeals

creation to explain that creation does not require passive potency

made

it

were created

in

world has

to angelic

- he explains

that

out of matter (they have no passive potency), yet they are capable

of being made by God. This would be one way
if

One

be no time prior to the world's existence for there

be passive potency from which the world

angels are not

made would be

some manner

in

which an

like the angels, then
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infinite

world could exist -

no prior passive potency would

be required. 35 Aquinas also considers the
heretical position
eternally existing passive potency
heretical,

36

Aquinas observes

might advance)

is

that

that there

could have been

from which the world was made. Though

this

view

is

such an account (which an Aristotelian etemalist

nevertheless metaphysically possible, and thus,
such a world would

be capable of being made.
)

The

last

way

[2b] in

which a world of infinite duration might be shown

impossible would be to show that there was a contradiction
involved

The contradiction can be expressed

eternal, world.

( 1 )

For any

(2)

The concepts The world has
God'

A

(3

x, if the

in the

form of a demonstration:
is

impossible

The world was created by

are incompatible

world created by God that has existed forever

This argument

(if successful)

would be necessarily
world could not

true,

exist.

and hence

impossible

we would have

certitude that a created eternal

However, the argument cannot count as a demonstration propter

,

(2) (if we indeed

is

counts as a demonstration quia because the conclusion

quid because, as Aquinas argued

in the

have such knowledge)

previous sections, our knowledge of the truth of

is

not ultimately a result of understanding the

essence of the world or of God’s act of creation. By proving that creation and
duration are incompatible,

Aquinas's goal

is

to

show

not a demonstration at

ideas, to be created

beginning

be

in a created,

concepts involved in x are incompatible, then x
existed forever’ and

to

all.

we can conclude
that

He

premise (2)
says,

is false,

world

is finite

and thus

to this,

to a thing’s entire substance,

mutually repugnant or not.”
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in duration.

that the syllogism

“The whole question comes

by God according

in duration, are

that the

infinite

above

whether the

and yet

to lack a

is

Aquinas

asserts that there are only

two ways

in

which the concepts

be mutually incompatible. 38 He says, “...a
contradiction could arise only
efficient cause

must precede

precede existence

in

its

39

show

In order to

that (2)

proceeds to argue that the concepts are not incompatible

These two possible proofs of premise

(2)

in either

(b)

If

God

is

the creator of the world, then

God

If

God

is

the creator of the world, then

God’s

(c)

to the existence

(d)

(e)

If

something

If

God

is

is

of these ways.

is

the efficient cause of the world

efficient cause is prior in duration

of the world
prior in duration to x, then x has not existed forever

the creator of the world, then the world has not existed forever

All things that are

(f)

must

can be summarized as follows:

All efficient causes are prior in duration to their effects

.

because an

cannot be true, Aquinas

(a)

.

...

effect in duration, or because non-existence

duration ...”

could

in (2)

made from nothing have

non-existence prior in duration to

existence

If

(g)

God

made from nothing

is

the creator of the world, then the world

is

the creator of the world, then the non-existence of the world

is

(ex

nihilo )

.'.

(h)

If

God

duration to

(i)

(j)

its

If

something

If

God

is

is

existence

is

prior in duration to x, then x has not existed forever

the creator of the world, then the world has not existed forever
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prior in

Aquinas’s rejects the principle
effects in time.

Though he agrees

causes must precede their

that all efficient causation that

motion (motum) precedes the effect
effects instantaneously

(a) that all efficient

its

effect

their creation in time. Thus,

God's

of

act

creation needn't precede the created being
in time, if God acted instantaneously.

understand

Aquinas

why God

could have acted instantaneously

account of creation

s

resulting in motion (that

is,

in the

Woodworkers change wood

When

is

something

is

is

in creating the

theologiae

world,

is

state to a latter state.

changes seed into animals,

that exists, but creation

previously there was nothing.

When

This

is

its

lit,

their being

or between a

is

existent

where

no time between a match

mind forming

“In things of this kind, what

made, we mean

that they are

Hence, since creation

created at the

same time .”
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is

is

a concept and having one.

being made,

from another, and

without motion, a thing

God

creates the world.

the world; thus, his efficient causation of the world

rather,

produced.

because the causal act of creation involves no intermediary - no stuff that needs

to be transformed.

exist.

being

new

produces a

is

things are produced by creation rather than

change, becoming and being are simultaneous - there

and

think of

not a pre-existing thing that was

C hange transforms something

lit

But,

etc.

how we

changed; instead, with creation the entire substance, both form and
matter,

becoming

turn to

In the ordinary causation

not a real change, merely a change in

created there

we

To

40
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change from a former

into furniture, nature

according to Aquinas, creation
something.

Summa

change), there

by

he claims that efficient causes that produce

in time,

need not precede

produces

can be simultaneous with

it.
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is

is;

but

when we speak of

that previously they did not

being created and has been

He does

not change something into

would not be

prior in time to

it,

but

second argument, the claim

In the

world

is

made from

is

that the

world

made from

is

nothing, or non-existence, then non-existence
precedes existence in

duration, and thus, the world has had a beginning
in duration.
the world

is

made from some

world. Since the world

N

(namely ‘non-existence’), so

is

explain the error,

reasonable

it

from which

we

it

is

...

something

[tor

to be said] to

was made.

In a like sense

we may

drawn above

exception of the supreme essence,
not out of something.”

was created from nothing'
is
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all

is

quotes Anselm in order to

have been made from nothing,

say that,

when

things that exist were

that

is,

to

is

confused

in

be interpreted

it

is

is

interpretation of creation ex nihilo, nothing at

is

as:

all is

that,

it

saddened

no absurdity
with the

out of nothing,

holding that ‘the world

3x (w was created from

possible for the proposition

~ 3x (w was

world was not created from something.’ And since

in duration the existence

man

made by

requires the following interpretation:

world was created from nothing'

a

this sense, therefore,

non-existence. But, as Aquinas points out,

had a beginning

that the first

mean something

kept in mind, namely,

The temporalist

‘the

‘the

is

understand that the thing was, indeed, made, but that there was nothing

will follow if the conclusion

x) and x

that

must have preceded the

response

first

made from non-being. Aquinas

without cause, his sadness arises from nothing. In

is,

N

not necessarily true because ‘made from nothing' could

other than the world

that

The argument holds

preceded by N, the world can't have existed forever.
Aquinas

is

has two responses to this line of argument. Aquinas’s

premise

nothing. If the

created from x),

this is a possible

logically entailed to

have preceded

of the world, and hence one cannot demonstrate that the world

in duration.
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In Aquinas' second response to the
argument, he concedes
assert that creation ex nihilo be understood
to

being
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Even

.

if

we were

mean

we might wish

world was made from non-

that the

required to interpret creation ex nihilo in this
way,

it

follow, Aquinas argues, that non-being precedes
the world in duration. That
the world

created from non-being,

is

come

needn't

it

after

non-being

created from non-being could be understood temporally,
but

it

in time.

does not

is,

not

-

their existence

made

depends wholly on

to exist, they

won

t

exist.

their being

Aquinas

existence except from another; regarded as
existence, therefore, nothingness

that

it

would be nothing

if

illumination of the moon,

that they

eternal

4"

could he eternal

by the sun and

that

is,

it

were

left

natural

is its

lot. ...
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.

left to itself

.

.

Suppose

in duration.

light

also could be understood

it

is

that

itself,

it

is

nothing; prior to

We maintain that

was always shining on

light

from darkness,

that

is, it is

By an analogy with

this fact

that the

nature

is

such

the

about created natures shows

moon were always

the

moon. The moon

we

is

in

time

can conceive of created beings

from

this sense,

we

illuminated

in this case

is

would

not illuminated

could talk of the

by nature dark, while

no darkness of the moon preceded

it

its

its

dark, and only receives illumination from a light source. If the light source were

argues,

and

to

of the sun (and the existence of the moon) were

removed, the moon would become dark. In

made

made

so if uncreated natures are

have always been illuminated. However, the moon, of its own nature,

-

if

“But a creature does not have

simply to

Aquinas explains why

suppose the

that the sun

says,

made —

even

Being

as expressing a conceptual priority. Created beings
are nothing before they are
exist

to

its

in the

this nature, this non-being, that

at the

an existent creature
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being

same time, could hold

illumination. Similarly,

same way - they

moon

are

is

Aquinas

by nature nothing,

made. The non-

existent nature of a thing does not precede
the created, existent thing in time,
just as the

darkness ot the

moon

(in the case presented)

rather, since the creature is

would not precede

by nature nothing,

its

non-being

being made, similar to the case in which a
by-nature-dark
the

moon’s being

is

its

illumination in time,

conceptually prior to

moon

is

its

conceptually prior to

illuminated. Thus, even if we interpret creation
ex nihilo as creation

from a non-existent nature,

it

existence in time, and thus

we

does not logically follow

that

such a nature must precede

cannot demonstrate that ‘the world

is

made from

nothing and the world has existed forever' are incompatible.

By showing
quia

is in tact

that the first

premise of each ot these two purported demonstrations

not necessarily true, Aquinas shows that these temporalist
arguments can

provide no scientia concerning the age of the world. However, Aquinas
seems only to

have shown

doesn

t

that these

two

sorts

of arguments

work -

fail to

his response to

them

obviously rule out the possibility of constructing another kind of argument that

an eternal world

is

self-contradictory

46
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And

yet

Aquinas seems

to claim confidently (in

the passage quoted earlier) that a contradiction could arise only if the cause precedes
effect or if nothingness precedes existence in time.

that only these

these

its

The source of Aquinas's confidence

two cases could yield a contradiction

is

not clear. If Aquinas thinks that

two arguments are the only reasonably good ones advanced, then he hasn't

in

principle ruled out that other arguments for a contradiction are possible, and thus hasn't

ruled out the possibility that a world of finite duration could be

demonstration quia. There

is

some reason

to interpret

Aquinas

shown by a
in this

way:

after

presenting and rejecting the arguments against infinite duration due to precedence in
time, Aquinas appeals to the authority of Augustine and other Church fathers as well as
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philosophers in that these people also saw no
contradiction

in

an eternal created world.

This seems to imply that Aquinas holds that
since these arguments don't work, and
since authorities have found no contradiction,
there

is

none

to be found.

Thus, by

this

reasoning, Aquinas would hold that no contradiction
can be (would be?) found in a
created, eternal world.

Under

this interpretation

self -contradictory is rather

thus

far,

proven

that

it is

unsatisfying, because

it

of Aquinas, his argument

weak, since

it

uncommon

for

an eternal world

As an

Aquinas

and then

not

at least

interpretation of Aquinas, this is

to rely

on authority

in order to

conclusion to a philosophical argument. Instead, Aquinas typically will
point,

is

merely seems to show that no one has,

self-contradictory.

is

that

first

draw

a

prove his

will appeal to authority in order to bolster his position, rather
than

appeal to authority in order to justify his conclusion. If Aquinas thinks there

is

no

contradiction in an eternal world, either he thinks so because no one has been able to

demonstrate one, or else he has a more principled reason
found. The latter option

own

is

philosophically stronger and

philosophical practices.

we ought

seems

that if

we

more

contradiction could be

consistent with Aquinas’s

can easily interpret Aquinas

this

way,

to.

In his

arguments from a consideration of creatures and of God, Aquinas shows

that the duration

cause

It

why no

(i.e.,

of the world

God's intention

nature of the world

itself).

is

neither demonstrable by a consideration of

in creating the world),

In

De

aeternitate

nor of its formal cause

its

(i.e.,

final

the

mundi Aquinas considers only two
,

possible arguments for the incompatibility of a created world and an eternal world

some cause must be

prior in time to the world’s existing or that non-being

157

must

be.

-

that

In

rebutting the

how God

first,

Aquinas gives a treatment of the

creates the world, and

demonstrated from
the world,

namely

shows how a

finite duration

In rebutting the second,

it.

from which the world

that

is

God

in the

Summa theologiae

of the world cannot be

Aquinas considers the material cause of
made, and also shows

duration ol the world cannot be
demonstrated from

and from

cause of the world, namely

efficient

In his

it.

and his responses

how

a finite

arguments from creatures

to these

two arguments

De

in

aetermtate mundi, Aquinas has shown that no
demonstration about the duration of the

world can be given by considering
is

exhaustive, and thus,

in

Aquinas has ruled out the
the world

s

final,

responding to the two arguments
possibility

ability to

have no scientia about

its

(they extensively

that

De

aetermtate mundi.

it.

demonstrate causally the duration of the world,

duration.

Whether the world

then must be held either by opinion or
that temporalist

in

faith.

is finite

The arguments

we

can

or infinite in duration

that

Aquinas presents

to

arguments cannot be demonstrations are largely philosophical

employ an

Aristotelian metaphysics), but they do include premises

would be accepted only by

Christians.

As

such, these arguments can persuade only

Christians and must therefore be directed towards them. Arguments

(who

list

of any explanation involving necessary causes of

duration, and hence, any demonstration of

Without some

show

formal, efficient and material causes. This

made by

etemalists

are clearly advocating a heretical and thus, presumably, non-Christian view), are

not treated quite so systematically by Aquinas. Because Aquinas has faith (and thus
certitude) that the world

is

not eternal, he can be sure that

are wrong. Aquinas’s approach to these

is

all

more piecemeal,
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etemalist demonstrations

but also wholly

philosophical

- he

points out the philosophical errors

and rebuts them one

at

The

Aquinas takes great pains

is fairly

A

strongly criticized by theologians of the period

further,

and perhaps more perplexing mystery,

attacked temporalists (with
tried to

that the world,

47
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controversial, and his

Why

strenuously defended such a theologically controversial
position
clear.

show

to

held to have had a beginning and a finite
duration in time,

is

cannot be demonstrated to be such. Aquinas’s position
is

demonstrations

role of scientia in divine matters

in the last section,

which as a matter of faith

position

in etemalist

a time.

4.4.

As we saw

made

whom

is

is

Aquinas so
not immediately

why Aquinas

he agreed that the world was

strongly

finite in duration)

who

demonstrate the truth of their position, while maintaining a rather mild
response

to etemalists

A

who

tried to

prove a heretical position.

ready response to these questions would be to hold that Aquinas’s

epistemology required

this position.

According

to

Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of

cognition and his Aristotelian epistemological account of scientia the
,

human mind

is

simply incapable of proving truths about the duration of the world (and, presumably,
truths about the other articles of faith). This philosophical result corresponds nicely

with Aquinas's account of faith as an epistemic
not" and which

is

incompatible with scientia -

divine matters, then the faith

we do have

state

if

concerning “things that appear

we simply

cannot have scientia about

about them (particularly since

it

is

epistemically stronger than the other option, opinion), would seem to be epistemically
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reasonable.

Under

this interpretation,

mainstream because he

is

is

forced to take on the temporalist

theologically as well as epistemologically
obligated to do so.

This interpretation runs into
are,

Aquinas

difficulties,

however, when

we

consider that there

according to Aquinas, some matters of faith that
can be demonstrated. The

existence of God, for example, seems to be a matter
of faith that Aquinas himself

demonstrates

seems odd

in his

that

famous Five Ways.

Aquinas would prove

These proofs would seem

to

If faith

that

God

concerns what cannot be proven, then

exists,

and

further, that

He

undermine the epistemological motivation

temporal ists that was suggested by the interpretation above. Further,

if

is

it

simple, etc.

for taking

on the

epistemological

considerations led Aquinas to conclude that the duration of the world (or
the Trinity, or
the Incarnation, etc.) could not be demonstrated, then

why

is it

that similar

considerations did not lead Aquinas to conclude that the existence of God (or His
simplicity, etc.) also could not be demonstrated?

To

say the least,

it

Aquinas would so tenaciously argue against the demonstrability of a
world, while

at the

seems odd

that

created, finite

same time demonstrate other matters of faith. The Five Ways

represent a special, interesting case concerning the role reason plays in faith for

Aquinas. In the next section,
particular focusing

approach

we

turn to a detailed examination of the Five

on how Aquinas uses them with respect

to the existence

to faith,

and

Ways,

how

in

his

of God differs from that taken with the duration of the world.
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Reason and

4.4.1.

Near the beginning of the

some matters concerning

scientia of the divine:

Summa contra gentiles

,

The Five Ways

Aquinas makes clear

that

the divine are subject to reason while
others are not:

There

is

about

God exceed

a twofold

mode of truth
all

in

what we profess about God. Some truths
human reason. Such is the truth that God
which the natural reason also is able to

the ability of the

But there are some truths
reach. Such are that God exists, that He is
one, and the like. In fact, such truths
about God have been proved demonstratively by the
philosophers, guided by the
light of the natural reason. 9
is

triune.

Aquinas goes on
due
4.

to the limitations

1 ).

we

to explain that

we

cannot have scientia about certain truths about

of our cognitive apparatus, as was discussed above

Though Aquinas holds

that

we

cannot have perfect scientia about

(in section

God

cannot form any demonstrations from God’s essence), he does
claim that

have scientia quia concerning God -

that

forming demonstrations from effects

to their divine cause.

Now,

in

quia.

It is

is,

we can have

scientia that

God

God

(because

we can

exists

by

arguments proving the existence of God,

it is not necessary to assume
the divine essence or quiddity as the middle term of the demonstration. ... In
place ol the quiddity, an effect is taken as the middle term, as in demonstrations

divine

relating

It is

from such effects

names

God

existence

is

knowledge
this,

in

imposed

some way

to

itself,

effects.

that,

although

God

transcends

all

sensible things

And thus, the origin of our
sense applies also to those things that transcend the sense. 50

based, are nevertheless sensible things.
in the

Aquinas proceeds

that

His

His effects, on which the demonstration proving His

to present five

proven via a demonstration quia -

namely

meaning of the name God is taken. For all
by removing the effects of God from Him or by

that the

either

thereby likewise evident

and the sense

From

are

something

is in

ways

in

which the existence of God

in the first, for instance,

motion (and

that this
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motion

is

he proceeds from an

is

effect,

evident to the senses), and

from
i.e.

this effect,

demonstrates the existence of its ultimate
cause, the unmoved mover,

God.
This account presented in the

to the puzzles raised at the

we

argues that

here,

beginning of this section, however. Aquinas
strenuously

would seem

commitments would seem

Aquinas clearly holds

that,

by the argument from

to require that faith

We

seem

to

we

is

cannot demonstrate
others cannot, and

God

s

existence; or

we need

is

the

Some Aquinas

have an unresolved puzzle
all

"

(the theological

that

are not

that cannot be demonstrated).

unmoved mover, uncaused

Ways were

rather, they either

may

causer, etc.) that

prove the

or

may

or they are intended to reveal truths not about God, but about the nature of

existence, causation, etc
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Aquinas does clearly seem

the existence of God, so before

we

to

claim that he

entertain such interpretations,

we

is

demonstrating

should see whether

the puzzles raised can be resolved while taking Aquinas’s claims about the Five

at face value.

we

held position by holding that the duration

scholars resolve this puzzle by arguing that the Five

existence of some entity (an

He

in

which are demonstrable and which

never presented as demonstrations for the existence of God;

not be God,

of things unseen. Yet,

which case Aquinas should hold

commonly

one of those matters

-

some matters of faith can be demonstrated and

to understand

why Aquinas bucked

of the world

faith), in

faith

can have scientia quia that

either matters of faith cannot be demonstrated at

commitment of the argument from

(and also

to be motivated

concerning God,

exists (though not perfect scientia). 51

Aquinas -

contra gentiles does not provide an answer

can have neither perfect scientia nor scientia
quia about the duration of

the world in time, and this

theological

Summa

In his later,

and more mature work, the
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Summa

Ways

theologiae Aquinas does
,

seem

to provide additional

grounds for understanding

why some

matters of faith can be

demonstrated and others cannot.
In the

God

Summa

theologiae Aquinas considers the objection
that the existence of
,

cannot be demonstrated, for faith

is

of things unseen and demonstration produces

scientia. Aquinas's response creates a distinction

The existence of God and other

like truths

between two kinds of divine matters:
about God, which can be

known

(nota) by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but
are preambles
{pi cieambula) to the articles; tor taith presupposes
{praesupponit ) natural
cognition ( cognitionem ), even as grace presupposes nature,
and perfection the
perfectible. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent
a man, who cannot grasp a
proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in
itself is capable of

being scientifically

As we

known and demonstrated

see here, Aquinas distinguishes between
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two kinds of matters of faith —

articles

and preambles. Preambles are those matters of faith which can be known
by natural
reason, articles those

articles

known

only by

- they somehow come

The preambles

faith.

also

seem

to

be prior to the

before the articles, just as “faith presupposes natural

cognition, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection the perfectible.”

One way of interpreting
is

the preamble/article distinction that should be avoided

a logical one. Since the preambles are prerequisites for the articles, and since

believers

who

cannot demonstrate the preambles must presuppose them,

natural to conclude that

distinction

God

is

Aquinas

is

triune without believing that

my

belief that

would seem

characterizing a logical rather than epistemic

between the preambles and the

triune presupposes

it

God

God

articles.

exists.

exists,

attention to a logical relation between these

it

For example,

When
seems

I

say that

I

cannot believe that

my

belief that

natural to infer that

two statements. Under

I

am

God

is

calling

this interpretation,

the preambles are distinguished from the articles because in order for the articles to be

true, the

preambles must be true (though not vice-versa).
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However, the passages

Summa

in

contra gentiles clearly point to an epistemic

rather than a logical distinction. In
chapter 9,

not

twofold on the part of God,

who

is

Aquinas notes

one simple Truth, but on the

knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different
aptitudes
things.

Further, in chapter 3,

truth of divine things, he

that the truth

when Aquinas

goes on to discuss

is

part of our

knowledge of divine

introduces the concept of the twofold

first

how

for the

of things

angelic natural

knowledge

is

greater

than that of humans, implying that the dividing line
between knowable and not-

knowable

would be

for angels

of divine things

preamble and

in the

article,

Summa

hat the difference

borne out

in the

Summa

is

it

is

for

human

beings. If the twofold truth

contra gentiles corresponds to the distinction between

then the distinction

grounds, for the distinction

I

different than

drawn

is

made on

clearly

epistemic, not logical

in different places for angels

between preamble and

article is

meant

to be epistemic

seems

theologiae as well. After defining articles of faith as being

enumerated on epistemic grounds, Aquinas discusses two ways
faith

and humans.

in

which the

articles

of

can be considered.
...the formal account of the object of faith can be understood in two ways. One
way, on the part of the very thing believed. And in this way the formal account
of all believable things is one, namely, the first truth. And in this way articles

are not distinguished.

another way, on our
believable

is

The formal account of believable

part.

And

things can be taken in

way the formal account is that the
And in this way the articles of faith are

in this

something not seen.

distinguished, as has been said.^

On

the part of the formal object of faith, that

distinction

between

articles, but there

and preambles - each

truth about

God

is,

God, not only

would be no
entails

and

is

logical distinction

is

from our point of view, and

in this

way
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between

articles

entailed by the others (and strictly

speaking, cannot be distinguished from the others). The second

articles is

there no logical

the preambles

way of considering
would be distinguished

from the

articles for they

would be seen (by those who have proven
them) whereas

would be unseen - but

articles

A

distinction

though

faith is

between preambles and

of things unseen,

be demonstrated because
is

it

is

not very satisfying because

anything,

“God

exists"

is

earlier.

faith

The

it

articles

would give Aquinas room

solution

to

would proceed as follows: even

concerns articles* and the existence of God
can

a preamble.

At

this point,

remains exposed

to the

Aquinas' solution

obvious objection

to

our puzzle

that, if

central to faith. In order for the article/preamble
distinction to

be a valuable solution to our puzzle,

some

an epistemic distinction.

this is

wriggle out of the puzzle raised

the

we need

to understand better

propositions as articles and others as preambles.

why Aquinas

We take this

up

in the

counts

next

section.

4.4.2.

The

existence of

The Five Ways, Aquinas’s proofs

God

as a part of faith

for the existence of

God, are taken by many

philosophers to be intended to provide some sort of epistemic justification for

faith.

This could provide a ground lor counting God's existence as epistemically distinct from
articles

of faith.

If faith

needs epistemic justification,

demonstrable preambles — whereas
articles.

The

is

presented the Five

is

perhaps to be found

in

concerned with indemonstrable

interpretation might go something like this

rational justification

faith.

faith itself is

it

-

faith

without some sort of

unreasonable and epistemically inappropriate, and Aquinas

Ways

as a

means of providing just such

Anthony Kenny expresses exactly

this position, in
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a rational justification for

The Five Ways

T°

™e

ems that 11 belief in the existence of God cannot
be rationally
f
justified, there can be no good
reason for adopting any of the traditional
monotheistic religions.
philosophical proof of God's existence
from the
nature of the world would not be the
only form such a rational justification
might take: a man might, for instance, come
to accept the
s

A

existence of God
through believing something in the world
to be a revelation from God ...
Those
philosophers and theologians who still consider
belief in God to need rational
justification frequently offer the arguments
of Aquinas as such a justification 57
.

If the

Five

Ways were Aquinas's

are unsound, then faith

in

would

attempt to rationally justify

tail to

philosophy has been devoted

faith,

be made reasonable by them.

and

A

if

great deal of work

understanding and attacking or defending the

to

soundness ot the Five Ways, presumably precisely because
they are seen
provide epistemic justification for faith

Given
problem

my

Aquinas, as

is

Aquinas

this

(if

sound) to

58
.

interpretation ot Aquinas’s account of faith,

in interpreting

these proofs

way, for

faith is not

we

run into an immediate

had by means of proof and yet

well known, offers five proofs for the existence of God. Further,
he

59
clearly identifies his proofs as demonstrations quia (which produces
scientia quia ),

and
is

I

have argued

in the last chapter that faith

could not be scientia quia. This difficulty

compounded when we consider numerous claims Aquinas makes such

impossible to have faith and scientia about the same thing .” 60

It

as “it

would seem

is

that

one

cannot have faith about matters for which one has a proof, such as the existence of God.
This seems, to say the
interpreted

it.

least, a peculiar result

In contrast,

for beliefs in the existence

many

of Aquinas’s account of faith as

interpreters of

of God

61
.

But

if

I

Aquinas take

am

right

I

have

his proofs to be the basis

and the Five

Ways

are not

intended by Aquinas to be the basis of faith, then what are they for?

There

is

some disagreement among Aquinas

scholars about what the Five

Ways

actually prove, but the following claims are clearly found in Aquinas: Aquinas provides
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demonstrations quia" 2 (a demonstration from
effects to causes) that establish
or
are related to the existence of what
Christians call

demonstrations
instead

not

is

is

not an article of faith because

a “preamble to the articles”

known by

known by

is

it

the result of these

pmeambulum) 65

(,

natural reason.

though

if

faith

faith,

and demonstration of a preamble. 67 There would seem

when

preambles and

later

comes

to

have

preambles and

later

comes

to

demonstrate them, (3) a person has

it

comes

and never demonstrates them, or
them, for Aquinas, (1)

been undermined

68
),

for

one seems a

ot no interest here, for

it

to

Ways,

might believe

in

for

God

would seem
have

that

faith in the

faith) that

it

likely scenario for

would not seem

Ways and

(4)

that

and

preambles

preambles and never has

Ways

any relevance

to a lack

to

of

three

are to be used: (3)

our trying to

for the sake of people

faith, since

he thinks that faith

by proof is without merit.

Aquinas introduces the Five Ways
is

is true,

seems highly unlikely as an explanation

that belief motivated

preambles. This

faith in the

Of the remaining

the Five

Aquinas would not propose proofs

60

has faith in the

something

is true.

how

to bear

through proofs rather than

necessary for salvation

first

impossible (assuming the demonstrations have not

have

determine the purpose of the Five
for the Five

them, (2) a person

faith in

(4) a person demonstrates the

is

to be four

to preambles: (1) a person first demonstrates
the

one cannot go from scientia

would be required

possibilities, only

is

these preambles were

but for a given person one cannot

epistemic scenarios

scientia (as

but

quite clear that the preambles can be
assented to by either of

it

two epistemic means: demonstration quia or

faith in

64

natural reason, they could be held by faith. 66

Aquinas makes

have both

God," and

at least

for the sake

of those

70

who

who
is

Thus,

it

already

borne out by Aquinas's claims about the purpose of
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the

Summa theologiae.

In the prologue, he claims that
the

work

is

a

work of sacred

doctrine (sacra doctrina intended for
the instruction of beginning theology
)
students,

of whom would presumably have

faith in the

preambles

(e.g. in the

all

existence of God.

etc.).

Why
Five

Ways

should the faithful need or want proofs for
what they already believe ? The

appear to be demonstrations of philosophical (or
natural) theology,

Aquinas argues

to theological conclusions (e.g. that

God

exists) without

revealed truths in his arguments. This interpretation,
that the Five

be a project

1,

in philosophical

Ways

in

which

employing any
are intended to

theology leaves something to be desired. For,

in

question

immediately preceding the Five Ways, Aquinas clearly holds
that sacred doctrine

(which

is

the enterprise of the

Summa

proceed from divinely revealed
proceed to divine

truths.

If

theologiae)

is

a science in which demonstrations

71

truths,

the Five

rather than a science in

Ways

which demonstrations

are to be understood as part of an enterprise

of philosophical theology, then we are confronted with the worry of needing
understand

why Aquinas

immediately proceeds
This tension

in

to

sets

up the

Summa

to

as a project of sacred doctrine, and then

do philosophical theology.

Aquinas

is

not easily resolved. In question

to hold that philosophical theology

is

different

1,

Aquinas does seem

from sacred doctrine:

Sciences are differentiated according to the different natures of knowable things.
For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion - that
the earth, for instance,

is round; the astronomer by means of mathematics (that
by abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
Hence there is no reason why those things which are dealt with in the
is,

philosophical sciences, so far as they can be

known by

also be taught us by another science so far as they

fall

theology which pertains to sacred doctrine differs

in

which

is

part of philosophy.

72
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natural reason,

may

not

within revelation. Hence

genus from

that theology

From

this passage,

would be

it

would seem

that the Five

Ways,

as a product of natural reason,

part of philosophical theology,
not sacred doctrine.

But

in the

prologue to

question 2, in which Aquinas introduces
the Five Ways, he clearly seems to
think that
the Five

Ways

to teach the

are part of sacred doctrine:

knowledge of God, not only

beginning ot things and their

last

The Five Ways, because they

are

end

“Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine

He

as

is in

we must

...

known by

Himself, but also as

consider whether

natural reason, don’t

God

seem

He

is

the

exists ...”

to

is

73

be a part of

sacred doctrine, and yet Aquinas clearly seems to
hold that the existence of God (shown

by the Five Ways)

is

the

first

thing sacred doctrine must consider.

How are we to

resolve this apparent conflict?

Interpreters

At the

risk

have not been unified

in

how to

of entering a centuries-old debate,

Immediately prior

to presenting the Five

I

understand Aquinas on this issue. 74

offer the following interpretation. 7 ^

Ways, Aquinas describes exactly what he

is

doing:

When

the existence of a cause

is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes
the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence. This is
especially the case in regard to God ... 76

Aquinas here holds

that in demonstrations

in place ot definitions.

In question 1,

of the Five Ways, a posteriori effects serve

Aquinas discusses the usefulness of such an

approach:

Although we cannot know of God what He is, nevertheless in [sacred] doctrine
we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition,
in regard to whatever is treated of in this doctrine concerning God, even as in

some

philosophical sciences

effect,

by taking the

Because God’s essence

is

we

demonstrate something about a cause from

effect in place of a definition of the cause.

ineffable,

Aquinas holds

however, by means of demonstrations from

effects,
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that

we

we

cannot

its

77

know what God

is;

are able to consider things about

God -

for instance, that

we saw

in the

He

is

an unmoved mover. Consideration
of these things

prologue to question 2 (above), instrumental

sacred doctrine. If we understand the
premises of the Five

in

is.

as

achieving the goals of

Ways

to be primarily part of

one of the philosophical sciences, then we
can understand why Aquinas uses the Five

Ways, a product of natural reason,

in

a work concerned with revealed theology.

He

says:

This science

sacred doctrine] can in a sense take from the
philosophical
it stood in need of them,
but only in order to make its
teaching clearer. For it takes its principles not from
other sciences, but
[i.e.

sciences, not as though

immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does
not take from other
sciences as from the higher, but makes use of them
as of the lesser, and as
handmaidens; just as the master sciences make use of the

sciences that supply

their materials, as political of military science.
That
to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect

them is not due
which is
reason (from which proceed
it

thus uses

of our

more

easily led

by what

is

the other sciences), to that
this science.

known through
which

is

78

The Five Ways, though they seem

natural

above reason, such as are the teachings of

to

prove that

God

lor a student ol sacred doctrine, help the student consider

instance, the First

Way

is

God

in

more importantly

new ways. For

recognizes that these proofs are employed by philosophers as

well as Christian theologians

God

exists,

proves from the existence of moving things the existence of an

unmoved mover. Aquinas

uniquely Christian

intellect,

79

exists,

-

these arguments do not

which seems

to

be

why

seem

to

prove clearly that a

the conclusion of each argument

not about the existence of God but about the existence merely of some entity. The

First

Way,

for instance, concludes with “Therefore

mover which

is

existence of an

moved by no

other.”

unmoved mover

is

80

That the

it is

First

who

Way

seems

to

at

a

first

prove only the

unproblematic for Aquinas, for the Five Ways, as

have argued, are intended for those who already have
sacred doctrine

necessary to arrive

faith.

already believes that the Christian

170

God

For the

faithful student

exists, this

I

of

unmoved mover,

the creator of all motion,

concludes the

Way

First

is,

of course,

God

with the observation,

understands to be God.” Each of the Five
exist,

and

appeal to

Himself.

“And

Ways

And

this is

has this form - an entity

to

God. Without an implicit

thus they do not and cannot justify faith.
Their importance
faithful to learn

about

proven

is

these proofs do not demonstrate the existence
of the Christian God. and

faith,

unmoved,

is

From

God and

is in

what they allow the

about God. The First Way, for instance, reveals
to the student of sacred

God

requires God.

unmoved mover] everyone

this [the

this entity is then identified (without
proof) as

doctrine that

why Aquinas

the

creation.

that

He

started

motion without moving, and

unmoved mover argument, we

learn

some

that

motion

additional truths

The Five Ways (and other demonstrations) provide an

opportunity for students of sacred doctrine to understand better
the matters of faith that
they already accept

be

81
.

In these proofs, reason investigates

what

faith already accepts to

true.

For Aquinas, a further reason for studying proofs of what one already believes
that they provide for personal

improvement. Studying these proofs helps

contemplative

helps train the intellect and helps remove obstacles to

life,

because

it

to

promote the

contemplation of the divine - namely those erroneous arguments offered against the
faith.

“

Further, the study of

them “turns the mind away from

tames the flesh on account of the
desire of riches

...

It

toil that

study entails

also helps to teach obedience

...

..” 84
.

It

lustful thoughts,

also helps to

and

remove

the

For those whose lives are

devoted to the service of God, Aquinas cautions that these proofs should be pursued
only insofar as doing so aims

at

sacred doctrine. Otherwise, those

run the risk of becoming impious

84
.

171

who

is

pursue reason

as

If,

I

have argued, the proofs of the existence of
God do not serve as an

epistemic justificatory precursor to

faith,

nor does the existence of God serve as
a

logical presupposition of the articles of
faith, then

when he
that

is,

labels the existence of

(and other demonstrable conclusions) preambles

what sense do they presuppose the

in

previous chapter,
scientia

God

-

taith,

faith neither

what exactly does Aquinas mean

articles

according to Aquinas,

is

of faith? As

an epistemic

1

state

argued

-

in the

independent from

depends on scientia, nor vice versa. However unique

faith

is. it

occupies a place on an epistemic spectrum ranging from
opinion to scientia - as a part
ot this epistemic scale, faith

is

much

as

a

component of reason

that reason, for Aquinas, “denotes a transition

human

is

act of reason as scientia.

Understood

natural cognition in that our natural reasoning

to another

having

faith at all (as well as for scientia

in this

way, then,

faith is

by which the

condition for

that articles

its

as

presupposed by

and opinion), just as human nature

being perfected. The difference between

of faith require our having

is

powers serve as a necessary pre-condition

necessary pre-condition for grace and the existence of a substance

is,

scientia. Recall

soul reaches or arrives at cognition of something else.” 85 Faith, in
this way,

much an

for

from one thing

as

faith in order to

article

is,

a

a necessary pre-

and preamble, then,

count them as being known

cognized with certitude), whereas preambles do not require

exercising of our natural reasoning powers (that

is

is

faith,

is

(that

but merely the

our ability to perform

demonstrations).

The existence of God,
from
is,

to

articles

of faith

in that

as well as other demonstrable proofs, are distinguishable

they don't require faith in order for them to be

have scientia about them).

It

does not follow from
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this,

known

(that

however, that matters of

faith,

such as the existence of God. concern
things that are seen, for

defined by Aquinas, requires that

merely/-see that

it

is

4.4.3.

is

unseen;

Ways),

When we

when we

we no

why

have

nor that a proposition

faith

is

is true,

but

about God's existence, the

longer have faith about

Five

it

see the truth of God's existence
(through,

The puzzle of the duration

My interpretation of the
Ways do

neither see

to be believed.

truth of this proposition

for example, the Five

we

faith, as

it.

of the world resolved

Ways and of the preambles shows

that the Five

not undermine the argument from faith posited
earlier. Faith, for Aquinas,

cognitive state that essentially requires that

world, unlike the existence of God,

means of faith. But why,
that the duration of the

is

an

its

is

an

article

of faith,

that

is,

knowable only by
is

mode of truth

Aquinas so adamant

article of faith, especially considering the

controversy surrounding this view? Although Aquinas identifies
gentiles a twofold

a

object be unseen, and the duration of the

returning to the puzzle posed earlier,

world

is

about what

we can know

in the

Summa

contra

about God, and in the

Summa

theologiae, he refines this distinction to one of preambles and articles, he does
not

provide a systematic account of which propositions count as preambles and which as
articles.

Theologically, there does not seem to be great significance to

being counted as a preamble versus as an

article.

That

God

some

proposition

exists, or is one, is

demonstrable and thus a preamble, but that the world was created with a beginning
time

is not, at least

seems

to rest

in

according to Aquinas. But nothing of great theological importance

on Aquinas’s position on whether the duration of the world
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is

an

article or

preamble

no heresy or theological error seems

to follow

duration of the world could be demonstrated
(even

The problem Aquinas has with
Aquinas

has, at least so far, not been).

it

we saw earlier

to temporalist proofs is in his

(in section 4.3.4).

God

s efficient

In this polemical treatise.

causation of the world was temporally prior to

non-existence of the world was temporally prior to

limited views these arguments advance.

The

it,

or the

Aquinas's response to these

it.

arguments, and his exasperation with their proponents,

is

De

primarily concerned with the arguments that
the world could not be eternal

is

because either

account

that the

view, then, must be philosophical.

most exasperated response

s

aeternitate mundi, as

Aquinas

this

if

from allowing

is

due

to the philosophically

Aristotelian causation implied by the

first

too limiting for Aquinas's purposes. If he allows that
efficient causes must

always be temporally prior

to their effects, his Christian-Aristotelian synthesis is

deprived of the ability to posit creation as a miraculous and special form of
causation.
Further, according to Aquinas this

view of causation

is

philosophically just plain wrong,

as his counter-examples of instant illumination are intended to show.

If,

on the other

hand, he allows that non-existence must temporally precede existence, as the NeoPlatonic temporalists argue, then Aquinas

becomes constrained

in his ability to use

an

Aristotelian metaphysics in support of his theological endeavors. In each case, the

temporalists, by asserting that they can demonstrate that the world

have, at the

believe,

is

same

why

is finite in

duration,

time, limited the metaphysical options available to Aquinas. This,

he finds these arguments so tiresome, and

vigorously - they,

at root,

why

he attacks them so

challenge the validity of Aquinas’s approach of freely
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I

employing a modified Arislotelianism

to help understand

and explain theological

problems.

4.5.

Probable reasoning about divine matters

In addition to providing demonstrations
about divine matters,

employs reasoning (and sometimes proofs)

when he argues

arguments against

faith, as

he does

against each of the purported demonstrations
advanced in favor of the

eternity of the world.

employed even

to refute

Aquinas clearly

Aquinas also observes a mode of argumentation

for matters for

which we can know only by

...

there are certain probable

in

order to

that

can be

faith:

( verisimilis ) arguments that should be brought forth
divine truth apparent ( manifestandam ). This should be
done
for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not
with any idea of refuting

those

who

make

are adversaries.

For the very inadequacy of the arguments would
them in their error, since they would imagine that our
acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.
rather strengthen

As we saw with

the Five

Ways,

in the

case of preambles, demonstrations can be

provided for the faithful that help them investigate truths that they already believe. So
too, can probable

arguments be given for the same purpose. These arguments,

were not being provided

to those

who

-

Aquinas warns, we should not offer them

weak,

if

they

already had faith, would merely result in opinion,

since their premises are merely probable

that these

if

that

is,

they are not necessarily true. Thus,

to non-believers, since they

may

recognize

arguments are not compelling (they don’t yield certitude) and may seem

used for apologetics.

In the case

strenuously argues that no demonstration

arguments persuasive, as

of the duration of the world, though Aquinas
is

possible, he does find

for instance, the following.
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some probable

in th P rod Ction of thin s the
end of God’s will is His own goodness
S
as it
f !
^ rr
manifested
in His effects. Now, His power
and goodness are made manifest

is

above

all by the fact that things other
than Himself were not always in
existence.
or this fact shows clearly that these things
owe their existence to Him, and also
is proof that God does not act
by a necessity of His nature, and that His
power of
acting is infinite. Respecting the divine
goodness, therefore, it was entirely
fitting that God should have given
87
created things a temporal

beginning

Since

that

God

s

end

goodness

in creating is the manifestation

is fitting

scientia, for

necessary

beings), and

we come

to

many of the premises

(e.g., that

it

is

of his goodness, anything that reveals

(but not necessary) to that end. Finite
temporal created beings,

imply, to Thomas, an infinite, eternal creator.
existence of the world,

.

divine

power

By

reasoning from the temporal

comprehend God

in the

is

better.

This comprehension

is

not

above argument are merely probable, and not

made

manifest by the creation of

finite

temporal

not clear that anyone would have any reason for believing
the premises

to be true, except as they are matters

of

faith that
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have already been accepted.
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target of Aquinas’s
In his

tam

(DAM

DAM

De

others)

aeternitate

argues the Franciscan/Bonaventurean line that a world with
a finite duration can be
demonstrated (and he proceeds to do so). Aquinas’s treatise
appears to be targeted at
Pecham’s arguments.
1

There

is, ol course, the related question: why
does Aquinas strive to discount
demonstrations that prove the eternity of the world? This has a straightforward
answer,

and one

that

must be

false.

is not particularly interesting as far as my
project is concerned - Aquinas
rebuts demonstrations that prove the eternity of the world because
their conclusions
contradict faith and thus he has certitude that the conclusions of these

demonstrations

Aquinas could have

left his

response

at that,

but seems keen on helping

to eliminate the philosophical errors that led to these demonstrations,

which helps
explain his careful, temperamentally mild, philosophical rebuttals to the etemalist
arguments.
14

“fidei articuli demonstrative probari

apparentibus

est, ut dicitur

ad hebr.

xi.”

(ST

non possunt, quia

fides de

non

1.46.2 sed contra)

20

mundi ex tempore quamvis sit articulus fidei, tamen ratione, ut
potest investigari. Nee hoc est in praeiudicium fidei, dum no propter rationem
“creatio

videtur,

merito fidei ad eius intelligeniam pervenitur.” ( Quaestiones de
aeternitate mundi q. 2, responsio) Though Pecham here merely states that the question
fidei assentitur, sed
,

of the eternity of the world can be “investigated” ( investigari ) by reason (something
which Aquinas also accepts), he has a stronger claim in mind - he actually goes on to
demonstrate that the world cannot be eternal (something Aquinas does not think can be
done).
21

Aquinas also has an argument from authority to help convince the etemalists
that no demonstration of the age of the world can be given. He points out that the
arguments given by Aristotle which appear to prove that the world is eternal, are not, in
fact,

intended to be demonstrations.

He

gives three reasons for thinking

178

this:

because, both in Physics VIII and in
De Caelo 1 he advances some
laxagoras Empedocles and Plato, and
brings forward reasons to
refute them. Secondly,
df because wherever he speaks of
this subject, he quotes the
es imony o t e ancients, which is
not the way of a demonstrator, but
of one persuading
what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly
says in Book I of the Topics that there
° f WhlCh We d° not have roofs such
as ‘whether the world is
P
First,

'

SeThem sf

’

eternal (STI 46

’

As Aquinas

points out, one does not appeal to the
testimony of the ancients (in
the case of the argument from faith, these
include Gregory and Moses, and in this
case
Aristotle) to give a demonstration. So by
Aquinas's own standards, the argument from
raith has not yet proven that we cannot
demonstrate the age of the world, but has merely
given us reasons to believe that such demonstrations
may not be available to us.
22 “

dem °nstrationis enim principium est quod quid est. unumquodque
autem,
secundum rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hie et nunc,
propter quod dicitur quod
umversaha sunt ubique et semper, unde demonstrari non
potest quod homo, aut caelum
’

aut lapis

non semper

23

"Nee

fuit.”

obstat,

si

(ST

1.46.2)

dicatur

caelestium corporum, sicut

et

quod tabs quantitas consequitur naturam

omnium

caeli vel

natura constantium est aliqua determinata

quantitas, quia sicut divina potentia
illam, ita

non

limitatur ad

non limitatur ad hanc quantitatem magis quam ad
naturam cui debeatur tabs quantitas, magis quam ad naturam

aba quantitas debeatur. Et sic eadem redibit quaestio de natura, quae est
de
quantitate, quamvis concedamus, quod natura caeli non sit
indifferens ad quambbet
cui

quantitatem, nee

sit in

eo possibilitas ad

abam

quantitatem

nisi

ad istam ”

(DPD

3.17)

'‘Nam tempus est extrinsecum a re, sicut et locus; unde etiam in caelo, in quo
non est possibilitas respectu alterius quantitatis vel accidentis interius inhaerentis, est
tamen in eo possibilitas respectu loci et situs, cum locabter moveatur; et etiam respectu
temporis,

cum semper tempus

succedat tempori, sicut est successio in motu et in ubi;
quod neque tempus neque ubi consequatur naturam eius, sicut de
quantitate dicebatur. Unde patet quod ex simplici Dei voluntate dependet quod

unde non potest

dici,

praefigatur universo determinata quantitas durationis, sicut et determinata quantitas
dimensionis. Unde non potest necessario concludi aliquid de universi duratione, ut per

hoc ostendi possit demonstrative
25

“unde,

mundum semper

fuisse.”

(DPD

3.17)

cum

nee etiam ex parte divinae potentiae quae est infmita, nee divinae
bonitatis, quae rebus non indiget, ratio determinatae dispositionis universi sumi possit,
oportet

quod

eius ratio sumatur ex simplici voluntate producentis ut

quantitas caeli

producentis.”
26

sit

tanta et

(DPD

non maior, non potest huius

nisi circa

ea quae absolute

autem non sunt quae circa creaturas vult,
potest autem voluntas divina homini manifestari per revelationem. cui
necesse est

quaeratur, quare

ex voluntate

3.17)

“voluntas enim dei ratione investigari non potest,

deum

si

ratio reddi nisi

velle, talia
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ut

dictum

est.

fides innititur.

^

e mUndum incoe lsse est credibile,
P
^
1.46.2)
27

&

^

finem ” (ST
28

29

30

31

^^

Van Steenberghen

(1980),

vel scibile ”

inqUantUm ordinantur ad suam bonitatem

(ST

ut in

p. 23.

See section 2.4 for Aquinas’s account of demonstration
and scientia quia.

See note

1

7,

William de

above.

la

Mare, criticizing Aquinas

these sorts of arguments. See
32

non autem demonstrabile

Hoenen (1990),

in 1278/9, uses this

term to describe

48.

p.

See DPD3.14.

33
si

autem dicatur hoc esse impossibile, vel hoc dicetur quia deus non
potuit
quod semper fuerit, aut quia non potuit fieri, etsi deus posset facere ”

facere aliquid

(DAM

1)
34

“si

autem dicatur quod hoc non potest

duobus modis,

fieri,

passivae, vel propter repugnantiam intellectuum.”
35

And

hoc non potest

vel duas causas veritatis habere: vel propter

this

would seem

to

conform

to the

(DAM

intelligi nisi

remotionem potentiae

2)

orthodox position of the doctrine of

creation ex nihilo.
36

Heretical because such a passive potency

And

uncreated.
37

thus there

would be something

that

is

prior to creation,

God

and thus,

did not create.

*

“in hoc ergo tota consistit quaestio, utrum esse creatum a deo

secundum totam

substantiam, et non habere durationis principium, repugnent ad invicem. vel non.”

(DAM

3)
38

DAM

Aquinas does not seem to consider in
that (2) could be true because one
of the concepts to be conjoined is itself self-contradictory, thus either The world has
existed forever' or The world was created by God’ would be self-contradictory.
Perhaps he does not consider this because he feels he has already resolved this
possibility in earlier texts. Clearly, all Christians will reject out of hand as heretical the

view

The world was created by God' is self-contradictory (and Aquinas shows that
this is not self-contradictory by arguing that God created the world in ST 1.44.1). Our
discussion of the argument from a consideration of creatures above does seem to show
that an eternal world is not self-contradictory: the nature of the world, as Aquinas has
that

argued, does not contain

its

duration of existence, and thus having an infinite duration

would seem to be compatible with the essence of the world. Another approach to
asserting the self-contradictory nature of a world with infinite duration centers around
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arguments

that show an absurdity in there
being an actual number of infinite
days
hese sorts of arguments are not dealt
with systematically, but one by one
(see for
example, SCG 11.38), and thus, I shall

find
( l

Aquinas

s

not discuss them in detail here. Some
scholars
responses seemingly inconsistent (see Van
Steenberghen

VoU), p. 16-18) or unsatisfying (see
39

“si

emm

Kovach

(

1

976), p.

1

75- 1 76).

repugnant, hoc non est nisi propter alterum
duorum, vel propter
ut causa agens praecedat duratione;
aut quia oportet quod

utrumque: aut quia oportet

non esse praecedat
40

See

ST

duratione.’'

ruisse. unde,

3)

1.45.2 ad 2-3.

“et in his,

non

(DAM

quod

cum

est,

fit,

creatio

sit

sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse,
et prius
sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum
est ” (ST

1.45.2 ad 3)

“tertia, inquit, interpretatio,

qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum
quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum, per similem

intelligimus esse

significationem dici videtur,
nihilo.

secundum

praeter

summam

cum homo

contristatus sine causa, dicitur contristatus de

hunc sensum, si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est. quia
essentiam cuncta quae sunt ab eadem, ex nihilo facta sunt, idest
non ex
aliquo; nihil inconveniens sequetur.” (DAM 6). In this
passage Aquinas is quoting
igitur

Anselm from Monologium,
can be found

SCG

in

11.38

8.

ad

The same position expressed

in

Aquinas’s

own words

2.

Perhaps such an assertion would be driven by theological concerns, for
were reason to think that other interpretations of creation ex nihilo

instance, if there

would be
44

u
“esse

nisi

ab

naturaliter est sibi nihilum

alio; sibi

quam

autem

relicta in se considerata

quod propter hoc
quia duratione non praecedit: non enim ponitur, si creatura semper
ut in aliquo tempore nihil sit: sed ponitur quod natura eius tabs esset quod esset

simul nihil

fuit,

autem non habet creatura

unde prius

nihil est:
sit

heretical.

esse, nee oportet

et ens,

nihil, si sibi relinqueretur.”

(DAM

7)

Actually, Aquinas uses for his example the illumination of air, but he also
observes that his argument works even more clearly with the illumination of the planets.
I'll discuss the illumination of the moon, rather than of the air, since it sounds odd to

modem

ears to talk about illuminated and dark
46

world

is

For instance (as was noted

air.

in footnote

impossible because any actual infinite

38 above),

is

that

an eternally created

impossible.

47

For instance, in 1278-9, not long after Aquinas’s death, the Franciscan
William de la Mare wrote a scathing critique of Aquinas views, Correctorium Fratris

Thomae.

In this

work de

(including that the

Mare holds that Aquinas’s views that the articles of faith
world was created with a finite duration) cannot be proven, is false.
la

181

contrary to Scripture, the Saints and
the doctors, nourishes doubt and
is harmful
er than conducive to faith, and
the arguments Aquinas gives are
neither
philosophically nor theologically viable.
(For an examination of de la Mare's
C orectorium, see Hoenen
(1990).)
is

48

chapter

For a more thorough discussion of the
epistemic reasonableness of faith see
,

5.

49

u

est

namque vera

autem

.

.

in his

quae de deo confitemur duplex

sunt de deo quae

omnem

facultatem

veritatis

humanae

esse trinum et

modus, quaedam

rationis excedunt, ut

unum. quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio
naturalis pertingere
sicut est deum esse, deum esse unum,
et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam
philosophi
demonstrative de deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis
lumine rationis.”

(SCG

1.3

deum
potest,

n2)

“in rationibus autem quibus demonstratur
deum esse, non oportet assumi pro
medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio
proponebat: sed loco
quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut
accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et

ex

huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis deus. nam
omnia divina nomina’
imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel
ex aliqua habitudine
ad suos effectus.

dei

patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi deus sensibilia omnia
et sensum excedat, eius
ellectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum
deum esse, sensibiles

tamen

sunt, et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam
de his
1.12 n8-9)

quae sensum excedunt ”

(SCG

In SCG 1.14 ff, Aquinas provides additional and different
ways in which we
can have scientia quia about God. In these chapters, rather than arguing from
effects to
causes, as with the Five Ways, he argues by way of “remotion”; that is, he
proves truths
1

about

God by showing what God

is

not.

52

lor the

Norman Kretzmann (1997), p. 88, for instance, observes that the arguments
existence of God really only prove the existence of a metaphysical entity

Kretzmann

calls 'alpha.'

this entity.

Similarly, see Davies (1992), p. 26.

Though many

Later arguments by Aquinas

interpret the Five

Ways

fill

out the Christian character of

as proving the existence of the

Christian God, or at least of

some

some have argued

Ways are not intended to prove the existence of an
something not about God but about other things, such as

unmoved mover, uncaused

entity (an

causer, etc.),

that the Five

entity, rather, they establish

truths about natural causation (see, for instance, Fogelin (1990)) or the nature of finite

being (see the discussion of Mascall’s views
54

“ad primum ergo dicendum quod

in

deum

huiusmodi quae per
non sunt articuli fidei, sed
enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut

rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de deo,

praeambula ad

articulos, sic

Kinnick (I960))

gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile. nihil
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esse, et alia

ut dicitur

rom.

i

tamen prohibet

illud

quod secundum

se

demonstrabile est
capit.”

(ST

1.2.2

et scibile,

ad

ab aliquo accipi

ut credibile, qui

demonstrationem non

1)

ad secundum dicendum quod ratio
formalis obiecti fidei potest accipi
modo, ex parte ipsius rei creditae. et sic ratio
formalis omnium
credibilmm es t una scilicet veritas prima. et ex
hac parte articuli non distinguuntur. alio
° d .°P° teSt aCCipi tormalls ratl ° credibihum
ex parte nostra, et sic ratio formalis

duplKUtcr. uno

.

e

(b

1

u
n, .6^ ad
“I f
11-11.
2)

n0n ViSUm

-

et

ex hac parte

articuli fidei distinguuntur. ut

visum

est.”

1

56

That

faith is primarily

concerned with articles

is

advanced by Aquinas

in

II-II. 1.6-7.

57

Kenny

(1969),

ST

p. 4.

58

Typical of this view is that held by Clark
(1961). He says, “Now, if the
cosmological argument (leaving the ontological argument
out of consideration) is
invalid, either Christianity has no rational foundation,
or a meaning for reason

found that
59

60

must be

is

independent of Thomistic philosophy.”

See

ST

See

QDV

(p.

35)

1.2.2

14.9.

61

Jenkins (1997) conveniently cites several texts that offer the
Evidentialist
Interpretation. (See his footnote 14 on p.252). They are: Hick
20-1;
(1966),
p.

Penelhum (1977), p. 145; Plantinga (1983), p. 40-7; and Pojman
(1986), p. 32-40.
add
to this list Kenny (1969), p. 4, who also very clearly advocates
an Evidentialist line.
I

62

quia;

ST

1.2.2:

Hence

...

Demonstration

...

through the effect

the existence of God, in so far as

it

is

1.2.3:

necessary to arrive
to

be God.

called a demonstration

not self-evident to us, can be

demonstrated from those of His effects which are known

ST

... is

to us.”

“The existence of God can be proved in five ways. ... Therefore it is
at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands

Therefore

necessary to admit a

first efficient cause, to which
everyone gives the name of God.
Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of
some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but
...

it

is

.

.

.

rather causing in others their necessity. This

all men speak of as God. ... Therefore
must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness,
and every other perfection; and this we call God. ... Therefore some intelligent being
exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”

there

64

ST 1.2.2 ad “The existence of God and other like
known by natural reason, are not articles of faith ...”
1

can be

:

183

truths about

God, which

That the Five Ways are preambles to the
articles of faith is often taken to
be
evidence that Aquinas considered them to
be a rational justification for faith
However
the priority suggested by the gambles
is ambiguous - it could mean
that prior to one's
having faith one must have proof of the
existence of God; or it could mean that
the
existence ot God is necessarily prior to
one’s having faith. What Aquinas says in
the
remainder of the passage quoted above seems
to suggest this latter interpretation:
“For
aith presupposes natural knowledge,
just as grace does nature and all perfections
which
ey per ect. Just as grace necessarily depends
on a nature (for without natures God
has nothing to which he can give His grace),
so too does faith depend on (the object
of)
natural knowledge, in the sense that in order
to have faith it is necessary that God
(the
object of natural knowledge) must exist. The
analogy with grace does not work,
however, if the passage is interpreted so that faith is
understood to
require a prior

natural

knowledge of God.

ST 1.2.2 ad 1 ... there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot
grasp a
proof, from accepting, as a matter of faith, something
which in itself is capable
.

of being

scientia and demonstrated.”
67

68

forgetting

See

ST

II-II.1.5.

For example,
it,

or by

we might undermine

some

other mental defect by which

which previously was evident
69

70

71

72
"

See

ST

II-II.2.4.

See

ST

II-II.2.10.

See

ST

LI. 8.

we

fail to

see the truth of that

to us.

"ad secundum dicendum quod diversa

scientiarum inducit.

quod

a demonstration previously held by

ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem

eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, puta
medium mathematicum, idest a materia

terra est rotunda, sed astrologus per

medium circa materiam consideratum. unde nihil
prohibet de eisdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tractant secundum quod
abstractum; naturalis autem per

sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, et aliam scientiam tractare

secundum quod
cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis. unde theologia quae ad sacram doctrinam
pertinet, differt secundum genus ab ilia theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur.” (ST
1.1.1 ad 2)
“quia lgitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est dei cognitionem
tradere, et

rerum

non solum secundum quod

et finis

earum,

in se est,

et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut

huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes

(ST

sed etiam secundum quod est principium

...

ex dictis est manifestum; ad

primo considerandum

1.2 prol.)

184

est

an deus

sit ...”

v

X°

T

mStanc e Wallace
’

T r 7”

.

i

how

63, examines

p.
-

Gabriel Vasquez holds that

whereas Cajetan argues

Ways

mS m

0996) p

962),

ly ph,los
°P hical

thal philosophical
are properly theological. Gilson
seems to have changed his
8 llkC tHe f0mler V ‘ eW t0 ‘ he laHer ’
S discussed in Houser

orooftHk
proofs
like the Five
rO

( 1

.

“

03

'

r0Ughly slmilar t0 views h ^d by Francisco
Muniz (presented and
p. 63-68) and Houser ( 1 996), though
my approach
is
^

f

1

a a by !? ,?
expanded
Wallace (1962),

somewhat

different.

ad secundum dicendum quod

cum

est uti effectu loco defmitionis causae,
ad

contingit in deo.”

(ST

1.2.2

demonstratur causa per effectum. necesse
esse, et hoc maxime

probandum causam

ad 2)

ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet de deo non
possimus scire quid est.
utimur tamen eius effectu, in hac doctrina, vel naturae
vel gratiae, loco defmitionis ad
ea quae de deo in hac doctrina considerantur, sicut
et in

aliquibus scientiis philosophicis

demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum, accipiendo
effectum loco defmitionis
causae.” (ST 1.1.7 ad 1)
78

ad secundum dicendum quod haec scientia accipere potest
aliquid a
philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat,
sed ad maiorem
manifestationem eorum

quae in hac scientia traduntur. non enim accipit sua principia ab
alns scientiis, sed immediate a deo per revelationem. et ideo
non accipit ab aliis scientiis
tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis;
sicut

architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari. et hoc
ipsum quod sic utitur
eis, non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam eius,
sed propter defectum intellects
nostri; qui ex his quae per naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt
aliae scientiae)

cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia
traduntur.” (ST 1. .5 ad 2)
1

79

Though he does not

explicitly in
80

8

SCG

credit the First

The other Ways conclude

similarly, see

who have also argued
of God see Velecky (1994),

For others

understanding

Davies (1992),

Way

to Aristotle in

ST, he does so

1.13.

ST

1.2.3.

that the five
p. 63ff;

W.

ways primarily serve to aid
Hankey (1987), p. 42ff; and

J.

p. 26.

87

The proofs might also play some role in converting unbelievers by removing
obstacles that prevent them from having faith - for instance, the belief that God cannot
“

exist.

See

ST

83

In
84

II-II.2.10

ST

See

II-II.

ST

ad

2,

SCG

1.9.

188.5.

II-II.

188. 5. ad 3.

185

ratio

vero discursum

quemdam

designat,
'

—

quo ex uno

5 I) SC

in aliud

21

cognoscendum
discuss.cn of

86

-'sunt tamen ad huiusmodi
veritatem manifestandam rationes
aliquae
vensimiles tnducendae, ad fidelium quidem
exercitium et solatium,

non autem ad
adversaries convmcendos: quia ipsa rationum
insufficient^ eos magis in suo errore
aeSt,mareW nos P r °P ter tam debiles rationes
veritati fidei consentire ”
tcr'rTro
(oUj
1.9 n .2)
87

"finis emm divinae voluntatis in rerum
productione est eius bonitas inquantum
per causata mamfestatur. potissime autem
manifestatur divina virtus et bonitas per hoc

quod

res aliae praeter

res aliae praeter

quod non
ig! t ur

ipsum non semper fuerunt. ex hoc enim ostenditur
manifeste quod
ipsum ab ipso esse habent, quia non semper fuerunt.
ostenditur etiam

agit per necessitatem naturae; et

con ven ent i^si m urn
i

fuit

quod

virtus sua est infinita in agendo,

hoc

divinae bonitati, ut rebus creatis principium
durationis

186

CHAPTER 5

PUTTING

IT

ALL TOGETHER: AQUINAS’S RECONCILIATION OF
FAITH

AND REASON

5.1.

As we

An

discussed in chapter

epistemology. This

is

Aristotelian epistemology

2,

Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian framework

particularly significant

when we

Aquinas’ solution to the problem of faith and reason.

concerned about charges

try to

understand and evaluate

A Christian philosopher who

that faith is epistemically irresponsible

accounts of faith and reason

in

for his

may

attempt to develop

order to defend epistemic compatibilism.

1

Compatibilist

solutions to the problem of faith and reason run the risk of appearing to
be
particularly if the accounts of faith and reason that are provided

is

ad hoc,

seem motivated more

by apologetics than by developing an adequate account of religious epistemology.
Epistemic compatibilism can be easily had, but

at the risk

of being philosophically

uninteresting. Consider, as an example, the following solution to the problem of faith

and reason.

Suppose we
justified

stipulate that faith

is

a special case of ordinary belief: faith

by the evidence of miracles and by the evidence adduced by creation

Suppose further

that

1

is

belief

scientists.

claim that the results of modem scientific inquiry that seems

to

contradict the claims of faith (e.g., the theory of evolution), have no better evidence in

support of them than does

faith,

and

in fact, the
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evidence for evolution

is

less “strong”

than the evidence for creation science.
conflict, as

many

to believe the

scientific theories do,

When two
it

accounts (evolution, creation science)

(we might claim) epidemically responsible

is

one which has the strongest evidence, which

in this

case would seem to

be creation science. Faith under this story
would be epistemically responsible, and

might also hold

that scientific

be epistemically responsible,
didn

t

approaches to matters pertaining
if the

science weren't so bad

keep neglecting the evidence

In order to

in favor

defend such a solution to

the truth of a

faith

number of claims — that

(if,

to the divine

for

of creation science and against evolution).

is

this solution

and others

like

an epistemology that guarantees epistemic compatibilism. Under
solution, faith and reason turn out to be compatible

fundamentally the same:

faith is belief justified

(or science). But surely this solution

is

to establish

evidence of miracles and for creation

science, that such evidence exceeds that of evolution, etc. But
there

and more fundamental problem with

also

example, scientists

and reason adequately, we'd need

there

would

we

-

in fact,

it

is

-

it

an underlying

seems

assume

to

this hypothetical

they appear to be

by sufficient evidence, and so

reason

is

inadequate for precisely the same reason

succeeds in establishing epistemic compatibilism -

we

it

don’t really think that faith and

reason (or science) are basically the same.

When Aquinas

adopts Aristotle's epistemology and his conditions for scientia

and demonstration, opinion and probable arguments, Aquinas avoids the worry
account of reason

is

an ad hoc construction motivated by apologetics. Aristotle’s

philosophy represented a major source of tension between
philosophy)

that his

in the 13

th

faith

and reason

(in this case,

century. Aristotelian incompatibilists were inclined to favor

Aristotle over Christian faith, theist incompatibilists, the reverse.
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As

a compatibilist

solution, starting with Aristotle
immediately deprives secular critics of the
ability to

charge Aquinas of employing an ad hoc
epistemology for the sake of Christian
apologetics.

2

Using an Aristotelian epistemology

criticism tor Aquinas, however.

We can

infer

is

from

not merely a

his extensive

means

to avoid

employment of

Aristotelian notions in his responses to theological
questions that Aquinas found
Aristotle to be largely correct in a significant

theologically relevant areas.

helps Aquinas avoid

to the

I

number of philosophically and

have discussed

some ready

how

using Aristotelian epistemology

criticism that might be leveled against other
solutions

problem of faith and reason. The main question remains:

Aquinas use

Aristotle's epistemology,

As discussed

in

and what role did

it

How exactly

did

play in his solution?

chapter 2, Aquinas adopts Aristotle's account of scientia from

the Posterior Analytics. Aquinas, following Aristotle, recognizes
that perfect scientia
the ideal form of knowledge, and that

it

is

has three components - cognition, certitude and

perfect apprehension of the truth. Aquinas also accepts Aristotle's account
of opinion

(and

its

variants

- doubt,

suspicion, etc.), and notes that opinion lacks certitude and

perfect apprehension of the truth.

Aquinas notices however,
scientia and opinion

truth,

Thus

that there

is

- one which has

namely, the epistemic

state

far,

room

Aquinas’s epistemology

Christian faith

is that

Aristotle’s.

for a possible third epistemic state

between

certitude but lacks perfect apprehension of the

Aquinas

calls credere

belief (distinct from ordinary non-italicized ‘belief).

how

is

3

and

I

have been referring

The job

for

Aquinas

is to

to as

explain

epistemic state that Aristotle apparently overlooked (or could

not foresee). If Aquinas can adequately explain not only that belief is possible, but that
the Christian

view of faith conforms

to

it,

then he will have succeeded in
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“Aristotelianizing” faith. This represents a
great advance in establishing the
epistemic

compatibilism of

faith

and reason, since

it

establishes that faith as well as reason
(as

exemplified by scientia and opinion) occupy
positions on an epistemic spectrum - a

spectrum established by philosophers

An

5.2.

As discussed

in

chapter

who were

3,

not motivated by Christian apologetics.

Aristotelianized faith

Aquinas picks out belief as the epistemic

between scientia and opinion. Belief has

certitude, as does scientia

,

though

state in

it

lacks

perfect apprehension of the truth, and opinion lacks both. Perfect
apprehension of the
truth, that

is,

understanding what causes something to be true and

make something

true, is a result ot intellectual vision

3.1 .2.4 as perfect- or p-vision.

by the natural
instance,

true,

and

assent

is

we

light

of reason,

— what

I

This intellectual vision, which

is

the ability to ‘see’ that and

see that self-evident truths

in seeing that they are true,

(e.g., the principle

we

is,

these causes

characterize in section

is

a cognition illuminated

why something

is true.

For

of non-contradiction) are

are compelled to assent to them. Further, the

accompanied with certitude - we

proposition could be otherwise - that

why

are unable to conceive that the truth of the

we

conceive the proposition as being

necessarily true. Aquinas observes that belief as well as opinion lack such intellectual

vision

we

-

the sorts of things about

which we have belief or opinion are not those which

see to be true.

With opinion, we accept
of it - not only do

we

not see

the truth of a proposition without having any certitude

why

the proposition
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is true,

we

also

do not comprehend

that the proposition couldn’t be
false.

see

why

the proposition

belief because

we

is true,

With belief on

we do

hold that

it

is true.

If the intellect is not

object (the proposition), then, Aquinas reasons,

it

is

compelled by the will

(in a special

it

is

good

compelled

to assent

then choose to assent, and finally do assent

What
to

Aquinas,

come

gives faith

is that

we have

The

belief

if that

certitude and

someone

have

4

what

differentiates

it

from scientia according
,

The

faithful

of scientia,

it

interior light

do not

of faith because conclusive evidence has been presented

faith that

compelling evidence of its
will is helped to

would be

.

were the case, then these people would have scientia not

to

we

to desire to assent to the proposition,

,

for

move by

some proposition

truth.

else.

compels

will

that assenting to the proposition

the belief is a result of grace, not of evidence.

to believe matters

them -

its

by the

must be compelled by something

way),

from these apprehensions we begin

for us;

don’t

not compelled by our

the intellect to assent, according to Aquinas, through
the following process:

apprehend some proposition and apprehend

we

couldn't be otherwise. In cases of

lack p-vision, our assent to the proposition

seeing that the proposition

When

the other hand, though

is

Instead, the will

true, that

moves

Though

the grace of God.

faith.

to

In order

person cannot have

the intellect to assent, and the

faith lacks the

compelling evidence

has an alternate route to certitude. Along with God’s grace comes an

of faith, analogous to the

illuminates propositions so that

we can

faith illuminates propositions so that

to believe (f-seeing).

Once they

light

of reason. Just as the

light

of reason

‘see’ that they are true (p-seeing ), the light

we can

see what

‘see’ that they are

is to

that

we ought

be believed and have a will that
,

prepared by grace to choose to believe such propositions, the
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something

faithful

of

is

do so believe.

And

their faith has certitude because the
source

helps guide the will both

come from God,

Thus, the certitude of

Aquinas

scientia.

the

faith differs in

of the

most

light

of faith and the grace that

reliable source

an important

of truth there

way from

is.

the certitude of

says:

Certitude can

mean two

things.

The

firmness of adherence, and with
more certain than any understanding [of principles] and
scientific knowledge. For the first truth, which
causes the assent of faith, is a
more powerful cause than the light of reason, which causes the
assent of

reference to

first is

this, faith is

understanding or scientia. The second is the evidence of that
to which assent
given. Here, faith does not have certainty, but scientia and
understanding do.
is

because of

this, too, that

is

a firmness of

adherence to a proposition resulting from the process of grace-aided
is

faith as well as those

false.

If

belief,

an evidence that compels assent. What they have

that the intellect is determined to

who have

each type of certitude

scientia are epistemically

on a

one side of a contradiction,

scientia equally hold that

is

And

that

is,

in

those

and the

common

is

who have

what they believe cannot be

reliable, then the certitude

par.

It

understanding has no discursive thought/

There are two different types of certitude, the certitude of faith

certitude of scientia

is

of

faith

and the certitude of

thus Aquinas can hold faith to be on the same

Aristotelian epistemological spectrum as scientia and opinion.

5.3.

Thus

far

we have

seen

Limitations of reason

how Aquinas

established by Aristotle. This does not, in

faith

to

construes faith to

itself,

fit

into the epistemology

provide a solution to the problem of

and reason. Just as Aristotelian mathematicians would hold other mathematicians

be epistemically irresponsible should they construct an opinion-based (rather than

scientia- based) mathematics, so philosophers could hold the faithful to be epistemically
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irresponsible for believing

on

faith

what they should instead believe by
means of

demonstration. Aquinas blunts such
criticisms by arguing that natural
reason
inherently limited in

when

scientia

we can

is

its

abilities to

understand

many

matters of the divine, and. at least

impossible, having faith about these matters

do. Aquinas

shows

is

is

epidemically the best

that faith is epistemically responsible
at least for

propositions that natural reason cannot demonstrate,
which

I

shall call the

Scope

Strategy.

I

he details of the Scope Strategy to defend

chapter

4.

when

comes

it

faith

was discussed

at

length in

Briefly, the strategy is to argue that the scope
of natural reason is limited
to divine matters.

As was

discussed in that chapter,

we

observed that

Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian account of cognition, a move which
blocks

Aquinas as having developed an ad hoc account of cognition

for the sake

apologetics. Using this Aristotelian account, Aquinas argues that

we

criticism of

of

cannot have any

understanding about the divine essence and because of this, perfect scientia about
any
divine matters

without

first

is

knowing God, and

however, we can

deduce

unavailable to us, because

infer, but

their causes (thus

causes exist, but not

why

Aristotelian scientists,

God

exists,

and also

we can

t

cannot

do.

The

know why God
truth

did something

of some divine matters,

only so as to acquire scientia quia. From effects

performing a demonstration quia), and thus

know

we

can

that the

the causes brought about the effects. If we are careful

we

that

this

we

will then see that natural reason

He

is

an unmoved mover,

etc.

can lead us to scientia that

We will

also see that natural

reason cannot lead us to scientia about certain other divine matters, including the
Christian mysteries, but also including the duration of the universe. Aquinas' Scope
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Strategy in a nutshell

is this:

he employs Aristotelian accounts of epistemology
and

cognition and shows that according to such accounts,
natural reason

scope of what

it

it

would appear
6

be

faith.

for

even

limited in the

can generate scientia about. For any proposition P
that

scope of natural reason,
thus,

is

if

P can be had by

faith,

falls

outside the

then one can have certitude that P, and

that the best epistemic state a

human could have

vis-a-vis P

would

This achieves a degree of epistemic compatibilism between faith
and reason,
if

faith

were generally found

to

be epistemically inadequate

of reason (such a position will be considered

in the

next section),

when had

instead

cases where

at least in

reason cannot go, having faith would seem to be epistemically responsible.
Even for
divine matters that are accessible to natural reason, Aquinas thinks that
epistemically responsible

still

to

have

faith

it

would be

about these matters. This approach

I

call the

Pragmatic Strategy.
In

ought

to

are: (1)

many

have

places throughout his writings, Aquinas expresses the view that one

faith

about provable divine matters. His reasons for holding this view

because proofs about divine matters require a great deal of other knowledge,

scientia about such matters

would come only

late in life; (2)

many

don't have the time,

inclination or mental ability to perform such proofs; and (3) philosophers have often

made mistakes when reasoning about
without

faith, a significant

number of people

needed for salvation - pragmatically,
also

1

.

would seem

way counted

is

7

Aquinas's concern here

is that

will lack the appropriate sorts

faith is preferable to natural reason.

to satisfy Alston’s account

Recall that for Alston, a person

this

the divine.

of beliefs

This strategy

of practical rationality discussed

in

chapter

counted as a practically rational believer (and

as epistemically responsible)
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who

in

has belief-forming practices that

satisfy the following conditions:

there

is

no reason

we know

to think

of) that are

more

massively disruptive and

immediately

them

satisfies (i)

(i)

unreliable,

reliable,

difficult.

and

section 3.3), holds that faith

(ii).

is

they do not lead to massive inconsistencies,

and

It

(iv)

taith

Aquinas

more

(iii)

there are no alternative practices (that

changing

to

some other

practice

in (3)

above (and discussed

reliable than natural reason,

(iii).

Finally,

I

take

from requiring people

to believe

on the basis of faith

it

So

it

would appear

by natural reason, the

that

it

comes

that, in

( 1 )

to believing

proofs of natural reason would be massively disruptive and
satisfies (iv).

in detail in

when

most number of people we can, and given Aquinas’s observations

shift

would be

indeed yields certitude, then faith

divine matters, and thus his account satisfies
the

(ii)

difficult,

to

order to save

and

(2), to

on the basis of

thus his account

even though some matters of faith are accessible

faithful are practically rational

when

they believe those matters on

faith alone, and, at least to this extent, are epistemically responsible in their beliefs.

5.4.

A common

mistake

Faith and reason are compatible

in interpreting

Aquinas

is

to

conclude that the Five

out to prove the existence of God in order to provide rational justification for

we

construe rational justification as

we

just in case there

P was counted as epistemically responsible and

was

sufficient evidence if

sufficient evidence for P.

P was

faith.

set

If

did in section 1.2.1, then faith (understood as

that Aristotelianized unique epistemic state) is not rationally justified.

that chapter, a belief

Ways

And

a belief that P

Recall that in

rationally justified

was held

to

have

either: foundational (i.e. properly basic) or believed
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on the

basis ot foundational beliefs that inductively,
deductively or abductively supported P.

Faith fails to satisfy either of these conditions.
First, faith does not
basic, tor faith

to assent.

beliefs,

is

a result of a

complex process of grace and

seem

the will

Properly basic beliefs do not require any support for
them

when we apprehend them, we

Not so with

the beliefs of faith.

8

be properly

moving

-

the intellect

like self-evident

see that they are true, and accept

Second, believing by

to

them

faith is not believing

as such.

on the basis

of some evidence from which one deduces the truths of faith. The
Five Ways

at first

appear to provide such evidence - for instance, from the evidence that
something

moving, we deduce

that

God

exists.

One might

think that our belief that

God

exists

therefore rationally justified by the proofs based on such evidence. Flowever,
as

argued

in chapters 3

this sort

of rational

when we

etc.),

Five

faith

sort

Ways

justification for faith

we have

the other hand, the Five

for certain sorts

of some

4, the

lack a proof for P can

On

having

and

of belief.

9

-

for faith

is

of things unseen, that

Ways can be

only

is, it is

used to provide rational justification

if

God

exists without

they believe on the basis

be the Five Ways, or from the evidence of miracles,

can presumably count themselves as rationally justified

exists.

I

faith that P.

(understood as Aquinas does). These persons,

it

is

cannot have been given in order to provide

There can be those that believe that

of proof (whether

is

in believing that

God

Proofs of the existence of God (and other sorts of proofs or evidence) can thus

be advanced to justify beliefs about divine matters, and many contemporary
philosophers of religion concern themselves with whether or not such proofs or

evidence do, indeed, provide sufficient justification for some religious

Aquinas’s epistemic compatibilism, however,
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is

not

this.

beliefs.

Aquinas did not seek

to

show

that beliefs concerning divine matters

concern was to show that faith was.
because

faith lacks sufficient

quoted above

were epistemically responsible;

And

faith, strictly

speaking,

is

rather, his

not justified,

evidence for assent. (Recall the passage from

[in section 5.2] in

which Aquinas recognizes

QDV

14

that faith lacks the certitude

of evidence that scientia and understanding have.)

Another

role tor the Five

compatibilism. If the Five
the existence of

God can

Ways and

Ways were

other proofs could be to establish truth

taken to be successful, then the truth of at least

considered to have been established

-

secular truth

incompatibilism would no longer be a viable response to the tension between faith and
reason. Aquinas does

seem

the existence of God,

and

to

speak as

if the

Five

Ways

further, that these proofs are

are indeed proofs that establish

advanced

to the faith."

Aquinas seems

faith (e.g., the

problem of evil) have a counterpart. Once the

to

advance them,

established as at least possible, then one will be

disproofs against

articles

faith.

at least in part,

more

And, of course, Aquinas

section 3.3,

in

matters, and in chapter 4,

so that proofs against the

easily motivated to rebut

will hold that all such disproofs

which arguments could

we saw how Aquinas

remove obstacles

truths of faith are

of faith are erroneous or not actually demonstrations.

surveyed a number of ways

to

fail to

argued that natural reason

we examined some ways

in

In section 2.4.2,

we

be demonstrations,

is

of

in

often deficient in divine

which reason was incapable of

demonstrating conclusions about the divine. Considerations such as these give Aquinas
the confidence to believe that disproofs of matters of faith must

fail.

Armed

with (what

he considers to be) successful proofs of matters of faith, Aquinas can confidently hold a
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truth compatibilism

- that

is,

that the truths

from reasoning, since any incompatibility

that result

Aquinas seems
one advanced

evidence for

in section 1.2.1

By

P.

Aquinas holds,

to Aquinas,

it is

and discussed
is

this standard

of rational

faith lacks this

justification, faith

degree of evidence.

is

is

we p-see )

that

It

necessarily true.

certitude

-

the latter

Understanding has certitude because

not.

The chapter

is

it

is

1

sufficient

is

not justified, because,

seems, however, that according

not evidence that yields rational justification but certitude

from scientia and understanding

is

in earlier paragraphs.

rationally justified if and only if there

apprehension that some proposition

does

will be a result of error.

to hold to a different standard for rational
justification than the

account assumes that a belief P

as

of faith are fully compatible with the truths

What
two

-

the

distinguishes opinion

states

have

properly basic,

we

it,

the former

simply

what we understand cannot be otherwise. Scientia derives

‘see’ (that

its

certitude

from demonstrations (deductive inferences) from propositions which, ultimately,

grounded

in propositions

does seem

to

conform

we

are

understand. This model of understanding and scientia

to the version

of Classic Foundationalism

we

laid out in chapter

1.2.A:

(CF)

S's belief that P

is

epistemically responsible if and only if there

sufficient evidence for P.

There

is

sufficient evidence for

P

if

is

and only

either:

(1)

P

is

properly basic

(i.e.,

to the senses for S), or
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P

is

self-evident, incorrigible or evident

if

P

(2)

is

believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs
that are

epistemically responsible and that support P
deductively,
inductively or abductively.

Understanding

satisfies condition (1),

has certitude, and

it

properly basic, nor

has certitude.

And

and scientia

For Aquinas, however,

(2).

has this certitude despite a lack of evidence. Faith
is

it

evidentially supported

certitude ot faith

is

is

faith also

neither

by properly basic propositions, yet
by Aquinas

clearly held

epistemic responsibility, since Aquinas holds that

faith,

with

its

to

faith

be sufficient for

certitude, is at least, if

not more, reliable than scientia (see, for instance, section 3.3).
Classic foundationalism

responsibility, because faith,

is

thus too limiting an account of epistemic

due to

its

certitude, should count as epistemically

responsible. Rather than Classic Foundationalism, Aquinas seems rather to hold a

position closer to the following,

(FIF)

S's belief that P

let

is

us call

it

epistemically responsible

that P.

S has certitude that P

(1)

S p-sees that P
reason that P

in support

(2)

Faith-Inclusive Foundationalism:

is

to be believed

,

is,

why P

of P [and P
is

and only

true (that

is true,

S f-sees that P

if

is

is

if

and only

if

12,13

S has certitude

if either:

S understands P: S sees by natural

true

and needs no further evidence

properly basic]), or

true (that

is,

and S assents

S sees by the
to

P on

light

this basis

of faith

- S has

that

P

is

faith that

P), or

(3)

P

is

believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are

epistemically responsible and that support P by demonstration.
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Why
3. 1.2.4,

should

we

be inclined to favor FIF over

the role of evidence in the operation of the
intellect

settled to

one side of a contradiction. According

determination,

is

And

certitude.

be seen to be necessary,

itself a

mere opinion. Evidence,

it

is in

The movement

scientia.

this is

why

faith also

natural reason are

is

discussed in section

move

to

the intellect to be

to Aquinas, this settling, or

virtue of having this certitude that scientia can

necessary condition for distinguishing scientia from

then, is instrumental for certitude, but

determination ot the intellect to one thing, that

and

CF? As was

is

is

it

certitude, the

the epistemically relevant factor in

ot the will in faith also determines the intellect to

two means by which the

intellect is steered to certitude, but

is,

than mere opinion. FIF, then,

first, it

it

is

is

preferable to

certitude, not evidence, that

and understanding; second,

-

thing,

has certitude. Seeing by the light of faith and by the light of

with certitude that an epistemic state becomes “respectable” - that

that

one

it

is

CF

for

two reasons:

it is

only

becomes more
acknowledges

the epistemically interesting aspect of scientia

notes that there are two

means of achieving such

certitude

via the intellect by p-seeing and via the will and grace and by f-seeing.

If

we

we

count FIF rather than

can count

justification

as the correct version of foundationalism, then

Those who

faith as rationally justified.

is

that

So be

it.

Aquinas’s

Even

if faith is

faith, at least

when

its

epistemic credentials

is

not to be counted as rationally justified,

it

under an Aristotelian epistemology, should not

be counted as epistemically irresponsible.
gives scientia

are inclined to cringe

separated from evidence will recoil from describing Aquinas's faith as

rationally justified.

seems clear

CF

If

Aquinas’s account

certitude

- because

is

faith

should be counted as equally epistemically responsible. Because
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correct, then

has certitude,

faith

what
it,

too,

does not violate

the epistemic

norms of reason, Aquinas seems

compatibilism between

By employing

faith

faith

have achieved an epistemic

and reason.

an Aristotelian epistemology and account of
cognition, and

introducing an Aristotelianized

between

to

faith,

and reason along the

Aquinas also achieves an epistemic compatibility
of Plantinga's version of epistemic

lines

responsibility as having warrant. Recall from section
1.2.3 that according to Plantinga,

a belief has warrant for a person S only

if that belief is

faculties functioning properly (subject to

that is appropriate to S s kind

successfully aimed at truth.

our faculties

will,

produced

no dysfunction)

of cognitive

faculties,

in

S by cognitive

in a cognitive

environment

according to a design plan that

is

Aristotle s account of cognition nearly guarantees that

under ordinary circumstances, function properly, and will be

successfully aimed at the truth. For, according to Aristotle, our faculties are
determined
teleologically,

and nothing exists naturally

Aquinas observes

in his

commentary on

the desire to

...

each thing naturally desires

perform

its

proper function.

As

Aristotle's Metaphysics:

know belongs by

...

that cannot

its

nature to

own

which man is what he is, considered
becomes them actually only through

all

men.

perfection.

...

since the intellect, by

in itself is all things potentially,

scientia

...

so each

man

and

naturally desires

scientia just as matter desires form.

...

each thing has a natural inclination

the proper operation of man as
differs

from

all

other things.

man

Hence

to

is to

perform

its

proper operation

...

Now

understand, for by reason of this he

the desire of man

is

naturally inclined to

understand, and therefore to possess scientia.

...

a natural desire cannot exist in vain.

Aquinas (following

16

Aristotle) holds that natural faculties

definition, incoherent if their function

is,

and functions

in principle, unobtainable.

certain specific function F, exists in order to achieve F (achieving F
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A

are,

by

faculty with a

is its final

cause).

If

F

is in

principle unobtainable, that

the natural desire of the faculty (to achieve F)

is, if

could never be achieved, then the natural desire of F would he

would have

a final cause that could not be a final cause

proper function of man

is

to

understand and reason, and the

understanding and reasoning

be in vain,

we must

it

is

is

can achieve the

clear that as truth

and hence

-

the faculty
17

The

cause of the

the truth, so, in order for our intellectual faculties not to

we

the Philosopher says.

vain

this is incoherent.

final

be capable of using them to achieve the

designed so that with them,

Now

- and

in

is

the

good of the

as regards

...

truth.

truth; in fact,

As Aquinas
intellect, so

says.

falsehood

proper object the intellect

its

they must be

is

is its evil,

always

as

true;

never deceived of itself, but whatever deception occurs must be
ascribed to some lower power, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we
see that

it

is

when

the natural

when

images, but only

Thus when

the intellect

properly,

designed to aim

it

is

it

power of judgment
is

not free, as

operating under

at the truth

-

is

own

its

is

free

we

are not deceived

the case in sleep.

power, that

is,

by such

18

when

it

is

functioning

the operations of the Aristotelian intellect

thus, under Plantinga’s account, have warrant.

By

fitting faith into

an Aristotelian epistemology and cognition, Aquinas

same

to argue that faith has the

sort

and the

intellect are

,

is,

to certitude.

At

3,

the account holds that both the

involved in the act of faith. In the case of faith, unlike cases of

understanding or scientia the will moves the
that

root,

be determined to one thing,

intellect to

however, the act of faith

the final cause of scientia and understanding

is

is

an act ol

have warrant. The difference between

when

its

power

is

faith

intellect,

and just as

the truth, so too with faith.

Just as

same reasons,

will taith

scientia and understanding have warrant, so too and for the

functioning properly

able

of warrant that understanding and scientia have. As

discussed in the detailed account of faith in chapter

will

is

and scientia

is

that the latter will

be

not impaired by a lower power, such as the
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imagination. Faith, on the other hand, functions properly

when

the will

is

moved by

grace, and directed by the light of faith (rather than a will directed by
other motives or
for other reasons).

properly; thus

20

God’s

presumably ensures

role in faith

we may presume

that, for

Aquinas,

faith will

understand faith and scientia to be success terms (as
each, by definition, have warrant, for

truth or

when we

relation to God),

that

fail to

we

when

always have warrant.

If

we

think Aquinas does), then they

the intellect

is

not properly aimed at the

function properly (either in the manner of reasoning or in our

are always left with, at most,

he has scientia or

I

that faith is functioning

faith is to

that is to say, that these states

mere opinion. To say of someone

imply proper function and a

state that

grasps the truth,

always have warrant.

We see, therefore, that Aquinas reconciles faith and reason according to each of
the three

ways

outlined in chapter

epistemically responsible because

more

efficient

God and

1

for epistemic compatibilism.

it is

21

practically rational to believe

He
-

finds faith to be

faith

seems a

and effective means of forming beliefs about propositions concerning

His actions.

If,

following Aquinas,

we

accept a Faith-Inclusive

Foundationalism, then faith would also seem to be rationally justified. Even
not accept FIF, faith from f-seeing seems

has certitude. Finally, because faith

and understanding, each

I

is

at least

be value

in

is

we do

an act of the

intellect

it

of a similar sort to scientia

will be epistemically responsible because each has warrant.

compatibilism. Finally, though

holds that there

if

epistemically responsible because

have also suggested, the Five Ways would appear

to

far

I

shall not discuss

moral compatibilism between

our natural reason, even

in

to

it

ground claims of truth

here,

faith

As

it

is

quite clear that Aquinas

and reason. Aquinas finds there

reasoning about divine matters, and Aquinas
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certainly holds that faith will not be immoral.

and reason

to

I

appears then that Aquinas holds faith

be fully compatible.

5.5.

As

It

discussed

and reason run the

at the

risk

Objections and replies

beginning of this chapter, solutions to the problem of faith

of being ad hoc

if

the account of reason and/or faith that

is

provided seems motivated primarily by apologetics. By employing the account of

epistemology and cognition of the leading reason-based threat

to Christianity at the

time, Aquinas avoids the charge of advancing this sort of ad hoc solution. However,
precisely for employing Aristotle’s (pagan) epistemology, Aquinas runs into criticism

from

his fellow theologians, both

look

at

5.5.2,

Medieval and more recent. In the next section we

will

Christian responses to Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of reason. In section

we

will raise

more general philosophical problems with Aquinas’

problem of reason and

5.5.1.

Two

solution to the

faith.

Christian responses to Aquinas’s account of reason

key elements

in

Aquinas's epistemic compatibilism between

faith

and

reason are his use of the Scope Strategy, in which he limits the scope ot what reason can
grasp, and his modification of Classic Foundationalism into what

I

have termed Faith-

Inclusive Foundationalism, in which beliefs count as rationally justified not because

elements
they have sufficient evidence, but because they have certitude. Fach ot these
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relies significantly

on Aristotelian philosophy.

In order to limit the scope

Aquinas employs an Aristotelian account of cognition
this

(in

chapter 4,

1

of reason,

show how he

uses

account to argue that reason cannot prove the duration of the world). In support of

his certitude-based toundationalism,

which

Aquinas employs an Aristotelian epistemology

in

certitude plays a crucial role in picking out epistemically responsible states.

Aquinas’s account of reason based on an Aristotelian cognition/epistemology was. by

no means, universally accepted among Medieval Christian theologians, and aspects of
Aquinas’s account of reason would certainly seem inappropriate to
that

later

philosophers

no longer accepted Aristotelian accounts of cognition or epistemology.
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, long unavailable to the Latin West,

translated into Latin in

full

1

159, and Robert Grosseteste appears to have written the

commentary on around 1225.

scientia as Aquinas understood

have argued

that

what was key

it

I

have provided,

in chapter 2,

that scientia

who wrote

have differed with Aquinas,
It

was composed of three

at

much

far too long to

the

waning years of Aristotelianism and

cognitions:

In contrast with Aquinas,

to

demonstration are to

survey the differences between Aquinas's

has already been written on the subject."

basic outline of Aquinas’s epistemology

truth.

how scientia and

account of scientia and that of his contemporaries and
since

I

any length on Aristotelian scientia appears

at least slightly, in

would take

interpretation of

from his commentary on the Posterior Analytics.

apprehension, certitude and perfect apprehension of the

each Medieval philosopher

my

first

to this concept, particularly for his solution to the

problem of faith and reason, was

be understood.

was

became

a

the rise of
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3

later scholastics, particularly

Instead,

commonly

I

shall

claim that the

held view, at least until

new approaches

to natural

philosophy and logic after around 1600.

documented

here, though

congruent with Aquinas

I

My

support for this claim will be thinly

think evidence for later views that are fundamentally

s is

easily found.

I

offer only one bit of evidence here for

my

claim.

In

1

589, during his

first

teaching position

at the

University of Pisa, Galileo

himself wrote a commentary on the Posterior Analytics. As William Wallace argues, 24
Galileo's

Vallius.

commentary was

As

largely cribbed

from lectures by

excerpts from the Vallius lectures (plagiarized and published by Ludovico

Carbone) show, the account of Aristotelian epistemology
turn,

his professor Paulus

that Galileo learned,

and

in

presumably taught, was, though perhaps more nuanced, fundamentally unchanged

from Aquinas’s account. What follows are a number of passages concerning the
Vallius-Carbone text that exemplify the similarity between the

th

late

16 -century

interpretation of scientia and demonstration and Aquinas's account that

chapter

I

provided

in

2.

Vallius-Carbone define evidence as a certain

argument or sign

which a

is

clarity

and perspicuity whereby an

able to elicit conviction in the intellect,

visible object seen at a proper distance

elicits conviction in the

power of sight.

It is

much

the

way

and under appropriate

not the

can have certitude without evidence, as in divine
25
evidence without an accompanying certitude.

same

faith,

Vallius-Carbone define certitude as a firmness of the

in

light

as certitude, since one

but one cannot have

intellect in

knowing

that

eliminates doubt or wavering about the knowledge obtained; it differs from truth
in that truth can be accompanied by doubt whereas certitude cannot. There are,
moreover, two kinds of certitude: one is said to be extrinsic because, although

does so prompted by a command of the will; the
other is intrinsic because the intellect gives assent on its own, forced as it were
by the evidence presented or by its own reasoning, so that only a person

the intellect gives

its

assent,

it

deprived of the natural light would hold the contrary. The two certitudes differ
of unfounded
in various ways: the extrinsic type can be false, as in the case
human faith, whereas the intrinsic cannot; the extrinsic necessarily depends on
will; the extrinsic
the will, whereas the intrinsic can actually be opposed to the
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does not invoke the natural

light ot the intellect, whereas the intrinsic does; and
the extrinsic lacks evidence, whereas the intrinsic depends on it. 26

[Quoting Vallius-Carbone:] Demonstration is a syllogism composed of
necessary propositions wherefrom something is concluded necessarily and
evidently through causes or effects. Note here that there are three kinds of
demonstration: one

said to be most perfect and most powerful (potissima)\ a
demonstration of the reasoned fact (propter quid); a third,
demonstration of the fact (quia). Three functions are attributed to

second

is

is

demonstration. The

why, as

is

done

cause of a thing,
to

show

first is to show the existence of an effect and its reason
most powerful demonstration. The second is to manifest the
and demonstration of the reasoned fact does that. The third is

in

the existence of a cause through an effect, and that

demonstration of the

The

is

what

is

done by

27

fact.

careful reader will note that these views of Vallius-Carbone/Galileo do not match

those of Aquinas’s precisely. However, they are sufficiently similar to justify,

believe,

I

the claim that Aquinas’s accounts of scientia, demonstration, and certitude were widely

acceptable to Medieval and later theologians and philosophers. If views quite similar to
th

Aquinas's were part of the 16 -century logic curricula, then Aquinas’s views were not
(at least until

Even

1600) considered particularly controversial.

if

I

am

correct in holding that

it

was

the case that Aquinas’s interpretation

of Aristotelian scientia and demonstration was not particularly
Aristotelian cognition engendered a significant

account of cognition

which

I

I

advanced

in

embracing of

amount of controversy. Recall

the brief

discussing the eternity ot the world in chapter 4,

repeat again here.
In brief, Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of cognition

Objects

radical, his

make impressions on

is

roughly as follows.

the external senses and these impressions are copied and

transmitted to the intellect as likenesses, or phantasms (phantasmata ).

from these phantasms we can apprehend
object sensed.

What

in the intellect the

By

form and accidents

the senses respond to are individual particulars, but
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abstracting

ot the

what the

apprehends are

intellect

abstraction."

8

Thus,

intelligible species, that

when we apprehend

that

is,

universals apprehended by

humans

are rational animals this

of first sensing one or more particular humans, forming phantasms of them
intellect,

and then abstracting from these phantasms

species, or form, of a

human -

This power that
intellect

The

(

we have of apprehending

intellects agens).

to

and, for instance, that

Our

intellect

means of

apprehend the

is

a result

in the

intelligible

includes rationality.

it

intelligible species is that

of the agent

has both a passive and active component.

intellect is passive, in part, for its ability to receive. Just as the senses passively

receive impressions of objects, the passive intellect receives likenesses from these

impressions. But these impressions are corporeal, and thus the intellect must actively

make

these impressions intelligible (that

become, as a

power

result

it

is

turn

them

of abstraction, species that are

that converts the

apprehend -

is,

raw matter of thought

intellect is the

into the intelligible species that

receiving information to actively apprehending

that

Our agent

intelligible.

not only a power, but active, in that

But since Aristotle did not allow

into phantasms), so that they can

it.

it

we

draws us from passively

As Aquinas

argues:

forms of natural things subsist apart from

matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible,

it

follows

forms of the sensible things which we understand are not
actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potency to act except by
something in act; just as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible.

that the natures or

We must therefore

assign on the part of the intellect

some power

to

make

things

actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions.

And

such

is

the necessity for positing an agent intellect.

24

This view of cognition was sometimes vehemently rejected by Medieval
theologians

who

preferred a

more Augustinian/Avicennan account
.

Timothy Noone neatly summarizes one

ot cognition.

mam contrasting position. 30
.

.

.

.

Augustinisme avicenissant involves the following claims: 1 ) God is identified as
the agent intellect spoken of by Aristotle and is further thought of as functioning
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as the Intelligentia agens of Avicenna; 2) the human mind
is essentially passive
and is identified with the intellectus possibilis of Avicenna and Aristotle;

and

human

intellectual

under the

light

knowledge involves seeing things

in the intelligible

3)

world

of divine illumination, although the mature Bacon allows some

role for innate ideas in this process. 31

The main

difference between Aquinas's account of cognition and the

Augustinian/Avicennan account
former and a power of God

is that

the agent intellect

in the latter.

a

is

power of man

This difference has serious repercussions for

philosophy and theology. Under Aquinas’s account of cognition,
can be

known by

the unaided

human

intellect

is

intelligible species

- we can have understanding and

about these matters. (However, our intellectual powers
things

often weak: “But, our cognition [cognitio]

is

in

weak

to

such a point that no

reads that one philosopher spent thirty years in solitude that he might

cognosceret ) the nature of a bee.”

)

fly.

Thus one

know

Part and parcel of this account of cognition

rejection of separate Platonic forms as unnecessary.

On

scientia

discerning the natures of

philosopher would be able to investigate perfectly the nature of a single

(

in the

is

a

33

the other hand, the Augustinian/Avicennan account of cognition embraces a

Platonic account of forms, or similar variations thereof (Bonaventure, for example,

holds them to be ideas in God, identical with his essence

forms or ideas for us so
understanding

is

God’s,

that

we can

).

God

illuminates these

“see” them. Because the agency involved in

follows that the

it

34

human mind

is

incapable, without divine

illumination, of understanding even the truths of natural philosophy. According to this

view, our intellects are naturally inadequate for understanding. Once
aid of divine illumination,

further, without faith,

we

we can

finally understand.

cannot understand.
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we

think with the

But without illumination, and

The mind

has, as

were, eyes of

its own, analogous to the soul's senses. The
certain truths of the sciences are analogous to the objects which the
sun’s rays
make visible, such as the earth and earthly things. And it is God himself who

Having eyes is not the same thing as looking, and looking is not
The soul therefore needs three things: eyes which is can use
looking and seeing. The eye of the mind is healthy when it is pure from

illumines
the

same

aright,

every

it

all. ...

as seeing.

taint

of the body, that

mortal things.

And

is,

this, faith

when

is

it

remote and purged from desire of

alone can give in the

Augustine characterizes the natural (unilluminated)

state

first

of the

“healing." According to Augustine, only once the eye of the
are capable of understanding. This healing

is

by

place

35
.

intellect as

needing

mind has been

accomplished by joining with

is

we

healed,

God - that

faith:

Reason

who

is

the

power of the

soul to look, but

looks, sees. Right and perfect looking

virtue.

For virtue

is

right

it

does not follow that every one

which leads

to vision is called

and perfect reason. But even looking cannot turn eyes

already healed to the light unless these three things are present: faith that
believes that the object to which our looking ought to be directed can,
seen,

make

us blessed; hope which

is

when

assured that vision will follow right

looking; love which longs to see and to enjoy.

Once one has healed
in principle,

the eye of the mind, and

capable of looking and seeing, there

no reason why God could not reveal any

Thus, for example, the
illuminated by

that,

is

finite duration

God when

truth about

any created

is,

thing.

of the world could be proven, were one properly

constructing the demonstration.

A

second consequence

though the Five Ways could perhaps serve as demonstrative grounds for

is

beliefs in

divine matters, according to Aquinas (but not, however, as grounds for faith), they

cannot serve as grounds according to the Augustinian account - for the
faith

would presumably be too damaged and unilluminated

intellect

so that scientia about God's

existence would be impossible under these circumstances. Finally, faith

of the

intellect

according to Aquinas, and

operations of the intellect ,

37

is,

in principle,

is

an operation

independent of other

but for the Augustinian account, faith
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without

is

presumably a

precursor to any operation of the agent intellect

- that

any ability to have

is,

understanding or scientia of intelligible species.

The Augustinian/Avicennan account of cognition

then, should be seen as a

serious competitor to Aquinas’s Aristotelian account, one which, if held,

would block

Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason. Aquinas's insertion of faith into
the Aristotelian epistemology of understanding and scientia appears, as
to

have been

fairly well received,

and seems

to

I

have argued,

have had a long-lasting influence.

Aquinas’s account of cognition, particularly the roles of the active and passive

seem

to not

have had such influence. As

Kuksewicz (1982) observe,

the 13

th

I

have discussed above, and Noone (1999) and

century

saw strong challenges

account, both from the Augustinian/Avicennan

camp and from

to

Aquinas’s

Aristotelian

modifications of Aquinas’s account. Philosophers and theologians of the 14
centuries, though concerned with

human

and

of the agent

its

faculties, particularly that

Auriol, Durand,
.

et. al.,

essentially
.

•

.

Thomistic accounts of cognition.

cognition, were less so with the

intellect.

changed the nature of the

T8

to the

chapter 4), but could

between

faith

and reason.

human

th

soul

subject, developing non-

.

problem of faith and reason
still

and 15

.

.

Recall that Aquinas' Scope Strategy relied on his

Aquinas's Aristotelian account of cognition,

of the solution

th

Accounts of Ockham, Peter

account of cognition, but his certitude-based foundationalism does
reject

intellect

we might have

not.

to

Were we

abandon one

to

part

(essentially that part discussed in

maintain, on Aquinas's behalf, an epistemic compatibilism
34
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Philosophical problems with Aquinas’ solution

5.5.2.

In this section,

I

shall consider three philosophical objections to

reconciliation of faith and reason.

By no means

Aquinas's

are these objections exhaustive of the

possible criticisms of Aquinas's account; they are, perhaps, the most immediate.
First objection.

because

it

Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason

does not adequately establish that

faith is epistemically circular.

Thomas seems

fails

faith is epistemically responsible,

This objection

is

to be telling us both that

because

presented by Terence Penelhum;

one cannot believe

believes certain propositions about him, and that

when one

in

God

unless one

believes these

propositions in faith, one accepts them as coming from him. But there

is an
obvious circularity about holding both together. One cannot accept a given
proposition as coming from God unless one believes that God exists and has
spoken; but one cannot (can one?) believe that God exists and has spoken

because these propositions come from God. Surely at some stage one’s assent
has to be based on something less explicitly part of the faith than this, or how
40
could it all begin?

Reply

to the first objection.

In response to the objection that faith

epistemically circular, two solutions are

existence of God

to

is

commonly advanced. The

not held on faith, but by proof

be a successful response

(e.g.,

we have

that the

by the Five Ways) would seem

to the objection. This response

itself is epistemically unjustified; fortunately,

first,

is

acknowledges

that faith

by

demonstration to provide us with

epistemic foundations for belief. Proofs establish and justify the existence of God, and

once

we

believe that

namely, the

articles

argued in chapter

God

exists, then

we

are justified in believing

of faith. This response

4, the

Five

Ways were

what God

to the objection is not Aquinas's,

not intended to justify

faith.

reveals,

and as

Since, as Aquinas

points out, most believers are incapable of understanding proofs for the existence of
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I

God

(at least until late in life),

most Christians

A

is irrational,

a consequence of this response

a result that Aquinas

would

would be

that the faith

certainly not accept.

second response to the objection, made famous by Alvin Plantinga,

that belief in the existence of

Foundationalism presented
counts as properly basic

is

God

is

of

is

to hold

properly basic. Recall the formulation of Classic

earlier in this chapter.

Plantinga rejects

CF

because what

it

too limited.

But many propositions that do not meet these conditions are properly basic for
me. I believe, for example, that I had lunch this noon. I do not believe this
proposition on the basis of other propositions; I take it as basic; it is in the
foundations of my noetic structure. Furthermore, I am entirely rational in so
taking it, even though this proposition is neither self-evident nor evident to the
senses nor incorrigible for

me
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much

Plantinga proceeds by arguing that

same way

in the

‘I

had lunch

this

noon’

is

properly basic, so too, because one might experience God, for that person, ‘God exists'

is

properly basic
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.

Plantinga's claim that

‘God

exists’

can be properly basic

controversial one, and a great deal has been written both in favor and against

leave

it

What

is

to the interested reader to explore the

of particular interest to

me

here

is

contemporary

literature

on the

whether the view that ‘God

is

it,

a

and

I

subject.

exists' is

properly basic can serve as a viable (though controversial) response on behalf of

Aquinas
I

to the charge

of epistemic

circularity.

We turn now to this

argued earlier that Aquinas did not accept CF, but

rather, a

issue.

foundationalism

based on certitude.
(FIF)

S’s belief that

that P.

P

is

epistemically responsible if and only

S has certitude that P

if
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and only

if either:

if

S has certitude

S p-sees that P

( 1 )

reason that P

true (that

is true,

S f-sees

that

P

is

is,

why P

support of P [and P

in

(2)

is

is

is

S understands
true

P:

S sees by natural

and needs no further evidence

properly basic]), or

true (that

is,

S sees by the

light

of faith that P

be believed and S assents to P on this basis - S has

to

,

is

faith that

P), or

P

(3)

believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs that are

is

epistemically responsible and that support P by demonstration.

The analogue

to the Plantingan

faithful believe that

responsible. This

'God

move

move

FIF would be

seems unpromising. To say

exists' is true is to say that the proposition is

but rejected by Aquinas.

the circularity objection

circular.

As

God

To

- to

say that

exists,

which amounts

it

we p-see

that

'God

understood - a position held by Anselm,

f-see this proposition

to believe

that

wzf-see that 'God exists’

to the third condition, to believe

seems incoherent, and
that
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to argue that the Christian

with certitude, and thus such beliefs are epistemically

exists’

at first

for

would seem

'God

exists’

seems

to reintroduce

to be epistemically

on the basis of prior

on the basis of what we p-see amounts

to the first response to the objection,

faith

to proving

one which we have

already rejected. However, for similar reasons as those for which Plantinga rejected

CF, we should perhaps

As
to

reject FIF, at least as

it

is

currently formulated.

discussed in section 2.3.1, Aquinas does seem to leave

room

for allowing

have certitude about propositions concerning contingent matters. And

Ways, Aquinas seems

to

in the

Five

allow that of propositions that are evident to the senses one

also can have certitude. This

would seem

to suggest that FIF
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is

missing a fourth

one

condition, one in which S

P has certitude about contingent or sensible

s belief that

matters. Exactly

how to

since Aquinas

never very clear on exactly

is

provides certitude.

hold that

“I
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formulate this additional condition

noon'

this

adherence and be determined to

one could have

certitude.

certitude about

‘God

is

to

would have firm

seems plausible

it

that

one could have

exists’.

actually

De

is

veritate 14.

God

exists

is

pleasing to

embraced

found

I

this

view

in his reply to

is

hard to determine. The

an objection very similar to

include here the objection and Aquinas's reply.

an object of faith ( credibile ). However,

believe ( credimus ) this because
is

seems plausible

and thus would be a proposition about which

its truth,

best source for Aquinas’s position

something

it

a proposition about which one

Similarly, then,

Whether or not Aquinas

Obj. 9. That

particularly

or to what extent sensible evidence

However, following Plantinga’s reasoning,

had lunch

this first objection in

how

is difficult,

God

it

we do

not

acceptable to God, for no one can think that

is

unless he

first

thinks that there

is

a

God

to

whom

it

judgment by which one thinks that God exists precedes
judgment by which he thinks something is pleasing to God. Nor can the
former cause the latter. But we are led to believe something which we do not
know through that which we believe is pleasing to God. Therefore, that God
exists is believed ( creditum and known ( scitum ).
is

pleasing. Hence, the

the

Ad

9.

Someone can begin

to believe

he held with some hesitation. Thus,

what he did not believe before but which
is possible that, before believing in God,

it

someone might think that God exists, and that it would be pleasing to God to
have him believe that He exists. In this way a man can believe that God exists
because such a belief pleases God, although this is not an article of faith, but
4^
preliminary to the article, since it can be proved by demonstration.

The objection here seems
the

first

to pick out the epistemic circularity that

objection, and offers as a solution the

that in order to avoid the circularity

‘God

first

exists'

response that

must be

we've

we

rejected above

scientifically

response, Aquinas seems to allow that prior to faith one can accept that

some

hesitation

(

identified as

known.

God

In

exists with

existimatio debilis ), and also believe that accepting His existence
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-

would please God. Such a person does not

yet have faith, because

accepted only hesitantly, although presumably
alternatively, could

analogy

come

to

demonstrate that

in order to help explain

This

this

God

person could
exists).

what Aquinas has

in

‘God

come

to

exists’ is

have

faith (or.

John Jenkins offers a useful

mind with

this response.

which a person, George, say, who first has a
suspicion that he has a long-lost relative. Uncle Harry, subsequently comes to
the firm conviction that such an Uncle Harry exists when he receives a letter
is

similar to the case in

from him. George does not, of course, believe Uncle Harry that he exists, but he
does come to the firm conviction that Uncle Harry exists because he has taken
the

we

suggestion

is

that in a similar fashion

God exists because one
46
from God

to a firm conviction that

received a genuine revelation
If

My

communication as genuine.

comes

interpret

Aquinas

way

in this

believes that he has

.

(as

I

am

inclined to do), then Aquinas

seems

provide a response to the objection of epistemic circularity very similar in

We

Plantinga’s.

God

conjecture and hold, as an opinion only, that

God

to

spirit to

Then,

exists.

‘speaks' to us in providing the grace that aids the will in assenting to the articles of

faith,

to

first

one

and

in providing the light

be genuine, and as a

certitude

this

result, the believer

‘communication’

comes

God

something

what

is

to

be believed

that reveals (via the light

by the

that is illuminated

is

of

by experiencing the

God and comes

God's existence with

only opinion

In

sorts

adherence and

of certitude:

first,

truths.

‘God

it

exists’ then, is not

light

of faith one directly experiences

certitude,

where previously there was

47
.

concluding the response to

important difference between

my

this objection,

interpretation of
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is

and thus the charge of epistemic

faith,

circularity is avoided; rather,

to believe in

taken by the believer

necessarily true; second, the certitude that

of faith) these

light

is

to believe with firm

what was previously only opined. Faith produces two

the certitude that

indeed

of faith -

I

would

like to point out

an

Aquinas ottered above and

that ot

Plantinga. Plantinga holds, as

do, that Aquinas believes that

I

for importantly different reasons.

faith

because God’s role

I

interpret

"God

exists’ is basic, but

exists’ as basic for those

His existence to the

in faith reveals

"God

who have

Plantinga, on the

faithful.

other hand, interprets Aquinas as holding that "God exists’ as accompanying
more

mundane

experiences:

The heavens declare
hands: but not by
guilt

may

lead

the glory of

as premises for an argument.

work of his
Awareness of

God; but

not that in this awareness

have the material

me

to

for a quick theistic argument:

take
is

my

I

clearly seeing

my

It is

Plantinga

am

guilt

- simply
I

frequently

way

is

must be a God. ... I don’t
of God, or for the proposition that he
that circumstance - the circumstance of

may

find myself with the belief that

for attributing this

made by Aquinas

“To know

that:

implanted in us by nature

...”
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I

do not think such a view

view
that

to

God

1

exists in a general

and confused

to interpret the innate

referred to in the quoted passage as an innate capacity for

The knowledge, though

want

attributable

(Plantinga quotes this very passage at the outset

God’s existence, and various experiences (watching

capacity, and thus

is

Aquinas depend on the claim

of the chapter for his passage quoted above.) Plantinga seems

capacity.

is

well be right in claiming that these sorts of experiences provide a

The grounds

knowledge of God

God

48

basic belie! in the existence of God; however,

to Aquinas.

I

guilty, so there

rather that in

disapproving or disappointed.

Now

it is

the skies proclaim the

guilt as evidence for the existence

displeased with me.

my

God and

way of serving

is

activated

the heavens, guilt) activate this

by experience,

is

due

to

an implanted

basic.

to resist Plantinga' s interpretation for

two reasons.

places the locus of the certitude of the existence of God in rather

rather than in faith. Faith, as

God’s existence, and

knowing

I

argued above, carries with

this is, in part,

what makes
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it

First,

because

mundane

it

experiences,

awareness (and certitude) of

faith so special.

Although the presence

of God

may

not

seem important

for

unformed

faith, recall that faith

formed by charity

involves a relationship between the believer and God. In order for such
a relationship to
exist,

God must

presents

view

God

that

be present to the believer, and so

to the believer.

we have

innate

actually have this view.

cognoscere and

its

exists

knowledge of God, but

When Aquinas

cognates, a term which,

belief in

that

it

0

God's existence.

will rain, but

my

I

To have

may have

it

will rain

want

relies

I

to suggest that

God

and would not seem

exists,

a confused sense on

some

would be

irrational.

Similarly,

to indicate that to

it

would seem,

when

I

is

I

hold strongly a

were

to

have a

look at a beautiful sunset

further supported

following the one quoted above. In his response to

we have

if

previous

faith, to

then firmly

also be irrational. That cognoscere should be translated as

proposing, rather than as ‘knowledge’,

that

my

lack of meteorological knowledge coupled with

would seem

to justify

particular afternoon

while lacking any demonstration for His existence and also lacking

God would

Aquinas did not

have argued, should not be translated as

general and confused cognition of God's existence

believe in

on Aquinas’s

a general and confused innate cognition that

inattentiveness to indicative signs of rain

belief that

I

to say that faith

speaks of innate ‘knowledge’ he uses

merely to have a sense that

is

makes sense

Second, Plantinga’s interpretation

‘knowledge’ but ‘cognition.'"

God

it

ST

I

am

by Aquinas's response

1.2.1

objection

1,

Aquinas says

a general and confused cognoscere of God’s existence. In his response to

objection 2, in which he rejects Anselm’s ontological argument, Aquinas notes that

some believed God

to be a body.

That Aquinas

first

cognoscere of God's existence, and then observes

would strongly seem

to suggest that

points out that

that

we have

some believed God

a confused

to be a

cognoscere should be translated merely as
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body

‘cognition" and not as 'knowledge'. This interpretation seems
further confirmed by

what Aquinas says

DV

in

14.10:

Our understanding does not have
the sense that

it

should

a natural determination to matters of faith in

know ( cognoscat) them

naturally, but it does in some
sense have a natural ordination to a knowledge cognoscendci of them in so far
(
)
as nature is said to have an ordination to grace by reason of a divine decree. 51

Second objection. Since one cannot
light

of faith or not,

faith

tell

whether one believes according

cannot produce certitude. Here

discussed in section 3.2.1, Aquinas holds that a heretic
article

the argument: as

is

who

according to the light of faith, but according to some personal,

formed according

at least

to the light

some of these

of faith -

at least

heretics

some

still

indistinguishable from mere opinion. But

faith (that

A

is,

whether one

is

if

human

still

tell

believing by faith and believing without faith, and thus faith

to faith not

standard of

think that their beliefs are

heretics

properly believing Christians. Heretics of this sort cannot

is

think of themselves as

the difference

presents

between

phenomenologically

one cannot be sure whether or not one has

a heretic of this sort), then faith cannot provide certitude.

second, related argument can be given in light of my response to the

As Robert Audi

was

refuses to believe even one

of faith loses the habit of faith and believes matters relevant

judging. But presumably

to the

first

objection.

it:

And imagine a cult, say of the Great Oz, who is so conceived that he cannot be
God under another name. Suppose its votaries made similar claims about the
existence of a natural tendency to form basic Ozistic beliefs and they argued that

Hebraic-Christian (and other) influences have prevented widespread realization
of this tendency. They might also maintain that they have Ozian experiences in

which they
...

are directly

How comforting

aware of Oz.

should

it

be to

know

that one's basic religious beliefs

have a

favorable epistemic status if incompatible, even outlandish, religious beliefs, can
also have

it?'
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Nothing,

in principle,

would seem

for themselves a light of faith by

existence of

God

is

to prevent

Ozians (or Muslims,

etc.)

from claiming

which they believe with certitude and by which the

properly basic. But supposing that Ozian beliefs are incompatible

with Christian beliefs,

it

seems

that neither the

Ozians nor the Christians can reasonably

claim that their beliefs have certitude.

Reply

to the

second objection. As was discussed

Aquinas' stringent account of faith would seem
ascribed C hristians do, in

in the objection

above),

tact,

have

faith.

someone who

to

at the

end of section

3.4,

have the consequence that few

For, as Aquinas claims (and as

is

self-

pointed out

disbelieves even one article of faith lacks faith.

Let us accept this consequence of Aquinas's account. 53 Thus, most self-ascribed
Christians do not have faith. Yet, according to the objection,

believe according to the light of faith, and that they have

would
truly

to

reject this last claim,

have

and thus stop the objection

faith accept all articles

Aquinas, anyone

the basis of his

own

who
will

many

faith.

I

think that they

still

think that Aquinas

in its tracks here.

of faith according to the

light

of

faith,

Those who

but according

disbelieves an article of faith must be deciding for himself, on

and judgment, what

to accept

and what not

to

accept/

4

When

these sorts of believers think that they believe according to the light of faith, they are

simply wrong. Their error does not suggest that believing according

and judgment cannot be distinguished from believing according
rather,

it

shows

that

some may claim

to believe

by the

out of ignorance. Consider the following analogy.
introductory philosophy

in the

sky

is infinite is

come

to

light

Some

mind) make claims such

knowable a priori.' That some
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to one’s

to the light

own

of

will

faith;

of faith either facetiously or

people (undergraduates

as,

‘That the

number

in

of stars

falsely claim that propositions

are a priori does not

show

that

one cannot,

priori and a posteriori claims. Rather,

erroneous claims do not
ascribed Christians

to the grace

they're

who

know what
disbelieve

of God and the

light

lack faith

is

merely shows

that those

between a

who make

they are talking about. Similarly, those

some

article

of faith, don't

making empty claims about
Another analogy

it

in principle, tell the difference

of faith yet claim

know what

the

self-

to believe according

they’re talking about

-

their belief formation.

to help explain

how those who

considered by Aquinas in the

Summa

disbelieve one article of faith

when he

theologiae,

considers the

following objection:

Furthermore, just as

obeys

in

man obeys God

following the

in believing the articles

commandments of the

some commandments and not to
some articles and not others 55

law. But a

of

faith,

man can

others. Therefore he can

have

so also he

be obedient to

faith

concerning

.

In his response to this objection,

the

commandments does

motive to obey

God

really being driven

Aquinas observes

not really obey God.

completely.

that

someone who does not obey

To obey God

One who obeys some

but not

by various proximate motives which

obey. Just as selective obedience to
belief in articles of faith

God

is

select

to be driven

commandments

is

which commandments

to

all

it

is

is

what

is

the

that motivates a person to

disbelieve an article of faith, and thus embrace error, also might

realization that this

by the

not really obedience, similarly, selective

not really faith. Whatever

is

is

all

occurring - and this

is

why

mask

such people

that person's self-

still

think that

they believe according to the light of faith.

As
Christians,

to a light

for Ozians, or

I

Muslims or other

think that Aquinas

of faith. Here,

I

religious groups in competition with

would deny

that such groups appeal to belief according

think, Aquinas's claim
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is

meant

to

be factual - Christians

believe according to the light ot faith; Muslims don

Aquinas contrasts the way

in

t.

which Christians and Muslims come

as the greatest miracle of Christianity the fact that vast

and learned, have flocked

coming

In Stunmci contra gentiles ,

He

sees

numbers of people, both simple

to the Christian faith despite adversity

to believe truths that

to believe.

exceed reason, and belief that

is

and persecution, and

neither coerced nor

enticed by the promise of pleasure. In other words, the Christians believe by faith and

through God. For Muslims, on the other hand, the motives for belief are different;

On

who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines
way that is opposite to this. The point is clear in the case of
Mohammed. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the
the other hand, those

proceeded

in a

concupiscence of the flesh goads

were

in

is

forced others to

that

His teaching also contained precepts that

conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure.

In all this, as

Whether or not

us.

not unexpected, he

become

was obeyed by

his followers

...

Mohammed

by the violence of his arms /

his assertions about Islam are correct,

Muslims believe on

carnal men.

6

Aquinas clearly seems

to believe

the basis of motives that are not those corresponding to his

account of faith. Muslims (and presumably, members of all other religious groups) do
not have faith and do not believe by the light of faith - should they claim to do so, they,
SI

like the heretics discussed above, claim falsely.'

Third objection. Aquinas' solution to the problem of faith and reason

because

it

relies

fails

on an inaccurate epistemology, as presented by Kenneth Konyndyk;

One of the more

serious objections to Aquinas' solution to the problem ot

between faith and science is its reliance on an unacceptable
epistemology and an antiquated view of the sciences. Aquinas links a certain
deductive structure of science, proceeding as it were axiomatically from

conflicts

postulates and

first

principles (axioms?), with an epistemology of science or

theory of justification. Thus

we

we know

scientifically

and

fully justifiably

because

see the links between the claim under consideration and the
some claims that one would have thought were per se nota and candidates for
first

axioms or postulates have been shown
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principles.

to lead to notorious logical paradoxes.

...

In short,

appears that

it will not work to try to get an axiomatic
structuring of
science to coincide with the sort of theory of justification that Aquinas wants.
it

Because Thomas’s arguments for compatibility are based on this structure,
rejection of the structure means that certain key premises in his arguments must
8
be rejected/
Reply to the

third objection. Anachronistic objections such as this are, in

sense, unfair to Aquinas. Aquinas's project

faith

was

with the standards of philosophical reason

were exemplified by

Aristotle.

some

to provide a solution that reconciled

at the

In this dissertation,

I

time in which he wrote, which

have

tried to present

Aquinas’

solution to the reconciliation of Christian faith with Aristotelian reason, and have

suggested in section 5.5.1 above that his solution was prima facie well-received
its

main elements seem

still

have been

to

In this context, Aquinas’ solution

However, we might

also

wish

is

in place at least as late as

observes.

purchase

On the

it

Galileo wrote.

impervious to objections of the sort given above.

to evaluate the

adequacy of Aquinas’ solution

current climate of tension between faith and reason.

clearly fails, relying as

when

in that

By

this standard,

in the

Aquinas’ solution

does on an outdated epistemology, as Konyndyk rightly

some

other hand, the main thrust of Aquinas’ solution might yet find

in the current debate.

faith is often taken to

In

contemporary discussions of religious epistemology,

be un- or under-evidenced

involve beliefs with sufficient evidence.
epistemically irresponsible since

it

By such an

whereas science

fundamentally for Aquinas,

something

Contemporary science has given up on

taken to

However, we can jettison

adopt Aquinas's account of

still

is

account, faith clearly seems to be

lacks sufficient evidence.

Aristotelian epistemology and

is

belief,

faith.

Faith,

that has certitude without evidence.

certitude

—

beliefs of science are

with scientia but inductively and contingently. Aquinas's

faith, in

no longer held

comparison,

is

,

stronger and

more

reliable epistemic state than
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contemporary

scientific belief, so

it

a far

would seem

we

that

could

still

argue for epistemic compatibilism between faith and

contemporary science, particularly

it

we

adopt some version ot the Scope Strategy that

limits the scope of what science can discern, such as that suggested by

Keller (see endnote 14 in chapter

1).

5.6.

In this dissertation,

how Aquinas

I

Concluding remarks

have attempted

to provide a detailed

account of precisely

reconciles faith with Aristotelian reason. Such an exegetical enterprise

important for several reasons.

First,

Aquinas was the

first to

and

may

is

both historically

and theologians. Further, such a

influential to later philosophers

thoroughly developed solution

is

provide a thorough and

systematic reconciliation between faith and reason. His exercise

significant

Evelyn Fox

serve as a useful standard by which contemporary

reconciliations of faith and reason should be developed.

54

Second, as a significant

figure in the history of philosophy, Aquinas deserves to be understood correctly. In

providing a detailed account of Aquinas's views,

number of common

I

have made

my

case for correcting a

much

but erroneous interpretations of Aquinas. Finally, though

been written on Aquinas’s account of faith, his account of reason, of the
world, and of the Five Ways,

my

enterprise

is

the

first that

I

am

has

eternity of the

aware of that

tries to

provide a complete account of Aquinas’s views, bringing together disparate passages by

Aquinas

that are relevant to faith

comprehensible whole.

I

hope

and reason and synthesizing them

that

I

have achieved these goals

dissertation.
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into a unified

in writing this

and

ENDNOTES

Recall from chapter

be epistemically responsible

1

that epistemic compatibilism is the position that

one can
on the

in believing propositions pertaining to the divine

basis both of faith and reason.
2

Though, as we shall see in section 5.5.1, Aquinas's use of an Aristotelian
account of cognition earns him some severe criticism from fellow theologians.
3
I

presume

that

Aquinas never entertained a fourth possible epistemic

state:

one

has perfect apprehension of the truth but lacks certitude. Certitude establishes that a
proposition is true and could not be otherwise (i.e., is necessary), perfect apprehension

of the truth reveals why.

I

something was necessarily

Though

it is

assume that Aquinas thought it obvious that if you knew why
true, you'd automatically know that it was necessarily true.

clear that

Aquinas thinks

that belief ( credere

has certitude (“But

the act of believing has firm adherence to one alternative, in which the believer agrees

with the knower ( sciente ) and the one
to

who

understands.” (ST

what other instances may count as belief other than

particular interest here,

I

shall limit

my

faith.

II-II.2.1),

Given

I

am

not clear as

that faith is

my

discussion to faith in particular, rather than

belief in general.
5

“ad septimum dicendum, quod certitudo duo potest importare:

firmitatem adhaesionis; et quantum

ad hoc

fides est certior etiam

omni

scilicet

intellectu et

prima veritas, quae causat fidei assensum, est fortior causa quam lumen
quae causat assensum intellectus vel scientiae. importat etiam evidentiam eius

scientia, quia
rationis,

non habet certitudinem, sed scientia et
cogitationem non habet." (QDV 14.1 ad 7)

cui assentitur; et sic fides
est

quod
6

intellectus

As Aquinas

points out, those

who have

humans
7

are

“.

.

.

it

are not. See, for instance,

is

necessary for

man

ST

exinde

experienced the beatific vision, angels,

and God are capable of having p-vision of certain divine matters
mortal

intellectus: et

that

we, as ordinary

1.57.3.

way of faith not only the things that
known
by reason. And this for three
can be

to accept in the

above reason, but also the things that
man might come more quickly

reasons. First, so that

to the

apprehension ot divine

truth. The body of knowledge that has the task of proving that God exists and other
such things about God, is proposed to men for learning last, many other sciences being
presupposed. And so man could not come to the apprehension of God during his life

except after a long time. Second, so that the apprehension of God be more common.
Many cannot make progress in the study of knowledge, either because of dullness ot
even
wit; or because of other occupations and the necessities of temporal life; or

because of laziness in learning. All of them would be entirely cheated of the
apprehension of God unless divine things were proposed to them in the manner ot
Third, on account of certainty.

Human

reason
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is

much

deficient in divine things.

faith.

A

sign of this

that the philosophers, investigating

human things naturally, erred in many
things and held opinions contrary to themselves. Divine things had to be handed
down
to them in the manner of faith, as being said by God, who cannot lie, so that
there might
is

be indubitable and certain apprehension of God among men.” (ST
8

This

is

in section 5.5.2
9

chapter

II-II.2.4)

an oversimplification. As I argue in the response to the first objection
below, there is a sense, I think, in which faith is properly basic.

Though

do not believe

I

that this

is

the intended purpose of these proofs. See

4.
10

11

See ST
See

ST

1.2.2.

II-II.2.10

ad

2.

^

1

I

should note that Aquinas does not explicitly argue for epistemic

responsibility or rational justification. Although

the views held by Aquinas, he did not

seem

I

think this account

is

consistent with

particularly concerned with explicitly

developing an account of epistemic justification.
13

See Stump (1991-11) for an interesting survey of views on Aquinas as a
Stump does not believe that Aquinas accepts CF, but it seems that she
would also reject Aquinas as holding FIF. Her positions depends on a substantially
Foundationalist.

different approach
this reason,
14

scientia

I

and interpretation

do not have the room

There seem

is

acquired

to

to

Aquinas’s epistemology than

my own,

and for

views here.

to rebut her

be three sorts of certitude had by derivative means. Perfect

when one demonstrates from

conclusions. Scientia quia on the other hand,
,

propositions intellectually assented

to,

is

propositions understood to

had when one demonstrates from

but not understood (for example, propositions

known to be true because proved by some other scientist or proved in the past, or
propositions evident to the senses, e.g., something is moving). The science of sacred
doctrine involves demonstrations from propositions that dxef-seen to conclusions that
are proven, but not themselves seen.
15

16

Plantinga (2000),

p.

1

56.

“proponit igitur primo, quod omnibus hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest

ad sciendum.
cuius ratio potest esse triplex: primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res naturaliter
appetit perfectionem sui. unde et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut imperfectum
appetit

suam perfectionem. cum

consideratus

sit

in potentia

quo homo est id quod est, in se
actum eorum reducatur nisi per scientiam,

igitur intellectus, a

omnia, nec

in

quia nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de anima:
naturaliter unusquisque desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam.
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sic

secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem inclinationem habet ad suam
propriam
operationem. sicut calidum ad caletaciendum, et grave ut deorsum moveatur.

propria

autem operatio hominis inquantum homo, est intelligere. per hoc enim ab omnibus
differt. unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad
intelligendum, et per
consequens ad sciendum.
tertio,

quia unicuique

enim uniuscuiusque

rei

aliis

desiderabile est, ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc

perfectio consistit.

unde

et

motus

circularis est perfectissimus, ut

probatur octavo physicorum, quia finem coniungit principio. substantiis autem separatis,
quae sunt principia intellects humani, et ad quae intellects humanus se habet ut
imperfectum ad perfectum, non coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum: unde et in hoc
ultima hominis felicitas consistit. et ideo naturaliter homo desiderat scientiam. nee
si aliqui homines scientiae huic studium non impendant; cum frequenter qui
finem aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter

obstat

difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias occupationes. sic etiam licet

scientiam desiderent, non tamen

omnes

omnes homines

scientiae studium impendunt, quia ab aliis

detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam propter

pigritiam vitant laborem addiscendi. hoc autem proponit aristoteles ut ostendat, quod

quaerere scientiam non propter aliud utilem, qualis est haec scientia, non est vanum,
cum naturale desiderium vanum esse non possit.”(M 1. 1.1 -4)
17

See ST

1.77.3

- powers

are ordered to their acts, and acts of active

powers

are

distinguished by their ends; thus powers are essentially distinguished and determined by
their ends.
1

s

autem quod, sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est
... manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod
intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. unde ex seipso nunquam
decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel
aliquo huiusmodi. unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum,
non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in
dormientibus.” (ST 1.94.4)

malum

“manifestum

est

eius, ut dicitur in vi ethic.

19

20

21

See

ST

II-II.4.2.

See

ST

II-II.6.1.

may

be that Aquinas's approach seems to us to be an adequate
reconciliation of faith and reason only if we accept an Aristotelian account of
epistemology and cognition. This issue will be taken up later in the third objection in

However,

it

section 5.5.2 below.
22

Dates from Serene (1982),

p.

498.

23

For a good survey of Medieval views on scientia see Serene ( 1 982). Marrone
(1990) also has a useful survey of views held by theologians in Paris shortly following
,
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Aquinas's death. Adams (1987), chapter 14, provides a particularly detailed
look
views of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Ockham, et. al.
“4

Wallace (1992),

at the

All claims interpreting Galileo which follow are from

p. xiii.

this source.
25

Ibid., p. 95.
26

Ibid., p. 96.
27

Ibid., p. 65.
28

29

For Aquinas’s account of cognition, see

ST

1.84.

See also Kretzmann (1993).

“sed quia aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine

materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur
quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles
actu. nihil
fit

autem reducitur de potentia

in

actum,

in actu per sensibile in actu. oportebat igitur

intellectus,

quae faceret

nisi per

intelligibilia in actu, per

conditionibus materialibus.

et

aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus

ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte
abstractionem specierum a

haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.” (ST

1.79.3)
30

...

.

For variations on and criticisms of Aristotelian cognition, see Kuksewicz

(1982) and Pasnau (1997).
31

Noone

(1999),

p. 68.

T9

“Sed cognitio nostra adeo debilis est quod nullus philosophus potuit perfecte
inuestigare naturam unius musce; unde legitur quod unus philosophus fuit triginta annis
in solitudine ut cognosceret naturam apis.” ( The Sermon-Conferences of St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Apostles Creed 1.4.)
’

,

33

34

35

See ST 1.79.3,1.84.1.
See Quinn (1973),

Augustine, Soliloquies VI, 12.

36

Ibid.,
37

ch. 7.

VI, 13.

and the gratuitous grace of
of understanding and scientia - basically improvements

However, Aquinas acknowledges

God, we can acquire the

gifts

that

our ability to understand and to demonstrate.
38

See Kuksewicz (1982),

p.

628.
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from

faith

in

39 x

t

No

theist solution to the problem of faith and reason
will be fully adequate
an account of faith in which nobody has it. Although
Aquinas avoids the
charge of an ad hoc solution from the side of secular philosophy
by largely employing
the account of reason in vogue among philosophers
at the time, he would still be

that has

vulnerable to criticism from theists, were he guilty of developing
an empty account of
faith merely to show that it was epistemically
compatible with Aristotelian reason.
Criticism of Aquinas s account of faith, at least among Aquinas's
peers and later

Medieval theologians, is hard to pinpoint - in part, perhaps, because few
Medieval
theologians seem to have provided nearly as thorough an account of faith
as did
Aquinas (and thus, there are few points of contrast), and further, because
Aquinas

took

show that his account of faith matched the characterization given in Scripture
Hebrews 11:1, “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things
that appear not.” As far as Aquinas’s account of faith holds that faith
lacks sufficient
pains to

in

evidence (things that appear not), and that faith is the ground for salvation (the
substance of things hoped for), presumably no Medieval theologian would disagree with
him. Further, that Aquinas's account of faith held that it is a result of a free choice of
will, which deserves merit for such faith, while at the same time having certitude:
these
are positions that would be welcomed by the orthodoxy. As to exactly how the
statement in Hebrews is to be explained by an account of faith, Aquinas has done so,
but

it

very difficult to see precisely

is

An

reasons mentioned above).

how this

account was received

(in part for the

interesting research project, but

one far too lengthy for
examine how Aquinas’ specific and detailed account of
faith was actually received. After the Medieval era. and continuing to this day there are
numerous theological interpretations of faith that conflict in some way with the account
given by Aquinas. My training in theology is inadequate, however, to attempt to

this dissertation,

would be

to

provide useful explanations of these various views, to show how they contrast with
Aquinas’s, or to defend Aquinas’s account in light of these latter day competitors. 1

more theologically trained reader to evaluate Aquinas's account herself.
however, that given his position as a Doctor of the Catholic Church, his
enormous influence on the Dominican order, and serving as the inspiration for latterday Thomists, his account of faith would seem not to be too objectionable to many
leave

(I

to the

it

shall note,

Christians.)
40

41

42

basic

is

p. 141.

Plantinga (1983),

p. 60.

Plantinga (1983),

p. 81,

some

Since the
talk

Penelhum (1977),

proposition like ‘God

latter

of the

acknowledges

proposition

latter as

is

is

In

ST

speaking, what

speaking to me’ which entails ‘God

derived from the former,

it

is

is

properly

exists'.

not basic; however,

we

can

being properly basic in most circumstances without running into

trouble.
43

that, strictly

1.2.1.
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Formulating this condition is also difficult tor contemporary religious
epistemology. Audi (1986), p. 148-9, constructively discusses a number
of useful
characteristics that could plausibly be claimed to hold of basic beliefs,
but precise
criteria for properly basic beliefs

Obj.

hoc eo quod

sit

has yet to be successfully defended, to

my

knowledge.

9. praeterea, deum esse, est quoddam credibile. non autem credimus
deo acceptum: quia nullus potest exstimare aliquid esse deo acceptum,

nisi prius existimet esse

deum

qui acceptat; et sic existimatio qua quis existimat

deum

esse, praecedit existimationem

qua quis putat aliquid esse deo acceptum, nec potest ex
ea causari. sed ad credendum ea quae nescimus, ducimur per hoc quod hoc credimus
esse deo acceptum. ergo deum esse, est creditum et scitum.
“ad nonum dicendum, quod aliquis potest incipere credere illud quod prius non
credebat, sed debilius existimabat; unde possibile est quod aliquis antequam credat

deum

esse, exstimaverit

sic aliquis potest credere
sit

deum esse, et hoc esse ei placitum quod credatur eum esse, et
deum esse, eo quod sit placitum deo. quamvis etiam hoc non

articulus; sed antecedens articulum, quia demonstrative probatur.”

(QDV

14.9 ob 9

& ad 9)
46

Jenkins (1997),

p. 199.

47

Although I favor this interpretation of Aquinas (as does Barad [1992], p. 70.
and Pojman [1986], p. 36), there is not much textual evidence to support it. The
quotation from QDV 14.9 seems to support this interpretation, even though Aquinas’s
response to the objection

is

by no means

evidence to either confirm or disconfirm
48

49

Plantinga (2000),

p.

clear;

and there seems

to

little

other

175.

“ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere deum esse

sub quadam

be

this interpretation.

confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum,

inquantum

in aliquo
scilicet

communi,

deus

est

hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter
desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. sed hoc non est simpliciter
cognoscere deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere petrum,
quamvis sit petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo,
existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud." (ST 1.2.1 ad
1). See also SCG III. 38.1 and Aquinas's Inaugural Lecture of 1256 (see Aquinas
(1988)

.

p.

50

51

356).

See chapter

2,

endnote

1

“ad quartum dicendum, quod ad ea quae sunt

determinate

fidei,

intellects quasi ea naturaliter cognoscat; sed

non

naturaliter

quodammodo

naturaliter

ordinatur in ipsa cognoscenda, sicut natura dicitur ordinari ad gratiam ex divina
institutione.”
52

(QDV

14.10 ad 4)

Audi (1986),

p.

164-5.
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53

Whether or not such a

the account
54

is

stringent standard for faith

an issue of theology, and so

See ST

II-II.5.4, also 5.4

“praeterea, sicut

servanda mandata

legis.

ad

ob

5.3

shall not take

it

is

an advantage or failing of

up

here.

1.

homo obedit deo ad credendum articulos fidei, ita etiam ad
homo potest esse obediens circa quaedam mandata et non

sed

circa alia, ergo potest habere fidem circa
II.

I

quosdam

articulos et

non circa

alios ”

(ST

II-

3)
6

vero qui sectas errorum introduxerunt processerunt via contraria: ut patet
qui camalium voluptatum promissis, ad quorum desiderium camalis
concupiscentia instigat, populus illexit. praecepta etiam tradidit promissis conformia,
*’hi

in

mahumeto

voluptati camali habenas relaxans, in quibus in

promptu est a camalibus hominibus
veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter
sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et
falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. signa etiam non adhibuit supernatural iter facta, quibus
solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae
non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit
se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. ei
etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio

obediri.

documenta etiam

crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus
ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit. nulla

etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum
quasi
eius

omnia

legem

veteris et novi testamenti

inspicienti.

ei

testimonium perhibent: quin potius

documenta fabulosa narratione depravat,

unde astuto consilio

libros veteris et novi testamenti suis

sequacibus non reliquit legendos, ne per eos
dictis fidem adhibentes leviter credunt ”

ut patet

falsitatis argueretur. et sic patet

(SCG

quod eius

1.6 n.4)

57

Should some religious group have motivations for their beliefs that more
closely resemble those that Aquinas claims on behalf of Christians, then the second

seems clear, however, that Aquinas holds that the
Christian religion is the only extant one which have motives for belief that are
compatible with having faith. I am not clear whether Aquinas held that believers of
Greek Orthodox Christianity had faith or not, but if so, then presumably the differences
between views held by Greek Orthodox believers and Catholic views were not

objection could be reinstated.

It

differences centering around the articles of faith.
58

Konyndyk (1995), p. 17. In addition to his criticism of the axiomatic structure
of science, Konyndyk criticizes Aquinas for finding no significant epistemic conflict
between faith and opinion, since opinion is based on merely probable reasoning (p. 18).
However, as Konyndyk observes, nearly all contemporary science fits under opinion by
Aquinas’s epistemology, and to say that faith and contemporary science have no real
tension because faith has certitude whereas contemporary science is merely probable
does not seem to dissipate the tension between the two adequately at all.

231

Plantinga (2000)
solution that

I

am

is a good example ot the sort of thorough,
systematic
talking about. Efforts like Plantinga' s, unfortunately,
are few and far

between.
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